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Abstract 
Religious, mystical and spiritual experiences are some of the most important and complex 
experiential qualities of human life. It has always been our greatest endeavour to make sense of 
our reality, and these experiences have permeated our theories, analogies and theologies since 
the beginning. The rise of the modern scientific enterprise has given us access to previously 
unattainable perspectives and insights into just how significantly these experiences influence us 
on a psycho-somatic level. In no other field of study has this investigation seen more prominent 
development than in the neural sciences. Their studies and findings gave us the opportunity to 
engage our experiences critically, but researchers started asking questions regarding the 
experiences’ causal nexus as well – where some even dismissed them as an evolutionary by-
product of brain function. In reaction to this position, a new field of study emerged that 
endeavours to reconcile the scientific study and theology of these experiences, namely, 
neurotheology. Andrew Newberg, a proponent of neurotheology, is currently spearheading an 
attempt to establish neurotheology as a autonomous discipline. However, his perspectives on 
the goals, principles and neurological basis of a neurotheology raise some concern from both the 
scientific and theological communities.  
Thus, it will be the task of this study to critically evaluate Newberg’s neurotheology from different 
interactive perspectives, while focussing on the relevance of its contribution and possible 
relationship with regards to neuroscience and theology. In order to undertake this task it is 
necessary to provide a few frameworks which will be able to accommodate neurotheology, 
neuroscience and theology. An argument will be made for the specific use of a cognitive 
neuroscientific and critical reformed theological model with respect to the unique thrust of this 
study. 
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Opsomming 
Godsdienstige, mistieke en spirituele ervaringe is van die belangrikste en mees komplekse 
ervarings-kwaliteite van die mensdom. Dit was nog altyd ons grootste strewe om sin te maak van 
ons werklikheid. Hierdie ervaringe het van die begin af ons teoretiese, analogiese en teologiese 
refleksies deurspek. Met die opkoms van die moderne wetenskap het ons toegang verkry tot 
voorheen verskuilde perspektiewe en insigte, tot hoe noemenswaardig die  psigosomatiese 
impak van hierdie ervaringe op ons is. In geen ander studieveld het hierdie ondersoek meer 
prominente vooruitgang getoon as in die neurale wetenskappe nie. Hul studies en bevindings het 
ons die geleentheid gegee om krities om te gaan met ons  ervaringe, maar die navorsers het begin 
vra na die kousaliteit hierin betrokke – dit het sommige gelei om die ervarings bloot te ontslaan 
as ’n byproduk van die brein se funksie. In reaksie hiertoe het ’n nuwe veld ontluik wat streef om 
die wetenskaplike studie en die teologie van hierdie ervaringe te versoen, naamlik, 
neuroteologie. Andrew Newberg, ’n voorstander van neuroteologie, is tans besig met ’n poging 
om neuroteologie te bevestig as ’n navorsingsveld uit eie reg. Sy perspektiewe op die 
doelstellings, beginsels en neurale begronding van neuroteologie het egter kommer gewek 
vanuit die wetenskaplike en teologiese gemeenskappe. 
Dit sal dus die taak van hierdie studie wees om Newberg se neuroteologie krities te evalueer 
vanaf verskeie interaktiewe perspektiewe, terwyl daar gefokus word op die relevansie van sy 
bydrae en die moontlike verhouding ten opsigte van neurowetenskap en die teologie. Met die 
blik op hierdie onderneming sal dit nodig wees om ’n aantal raamwerke te voorsien wat in staat 
sal wees om neuroteologie, neurowetenskap en teologie te akkommodeer. ’n Argument sal 
gemaak word vir die spesifieke gebruik van ’n kognitiewe neurowetenskaplike en ’n kritiese 
gereformeerde teologiese model, met betrekking tot die unieke invalshoek van hierdie studie.  
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Chapter 1 – General Introduction to the Study 
1.1. Background and Rationale  
With the abatement of the Cartesian-Newtonian worldview – especially due to the dawn of 
Einstein’s relativity theory and Heisenberg’s quantum uncertainty principle – science gradually 
started asking more and more  elaborate ontological/metaphysical questions (Ward, 2006). The 
search for ultimate answers, ultimately led honest scientists away from a physically deterministic 
view of reality, toward an understanding and appreciation of complexity and higher order 
causality, and even the possibility of a transcendent intelligence or mind underlying our physical 
reality (cf. Ellis and Murphy, 1996). From the side of religion, a correlating inclination took place. 
The search for ultimate answers, led honest believers away from a fideistic/fundamentalist view 
and explanation of reality, with the realization that religion needs a stronger scientific as well as  
contextual grounding to come to its full right. 
Thomas Kuhn, in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), titled this phenomenon 
a “paradigm-shift” (1962:85). 1 A closer look at paradigm-theory elucidates this shift in terms of 
two main concepts and their constituents, i.e. quantitative2- and qualitative3 research (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994:105f). Although qualitative research initially functioned as a post-modern critique 
of the primacy of quantitative research in the early twentieth century, the latter is still considered 
                                            
1Paradigm-shift: change in “a basic belief system based on ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological assumptions” – Guba and Lincoln, 1994:107 
2 Associated with inquiry conducted in what is known as the hard sciences: producing testable predictions, 
performing controlled experiments and relying on quantifiable data and mathematical models. 
3  Associated with inquiry conducted in what is known as the soft sciences: a method of inquiry employed 
in many different academic disciplines, traditionally in the social sciences, but also in market research and 
further contexts. Qualitative researchers aim to gather an in-depth understanding of human behaviour 
and the mechanisms that govern such behaviour. 
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the dominant paradigm for scientific inquiry today. It is also known as the positivist paradigm. 
A very recent addition to paradigm-theory can be considered a synthesis between quantitative 
and qualitative research called mixed method research. “In general, mixed methods research 
represents research that involves collecting, analysing, and interpreting quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or in a series of studies that investigate the same underlying 
phenomenon” (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2009:265). The impetus of this third overarching 
paradigm, is the novelty created by the integration of quantitative and qualitative research – 
therein lies the distinction; it is a paradigm in its own right, and not dependent on the other two.   
It is within this framework that researchers started to contemplate the nature and implications 
of physical and transcendent reality working with, and parallel to each other. One such field of 
research that recently began labouring to breach the quantitative-qualitative dualism, is 
cognitive neuroscience. This field of inquiry encapsulates neuropsychology, neurophysiology, 
neurophilosophy and, recently added to the list – the focus of this study – neurotheology4 (cf. 
Brandt, 2010:305). Addressing the Neurotheological endeavour, Andrew Newberg and the late 
Eugene d’Aquili, among others – both pioneers in their respective fields of radiology and 
psychiatry – constructed a model for neurotheology, which, after the passing of d’Aquili, 
Newberg expanded upon  (d’Aquili and Newberg – The Mystical Mind).  
The claim made by means of this model, is that of an integration between neuroscience and both 
religious and transcendent experience in a single study. It is the hope of this neurotheological 
model – contending, in due course, that all religious, ritual and spiritual (RMS) experience  has its 
basis in the functional interdependency of the mind and brain – that through it, a better 
understanding of these experiences will be facilitated.  
The proposition made by Newberg’s neurotheology, is that the meaning of all RMS experiences 
can be reworked – using neuropsychological and neurophysiological research as platform – into 
                                            
4 Neurotheology: referring to the study of religion – including myth-making, rituals, and the writing of 
theology – from a neuroscientific perspective. 
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an overall theological framework he terms a metatheology, which could ultimately lead to a 
megatheology (d’Aquili and Newberg, 1999:195ff). 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
The problem that this research paper will address, pertains to the proposed integration of science 
and religion – specifically neuroscience and theology – by Andrew Newberg’s model for 
neurotheology (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:4; Newberg, 2010:1). Utilizing this model, Newberg 
constructs a theoretical framework, wherein the distinct principles of both science and theology 
are, for lack of a better word, relativized. By arguing that the human mind is incapable of purely 
objective observations, he concludes that both the scientific and theological enterprises must 
use abstract metaphor to describe reality (d’Aquili et al. 2001:170-171).  
It follows that quantitative measurements and objectivity – the core principles of empirical 
science – can be dropped in such a way that removes any inherent incompatibility science has 
with theology (Gilroy 2005:10). Conversely, with neurotheology’s goal being to construct a meta- 
and megatheology,5 unique a priori  theological assumptions regarding RMS phenomena falls out 
of support, in favour of an a posteriori approach, implicating, to a large extent, religious 
universalism (cf. Brandt, 2010:305-306; Gilroy 2005:11). In other words, the focus is shifted from 
the transcendent to the concrete and measurable. 
Choosing – contrary to the above mentioned invalidation of the distinctive principles of empirical 
science and theology – to acknowledge the integrity of both these enterprises in their own right, 
it would be necessary to explicate their individual fields of inquiry to ascertain the extent to which 
they can engage with Newberg’s Neurotheological model – without having to make a paradigm-
shift or be made subject to a universalistic view of reality (cf. Newberg, 2010:58). 
 
                                            
5 This is done by means of a neuropsychological and neurophysiological explanation of religion, traditional 
and doctrinal a priori theological assumptions. 
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1.3. Research Questions 
In light of the problem statement, the aim of this research will be to answer the following three 
questions as responsibly as possible: 
1. How, and to what extent, does cognitive neuroscience and critical reformed theology 
critique Andrew Newberg’s neurotheological model? 
2. Within which paradigm of inquiry is Andrew Newberg constructing his model for a 
neurotheological integration of science and religion? Is it predominantly quantitative 
(neuroscientifically orientated), qualitative (theologically orientated), or a seamlessly 
integrated mixed-method? 
3. To what extent can neuroscience and reformed theology engage with neurotheology, 
without having to make a paradigm-shift? 
1.4. Contribution and Relevance 
In spite of all the critical reviews and engagement with Newberg’s body of work, a paradigm’s 
approach, has, to my knowledge, only ever been implied but never fully explicated, especially not 
from the perspective of Christian reformed theology. I believe that, by achieving  the goal of this 
study – to lay bare the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of 
neuroscience, reformed theology and neurotheology, as well as some of its esoteric 
characteristics – this research paper would be able to facilitate a framework for proper 
interaction between these three fields of research – as well as other scientific and theological 
enterprises – where the distinct principles of each need not be compromised. 
1.5. Research Methodology and Goals 
This research will be a non-empirical study (Mouton, 2001:57), mainly focussed on a review of 
relevant academic literature in neuroscience, theology, philosophy of religion and science, 
paradigms theory and neurotheology. The study will consist of a detailed analysis and 
disambiguation of concepts such as  neurotheology, cognitive neuroscience, Christian reformed 
theology and paradigm-theory, to map them within a framework that can be used for evaluation 
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and theory construction. 
It is the hope of this researcher that this study will be able to adequately articulate existing 
models for both cognitive neuroscience and reformed Christian Theology within their respective 
research paradigms. This will be done to test Andrew Newberg’s model of neurotheology against 
these two models to ascertain if, and consequently how, integration and interaction is possible. 
The correlate will also be investigated, namely, if the religio-scientific synthesis proposed by 
Newberg’s model is truly drawing upon proper empirical neuroscience, whilst doing justice to the 
religions implicated by his project, or if this synthesis is constructed out of a processed 
neuroscienctific and theological model in order to force the validity of his own neurotheology. 
1.6. Structure of the Study 
Chapter one will facilitate a general introduction to the subject matter as well as a very brief 
outline of the history of science and religion, delineating some of the background of the current 
debate, as well as where neurotheology fits into this scope.  
Following the preliminary introduction to the subject matter, chapter two will be dedicated to 
giving an extensive, but not exhaustive, description of Andrew Newberg’s model for 
neurotheology. Special focus will be placed upon what Newberg describes as the goals for 
neurotheology, what the guiding principles that gave rise to these goals are, and finally, what the 
neurological underpinnings of these principles entail. 
For Newberg (2010:69), the point of departure for his neurotheological model, as well for its 
engagement with neuroscience and theology, is the a priori principle, that everything that can be 
thought of about the world is ultimately an assumption. This, he argues, is because of the brain 
producing a ‘pre-processed’ or ‘second hand’ view of reality. It is this principle that prevents any 
absolute or ultimate understanding of reality, at least, he argues, from a scientific perspective. 
His proposition for a way around this epistemological problem is exactly the experiential 
approach that his neurotheology facilitates, and therefore his commitment to the 
complementarity of neuroscience and theology within a neurotheological model.  
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Chapter three will be dedicated to delineating Andrej Jeftić’s fourfold perspective on the different 
utilizations of, and engagement with neurotheology, namely, reductionist, religionist, apologetic 
and integrationist. A case will then be made as to where Newberg’s project fits in. This will be the 
first of three frameworks within which Newberg’s neurotheology will be placed, in order to relate 
it to neuroscience and theology trough a number of different fronts. The positive and negative 
reception of Newberg’s neurotheology by the implicated communities will also be discussed in 
this chapter. 
Here are some preliminary positive and negative engagement as a means of establishing a 
general perspective with regards to the rest of the study. Brandt (2010) examines the 
opportunities and challenges that neurotheology holds for religion and theology. His main 
arguments are, on the one hand, that the neuroscientific research into the functioning and the 
nature of the brain, seems to threaten traditional religious and theological assumptions, 
especially with regards to the soul and religious experience. On the other hand it provides 
previously unparalleled resources for the study of religion and theology, providing both scientific 
support for theological claims or resources for their development. It is Gilroy’s (2005) contention 
that Newberg’s work has enhanced the study of human spirituality, especially concerning ritual, 
myth, morality, mysticism and theology, by showing how these elements have been shaped by 
neurological and evolutionary factors. However, he proposes that a systematic inspection of 
Newberg’s position suggests that his neuropsychology and neurotheology rely heavily on 
traditional philosophical underpinnings, which, to Gilroy’s mind, are neither scientifically, nor 
theoretically adequate. He goes on to show how Newberg’s mind/body position, as a hybrid of 
dual aspect and epiphenomenalist theories, fails to do justice to human freedom, individuality 
and mentality. Furthermore, he argues, Newberg’s epistemology, which Gilroy coins a 
neurological Kantianism, does the same with objects, subjects, causality and time.6    
Chapter four will give a general introduction to paradigm-theory and the most basic paradigms 
of inquiry, with regards to each of their distinctive ontologies, epistemologies and 
                                            
6 The technical terms will be disambiguated in chapter three. 
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methodologies. The difference between quantitative and qualitative research, in this respect, will 
also be explicated and discussed and brought into conversation with the mixed-method paradigm 
of inquiry. A case will then be made as to where Newberg’s neurotheology fits into the spectrum. 
With this information, yet another point of reference is established from where to view the 
(possible) relationship between neurotheology, science and theology. 
The rationale of this undertaking can be explained with reference to a few important authors. 
Kuhn (1962) contends that all scientific inquiry is conducted in certain paradigms that direct and 
inform the inquirer in terms of a certain view of reality (ontology), relationship to reality 
(epistemology) and methodology to acquire knowledge about reality. Paradigms can make shifts 
concerning these three fundamental positions when it becomes inadequate to explain certain 
phenomena. Barbour (1974) explains how models are constructed within certain paradigms, that 
give rise to theory, which can be tested against observation. It is when this ground level theory 
reveals too many anomalies in the assumptions of a given model or paradigm, that these shifts 
can occur. This view of scientific inquiry stands opposed to one of an endless linear accumulation 
of knowledge. 
Guba (1990) and Guba & Lincoln (1994), delineates four fundamental paradigms of inquiry: 
positivism and postpositivism, critical theory and constructivism. Positivism and postpositivism 
are sided with quantitative research, while critical theory and constructivism are sided with 
qualitative theory. It seemed, for a long time, that this quantitative-qualitative dualism couldn’t 
be breached, until a mixed method was proposed. Sale (et al. 2002) discusses this mixing of 
methods and concludes that it cannot be used for cross-validation or triangulation purposes, 
because the paradigms within which the different methods are conducted have a different view 
of reality and therefore a different view of the implicated phenomena. It is their recommendation 
that mixed method research be conducted for complementary purposes only. 
Neurotheology, combining neuroscientific (quantitative) and theological (qualitative) research, 
could thus be considered as a mixed method research model and should be evaluated with 
regards to how well it operates within its own paradigmatic parameters, regarding its 
constituents. 
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The next chapter, five, will delineate Ian Barbour’s fourfold view of possible interactions between 
science and religion. This chapter will also see the reformed theological and cognitive 
neuroscientific research fields saddled with a contemporary research model for theory forming. 
Then, together with Newberg’s model, will be placed, respectively, within the framework of 
Barbour’s four interaction models. The neuroscientific and theological models will also be given 
a place within the previous two frameworks, with the intention of triangulating an argument for 
the possible interactions between them and Newberg’s neurotheology, from three different 
fronts. 
For a basic orientation and frame of reference for the reader, here are some preliminary 
contouring of the theological and neuroscientific assumptions that will guide the overall 
discussion. Concerning a research model for theology, Van Huyssteen (1989), uses the 
phenomena of language – specifically the metaphorical foundation thereof – and the inherent 
experiential quality of reformed theology, to implicate the imperative of a critical-realist model 
for theory forming in systematic theology. Herein – over and against the positivistic theology he 
accuses Barth of – the continuity of reference between a pre-scientific language of faith, and 
theoretical theological language (dogma and doctrine) can be preserved. This means that the 
scriptural revelation of God is open for continual reinterpretation using responsible 
hermeneutics. He proposes that valid and relevant systematic theological theory forming need 
to adhere to the rational standards of a philosophy of science. He circumscribes a threefold 
criteria for a credible systematic theological thought-model: 1) the reality-involved essence of 
theological statements, 2) the critical and problem-solving ability of theological statements, 3) 
and the progressive and creative nature of theological statements. 
Concerning a research model for neuroscience, Kandel et. al (2013), groups neuroscience within 
the scope of the biological sciences. The ultimate challenge for neuroscience, he contends, is to 
understand the biological basis of consciousness and the mental processes by which we perceive, 
act, learn and remember. By means of gene sequencing and the inference of amino acids, it has 
become possible to ascertain the specific function of cells, and produce a framework for all of 
cell biology, including cellular neurobiology. Utilizing this information, neuroscience is 
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endeavouring to achieve a unified scientific approach to the study of behaviour, following from 
the assumption that all behaviour is the result of brain function. This assumption effectively 
implicates consciousness as but a set of operations carried out by the brain. This model of inquiry 
correlates with what Guba (1990) identifies as post-positivistic. It conducts research based on 
observation and creates theory based on deduction and induction – a materialistic and largely 
reductionist model.  
The final chapter will give a summary of everything that has been discussed throughout each 
chapter. This information will the be used in directly answering the three research questions 
posed within chapter one. A short description of what this researcher deems to be the 
limitations, as well as areas of further study, will also be given. 
We shall now move on to a description of Andrew Newberg’s neurotheology. 
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Chapter 2 – A Description of Andrew Newberg’s Model for 
Neurotheology 
2.1. Introduction 
We feel certain...that any specific theological idea may eventually be reducible to 
neuropsychological functions...[but] we do not feel in any way that a neuropsychological analysis 
of theology or mysticism alters their true spiritual and possibly transcendent nature. It merely 
indicates how human beings perceive these phenomena. - (d'Aquili & Newberg, 1999:175-176) 7 
It is difficult to distinguish Andrew Newberg’s use of neuroscience and theology, with respect to 
neurotheology, from that of Eugene d’Aquili, when taking into account the collaborative nature 
of their earlier work. Their two mayor publications, The Mystical Mind (1999) and Why God Won’t 
Go Away (2001), including related articles, could be considered the foundation for both their 
understandings of the scientific and theological constituents which comprises their 
neurotheology. In The Mystical Mind, they conducted their research in cooperation with Buddhist 
monks – during meditation – and French nuns – during prayer. This involved brain scanning (using 
the fMRI8 method) that resulted in a unique neurological image of religious experience, which 
led them to conclude that what they had before them was “the photograph of God” (cf. 
Photograph of God? in d’Aquili et al. 2001) 
                                            
7 Eugene d’Aquili and Charles Laughlin, both pioneers in the field of neurotheology, first published “The 
Biopsychological Determinants of Religious Ritual Behaviour” in Zygon: The Journal of Religion and Science 
in 1975. Their thesis entails that all religious phenomenology arise from neuropsychology, but in a way 
that was much more complex than simple materialistic reduction (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:4) 
8 Functional magnetic resonance imaging uses magnetic fields and computers to generate images of the 
brain. It holds the advantage over other imaging techniques of a high resolution that can be accurate to 
2-3 millimeters, thus it can be used to study parts of the brain that are only a few millimeters across 
(d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:43). 
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Since the passing of d’Aquili, and given Newberg’s recent solo publications: How God Changes 
Your Brain (2009), The Principles of Neurotheology (2010), Words Can Change Your Brain (2012) 
and The Metaphysical Mind (2013), it becomes easier to extrapolate his personal stance 
regarding neurotheology. The most fascinating of these is surely his Principles (2010), wherein 
he postulates the basic principles of any neurotheological endeavour, so as to establish it as an 
autonomous scientific discipline. There has been some negative reception of this work, but has 
also been positively compared in stature, by proponents such as Tiffany Demke, to Whitehead’s 
Process and Reality (Zygon, 2011:763–764) - although, it has yet to be given the amount of 
consideration The Mystical Mind has received. 
2.1.1. Newberg’s Research Model Systematized 
The point of departure for Newberg’s model of neurotheology, as well for its engagement with 
neuroscience and theology, as is depicted in his Principles (2010:69), is the a priori principle, that 
everything that can be thought of about the world is ultimately an assumption (cf. d’Aquili et al. 
1999:170-171). This, he argues, is because of the brain producing a “pre-processed” or “second 
hand” view of reality. It is this ontological principle that prevents any absolute or ultimate 
understanding of reality, at least, he argues, from a scientific perspective. His proposition for a 
way around the epistemological implications brought about by this problem, is exactly the 
experiential approach that his neurotheology facilitates. This approach also accounts for his 
commitment to the complementarity of neuroscience and theology.9 
Furthermore, when it comes to neurotheological methodology, Newberg, by principle of rigor10 
                                            
9 Newberg builds upon Ian Barbour (1990) in this regard, who identifies four types of possible interaction 
between science and religion: (1) conflict, (2) mutual independence, (3) dialogue and (4) integration. 
These will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
10 While maintaining that rigor should be the overarching principle guiding neurotheological research, 
Newberg acknowledges that not all topics of study may be studied by using the same methods, as some 
methods are more commonly used in either traditional scientific or theological studies (Newberg, 
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and validity,  fervently cautions against relying too heavily on scientific or theological biases when 
dealing with issues regarding the neurobiological correlates of spiritual beliefs and experiences 
(Newberg, 2010:145) – he reasons that neurotheology is not beholden to either science or 
theology, therefore, when doing neurotheology, no ontological priority should be given to either 
the material universe or to God. For Newberg, this field of study necessitates that there should 
be a possibility that scholarship might someday show, that either science or religion could be 
devoid of value (2010:45) – he adds, however, that a determination of this magnitude will be 
difficult if not impossible. Herein lies a question regarding the function of neurotheology, should 
this indeed prove possible: What happens to neurotheology when either religion or neuroscience 
falls away? Newberg explains (2010:61f) that, should religion ever be proven to be nothing more 
than a manifestation of the brains’ functions, neurotheology could help to explain why, and 
contribute to modifying or even eliminate religion to accommodate the new information. 
Conversely, if it is unequivocally determined that a God exists, neurotheology would be able to 
assist in developing scientific methodologies that could accommodate such metaphysical 
empiricisms. 
An extension of the methodology mentioned above, that features very prominently in The 
Mystical Mind (1999:195ff) as well, is the potential applicability of neurotheology as a meta- and 
megatheology, following from what Newberg calls a ‘neurotheological hermeneutic.’11 A 
Metatheology describes how and why foundational, creation, and soteriological doctrines are 
established, developed into complex logical systems, and expressed. A Megatheology contains 
content of such a general and universal nature, that it could be adopted by most, if not all, the 
                                            
2010:68).  
11 A neurotheological hermeneutic follows from the philosophical standpoint that Newberg calls 
‘experientialism’ (2010:86-87). This standpoint stems from the belief that all thinking, emotions and ideas 
are tied to human experience. These experiences are inherently implicated by the systemic working of the 
mind and brain and are reminiscent of the Kantian position that the external world can only be known 
through our perceptions and ideas. 
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world’s great religions as a basic element, without any serious violation of their essential beliefs 
(2010:64-65). One reason for the potential of a neurotheological hermeneutic, in this regard, is 
that its basis rests on two universal elements – the human brain, and religion. 
With the above in mind, and in want of a simple framework within which to place Newberg’s 
neurotheology, this researcher endorses Andrej Jeftic’s (2013:266) proposed two-level model for 
a systematized view of Newberg’s research in neurotheology. Jeftic conducts this systemization 
with respect to the practical and theoretical implications of Newberg’s research.  
He divides the research within the practical sphere into two groups, each depending on the 
direction taken: 
- One direction could be defined as going from religion towards neurology. 
This approach starts from religious, spiritual and mystical experiences, in order to observe the 
impact these have on the functioning of the human brain, neural system and the entire individual 
as a psychosomatic entity. 
- The other direction goes from neurology toward theology. 
This approach examines the ways in which religious experience could be induced or enhanced by 
means of stimulation of certain neurological centres 
Jeftic similarly divides the research within the theoretical level into two possible groups: 
- One direction starts from neurology toward theology. 
This, we have already mentioned, Newberg calls a neurotheological hermeneutic. This direction 
aims at showing the correlation between the brain centres and their activity on the one side, and 
the formation of theological (theoretical) concepts on the other. 
- The other direction goes from theology to neurology. 
This research direction seeks to enable theology to contribute to the neural sciences, by 
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developing certain theoretical concepts – such as mind and conscience – or by assisting the 
scientific endeavour in general, in finding answers to questions concerning the natural and 
supernatural world.  
2.1.2. Chapter outline 
We will regard the above is a brief and basic outline of the paradigmatic12 underpinnings of 
Newberg’s neurotheological model, both practical and theoretical. In order to understand how 
he arrived at such a perspective, as well as the implications thereof, it would be necessary to 
explore the three core elements that influences Newberg’s thoughts on neurotheology. The 
remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to further explication of these elements: 
Firstly, Newberg’s formulation of the foundational goals of neurotheology. The question we want 
to answer here is: what does neurotheology want to accomplish, more specifically, what does 
Andrew Newberg want to accomplish with neurotheology?  It is necessary to understand what 
he perceives the goals of neurotheology to be, in order to grasp how he develops and defends 
his model for it.  
Secondly, Newberg’s depiction of the foundational principles, underlying the goals of 
neurotheology. For the purpose of this research, ‘principles’ will be defined as “a fundamental 
truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behaviour or for a 
chain of reasoning” (Merriam-Webster.com, Principle: 2014). By knowing what proponents of 
neurotheology are trying to accomplish through it, it becomes important to inquire as to what 
                                            
12 Guba and Lincoln (1994:107) defines a paradigm as a “set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals 
with ultimates or first principles.” According to Guba (1990:18; cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108), a paradigm 
of inquiry can be characterized by the way its proponents respond to three basic questions regarding: 
Ontology – What is the nature of the knowable/reality?;  Epistemology – What is the nature between the 
knower (or inquirer) and the known (or knowable)?; and Methodology – How should the inquirer go about 
finding knowledge? The concept of paradigms, taking into account Newberg’s neurotheology, will be 
developed further in Chapter 4. 
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guides them in this endeavour.  
Thirdly, and explication of the neurophysiological and –psychological substructures Newberg 
uses to construct his principles for neurotheology will be presented. This element of Newberg’s 
neurotheology is especially difficult to distinguish from that of d’Aquili, due to the empirical 
nature thereof, and the fact that this research was first circumscribed in their joint work, The 
Mystical Mind (1999). It is their aim to show that religious- and, in particular, mystical 
experiences, can be understood as a function of certain integrated processing units in the brain 
(Norman & Jeeves, 2010:242). They contend that the generation of such experiences is neither 
an epiphenomena of the functioning brain, nor due to any malfunction in the aforementioned 
processing systems, as certain researchers have proposed.13 
The intention of this researcher, by elucidating these three fundamental elements, and taking 
into account the paradigmatic discussion and evaluation of the next chapter, is to show how an 
operational model of Newberg’s neurotheology could be attained. A model of this kind would 
then be used, comparatively, against the chosen scientific and theological models, to ascertain 
the kind of assumptions Newberg has made regarding the science and theology incorporated 
within his neurotheology.  
2.2. The Foundational Goals of Newberg’s Neurotheology 
Newberg makes a case for the necessity of developing neurotheology, and defending it as an 
autonomous field of research, by highlighting the fact that it may be able to provide answers to 
some very important questions, e.g. (2010:17): 
- Neurotheology should be able to address many important issues pertaining to subjective 
experience, consciousness, the mind and the soul. 
                                            
13 Michael Persinger has ascribed these experiences to certain electrical events in the brain, especially the 
right temporal lobe, he calls ‘Temporal lobe transients’ (TLT’s), which he likened to micro-seizures, more 
commonly known as epilepsy, without  a motor component (Norman & Jeeves, 2010:241). 
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- It might bring new perspectives in the fields of theology and neuroscience. 
- It may enhance certain fields that are contributing to its cross-disciplinary nature, e.g. 
anthropology, sociology, neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience, medicine, genetics, 
physics, philosophy, religious studies and theology.  
- Finally, it could contribute to the integration of neuroscientific and religious or theological 
perspectives, which, in turn, would help to enhance our understanding of the above 
mentioned contributing fields. 
In light of these possibilities and developing neurotheology as a research field, Newberg 
underlines four foundational goals. He stresses that scholarship in this area should be dedicated 
to (2010:17-20): 
- improving our understanding of the human mind and brain  
- improving our understanding of religion and theology  
- improving the human condition, particularly in the context of health and wellbeing 
- improving the human condition, particularly in the context of religion and spirituality. 
These four goals can now be divided into two categories: the first two, Newberg explains, are 
meant to be both esoteric as well as pragmatic, regarding theological and scientific disciplines. 
The latter two goals refer to the importance of the application value of neurotheological findings, 
towards improving the human condition both individually and globally. These goals will now be 
explored in more detail. 
Toward understanding the human mind and brain. 
The field of cognitive neuroscience endeavours to link various aspects of human thought, feeling 
and perception to their biological correlates14. Neurotheology, as a field of collaborative 
                                            
14 Cunningham (2011:226), among others, however voices his concern regarding the localization of certain 
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research, utilizes these techniques and therewith challenges science to develop strong 
methodologies. The techniques used by cognitive neuroscience, have already advanced 
enormously over the past few decades, especially with the dawn of various brain imaging abilities 
and other techniques, to measure15 the state of the brain during a variety of mental tasks and 
perceptions. The further development of these techniques, specifically in the study of religious 
and spiritual phenomena, will, according to Newberg, undoubtedly be the cornerstone for 
neurotheology in the future. 
The methodological impact neurotheology has on cognitive neuroscience, is due to the fact that 
religious, mystical and spiritual (RMS)16 phenomena are especially difficult to evaluate 
scientifically. Problems for any empirically based neurotheological research  include, but are not 
limited to, 1) determining which subjects to study, 2) what should be measured biologically, 
phenomenologically or subjectively, 3) what approach is needed to make  measurements and 
even 4) what measurements to make. To perform such studies in a manner that would yield 
useful results, Newberg stresses the importance of an improved or even reworked methodology 
in cognitive neuroscience, which he hopes will lead to a better overall understanding of the 
human brain. His methodology will be further explicated in chapter four. 
In addition to contributing to the improvement of cognitive neuroscience methods, 
neurotheological research, according to Newberg, also provides new perspectives regarding the 
human mind. A study of one of the most pervasive dimensions of human life, viz religion and 
spirituality, should enhance our understanding of the human person greatly, as it relates to 
                                            
types of behaviour to certain areas of the brain. Chapter 3 will elaborate on this topic. 
15 D’Aquili & Newberg (1999:42-43) provides an outline of the most functional methods of measurement 
as: Electro Encephalography (EEG), Computer Axial Tomography (CAT), Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI) and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT). See section 2.4. 
16 Murphy (1998:143) lists the following kinds of RMS experience: interpretive, revelatory, quasi-sensory, 
numinous, regenerative and mystical. 
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morality, love, honesty and other complex behaviourisms. The reason for these assumptions is, 
that the foundational elements of human cognition – especially pertaining to religiosity and 
spirituality, e.g., causality, teleology and epistemological arguments, are always challenging the 
human mind. Therefore, understanding the relationship between theology, as the product of the 
analysis of religion and spirituality (Newberg 2010:37) and these different elements of human 
cognition, neurotheology may significantly contribute to our understanding of the human brain. 
Toward an understanding of religion and theology. 
The inherent implication of this goal, is that theology has something to gain through its 
interactions with cognitive neuroscience. Newberg defends this notion, based upon what he 
views as the historical foundations of neurotheology. According to Newberg, a rudimentary 
neurotheology was already in practice through various cultural groups. These groups especially 
include the Upanishads. With their holistic understanding of the human person they could 
identify certain physical determinants for psychological health. In the same vein, some medieval 
theologians like Thomas Aquinas proposed that all healthy and rational action proceeds from a 
desire to achieve certain ends, to Paul Tillich defining systematic theology as that which pertains 
to “ultimate concerns” (2010:3ff). In all three these examples we find an understanding of 
physical action and expression, that alludes to something either epiphenomenal, teleological or 
psychological.  
There is a concern, however, from the side of religion, that when using neurotheology to improve 
theology, in actuality theology will be replaced by a reductive, impersonal version of itself, using 
science17. Newberg, however, true to his principled, rigorous research methodology, discourages 
any attempt at such an undertaking.  
                                            
17 Proponents of a scientific reduction of theology and religion, attempts to account for all religious, 
spiritual and mystical phenomena by attributing it to evolutionary psychology (Beauregard & O’Leary, 
2008:208), proposing that we as a species are genetically ‘hardwired’ to adhere to some form of religion. 
This topic will be elaborated further in the next chapter. 
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Toward improving the human condition, through health and wellbeing. 
“Recent research has validated the multidimensional aspects of religious involvement, and 
investigated how religious factors operate through various bio-behavioral and psychosocial 
constructs, to affect health status through proposed mechanisms that link religion and health.” 
(Chatters, 2000:335) 
Flowing from the first goal – understanding the human mind and brain – a better understanding 
of the relationship between religion and the mind should ultimately yield information that will 
have practical application value, especially in the field of medicine and health. Since the 1970’s, 
the term Holistic Medicine/Health became more and more commonplace (Holistic Medicine, 
2013). The general philosophy behind this concept, is that human health need to be approached 
psychosomatically – physical, emotional, mental and spiritual elements are interconnected in 
maintaining health. Newberg (2010:63) stresses the possibility of neurotheology contributing to 
the development of a new integrated paradigm in healthcare and treatment, where all of these 
different elements will be taken into account. The implication of this integration, following 
studies in holistic health, might even include finding that certain spiritual practices, like 
meditation or prayer, may yield improvements in a variety of physical processes, including those 
related to the digestive-, cardiovascular- and immune systems (Newberg 2010:19).  
Research has also been done on the possibility of the corollary, namely, the negative effects of 
religion. Newberg however points out that not much is known about the factors that lead to 
these negative perspectives. Yet, with the gift of hindsight, we have observed religion being used 
to justify hatred, prejudice and aggression. We have experienced religion being used to foster 
guilt and compliance, with the fear of evoking open criticism, being publically ostracized, and 
even put to death for certain transgressions (Williams & Sternthal, 2007:S48). Coping with these 
religious fears, have been proven to affect a person’s health, and can contribute to illness. The 
ability to determine, neurotheologically, why hatred and exclusivity are condoned by religion, 
would certainly have important consequences for global health. 
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Toward improving the human condition through religion and spirituality. 
The final goal propagates the possibility that the religious and spiritual wellbeing of individuals, 
and humanity in general, could be improved by neurotheology. The reason being, that this field 
of study might provide a context wherein the improved understanding of religious and 
theological phenomena may contribute to practical applications, in the ways in which spiritual 
goals are pursued by individuals (Newberg, 2010:20). The optimism of this goal rests on the 
principle at work, namely: whenever there is improved knowledge, especially when offering a 
new perspective, there is opportunity for growth. Religion and theology encourage spiritual 
growth, and thus, it is argued, neurotheology should be supported as any another mechanism by 
which such growth might be achieved.18 
These are the four main goals that drive the neurotheological endeavour. We now move on to 
explore the guiding principles of this undertaking, as the means by which these goals are being 
achieved. 
2.3. The Foundational Principles of Newberg’s Neurotheology 
The major areas of the neurotheological enterprise that Newberg deems necessary to be 
principled are, in the first instance, the area of interaction (playing field) between science and 
religion. When working with his definition of neurotheology, namely, “the activity of studying 
religious and spiritual phenomena in association with a cognitive neuroscientific perspective” 
(Newberg, 2010:51), it becomes imperative to provide guidelines that will insure an intellectual 
environment, where consonance between these two fields is made possible. For illustrative 
purposes, think of a sports field – it is a place where two different teams come together to engage 
in the same activity. The activity in this case being the study of spiritual and religious phenomena, 
                                            
18 Strong criticisms have been made on account of the mechanism by which neurotheology would bring 
about improved spiritual experiences, in order to facilitate spiritual growth. This will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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with the scientific and religious enterprise as the representative teams.  
In the second instance, because of the very different natures of reflection within science and 
religion, an integrated methodology becomes a critically important matter – to extent the above 
mentioned illustration, we ask the question: what set of rules could be applied to both scientific 
and religious methodology to ensure that they may incorporate each other’s perspectives in their 
respective fields? Pertaining to this issue, Newberg suggests that, although it might become 
necessary to sporadically operate within one distinct paradigm of inquiry (e.g. scientific or 
religious) to bring a certain research issue to its conclusion, the results may ultimately have 
implications for the other as well (2010:116). 
These two challenges for neurotheology (interaction & methodology) will now be expounded 
further. 
2.3.1. Levelling the playing field 
Newberg introduces the fundamental principles for the neurotheological area of interaction 
between neuroscience and theology, by commenting and reflecting on Ian Barbour’s (cf. Barbour, 
I.G. 2013) four types of scientific and religious interaction (Newberg, 2010:51ff): 
Conflict 
Implicated by the very term, neurotheology, Newberg explains that a relationship is necessitated, 
rather than an exclusionary approach. However, because of the fundamentally different 
foundations of science (generally a natural foundation) and religion (generally a supernatural 
foundation), neurotheology must acknowledge the potential for conflict between these two 
fields of inquiry. Of course, according to Newberg, religions also have a keen interest in the 
natural world as it pertains to humanity and human endeavour. For that reason, science might 
be perceived as best relating to the immanence of God in the natural world. 
Conversely, since religion is based on the supernatural, it falls outside of the scope of science’s 
paradigmatic approach. However, science might have an ardent interest in the way religions view 
human beings, human behaviour and human involvement in this world – hence the existence of 
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the science of religion or the scientific study of religions disciplines. 
Newberg tasks neurotheology in this regard with understanding the nature of the conflict 
between science and religion, by focusing on the nature of the human mind/brain as the 
mediator of this conflict. A prominent component of the brain’s processing system, that will be 
discussed under section 2.4, is the binary operator, that needs to allow one of two seeming 
opposite concepts to take precedence over the other on a perceptual, cognitive or emotional 
level. Thus, the task of neurotheology would be to understand why the human mind/brain would 
strive to support an oppositional perspective between scientific and religious ideologies. 
Mutual independence 
Stephen Jay Gould, in a 1997 essay for Natural History magazine (1997:16-22), and later in his 
book, Rocks of Ages (1999), proposed what he described as "a blessedly simple and entirely 
conventional resolution to ... the supposed conflict between science and religion" – Non-
Overlapping Magisteria. In some ways, this stance is not unlike the first, although it lacks the 
antagonistic perspective described above. This notion implies that, at their core, science and 
religion are such fundamentally different approaches to reality, that they cannot hope to address 
the same topics.  
Neurotheology, Newberg argues, would, similar to the first approach, have trouble with this kind 
of interaction between science and religion. He propagates that there are many potential areas 
of overlap. Keeping this in mind, he argues, neurotheology should still be driven to evaluate this 
kind of relationship until it is definitively proven that non-overlapping magisteria actually exist, 
whilst remaining open to the possibility of a fully integrated interaction between science and 
religion.  
Dialogue 
Neurotheology has more in common with this third type of scientific and theological interaction; 
the reason for this is already implied in the term ‘neurotheology’. It is at this stage of his argument 
in his Principles that Newberg introduces the next principle for any neurotheological endeavour: 
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dialogue. He argues that, as an academic discipline, neurotheology should strive to nurture 
dialogue between science and religion in order to better understand both perspectives.  
To further expound on this principle, Newberg stresses the need to explore the actual nature of 
the dialogue as well; with such queries including, but not being limited to: 
- Discerning the importance of perceptions, emotions and cognitions within the dialogue, 
how some of these elements prevent certain people from partaking in the dialogue, as 
well as how such barriers could be overcome, while asking if indeed they should be 
overcome. 
- Which religious ideas or beliefs are most favourable or unfavourable to be brought into 
the dialogue?  
- If dialogue implies language, which fundamental language is most appropriate, e.g. 
philosophy, theology, anthropology, science or a hybrid of some kind?  
- How to accommodate scientific research and sacred texts in the dialogue. 
Whilst being fully aware of all types of interaction between science and religion, and even 
embracing these interactions as part of the overall goal of neurotheology, it is the principle 
interaction of integration, for Newberg, which represents the core of the neurotheological 
endeavour. It is this conviction that leads him to elaborate on his next, and very important 
neurotheological principle (2010:54), i.e. that “Neuroscientific and theological perspectives must 
be considered to be comparable contributors to neurotheological investigations.” 
Although some arguments and investigations will undeniably be slanted toward neuroscience or 
theology, Newberg argues that both perspectives should have similar and reciprocal prominence 
in the overall debate. For example, when analysing sacred and religious texts, the emphasis 
would primarily fall toward a theological interpretation thereof, with little assistance from 
neuroscience. On the other hand, when dealing with a study exploring brain changes during a 
particular religious experience, the emphasis would rather be centred around a neuroscientific 
methodology.  
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With this in mind, an ongoing challenge and an area of major neurotheological discordance, 
regarding the scientific and religious interaction prominent therein, Newberg argues, comes from 
trying to determine the direction of the causal arrow (2010:54). To explain this he uses the 
example of a study that utilises an MRI scan on nuns, while they are having the experience of 
being in the presence of God. If, during the study, it is found that there are specific changes in 
brain activity, it could be argued that either the activity in the brain caused these experiences to 
occur, or that the brain spontaneously responded to the experience of the subjects actually being 
in God’s presence. The reality, in fact, is the scan can only point out that there is a link between 
the experience and the brain activity, nothing more. 
Thus, Newberg warns neurotheological scholarship not to give God or the material universe 
causal priority, a priori – weary of the possibility of reverting to theological or scientific 
reductionism (d'Aquili & Newberg, 1999:175) – but rather to consider their causal relationship, 
and determining the causal priority, a posteriori – if, indeed, it ever proves possible to do so. 
2.3.2. The Rules of Engagement 
Having carefully constructed a neurotheological area of interaction – wherein a possible 
integration of neuroscientific and theological contributions could be achieved in the study of 
religious and spiritual phenomena – Newberg suggests a methodology (or ‘rules’ if we keep to 
the initial illustration) that takes into account, four distinct research dimensions.  
- Appropriate measures and definitions of Spirituality and Religiousness 
- Subject selection and comparison groups 
- Study design and biostatistics 
- Theological and epistemological implications 
These four dimensions are specifically aimed at facilitating the desired principle of unbiased 
integration between neuroscience and theology. Newberg strives to achieve this by configuring 
his methodology in such a way as to support both practical and esoteric goals of scientific and 
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theological scholarship, but also petitioning these two fields of research to allow for new 
methods, concepts and conclusions to arise from neurotheological scholarship. Important 
elements of the aforementioned research dimensions will now be expounded upon briefly 
(Newberg 2010:116ff): 
Newberg divides the issue of measurement within Neuroscientific studies into the categories of 
Subjective measures and objective measures. 
Subjective measures. 
This element of the scientific study of religious/spiritual experience is deemed most important. 
The reason being, that if any neurophysical of psychological change takes place during a study, it 
is critical to know the specifics of what the individual partaking in the study actually experienced 
– so as to acquire quantifiable data. The difficulties of this kind of study arise when comparisons 
need to be made, especially when distinguishing between what individuals experience as spiritual 
or religious, as well as how these experiences differ between various cultures and religions.  
To elaborate on this: a certain kind of physiological experience could be shared by, for example, 
a Catholic, Jew, Islamist and Buddhist. The Catholic may describe the experience as a sense of 
connection to Jesus Christ, the Jew may describe it as an apparent connection to God Almighty, 
an Islamist to Allah, and the Buddhist to the Ultimate reality of the Universe. 
In this regard, Newberg stresses the need for appropriate scales to measure and place an 
individual’s spirituality. These scales usually come in the form of questionnaires to extract 
applicable information from the individuals partaking in the study.19 Newberg then proceeds to 
expound upon a number of problems and provisions that need to be taken into account when 
using scales for neurotheological study, relating to the definition of certain concepts and how the 
understanding of these concepts vary across religions and cultures. He concludes that any scale 
must be adequate enough to measure what it claims to measure, be broad enough to include a 
                                            
19 The weaknesses of such a methodological approach will be discussed in chapter three. 
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satisfactory array of spiritualties, but narrow enough to be measurable, utilising unambiguous 
definitions appropriate for the context and the individual it is being used on (Newberg, 
2010:120). 
Objective measures. 
“…mystical experience is biologically, observably, and scientifically real.”- (Newberg et al. 2008) 
A vast assortment of approaches and techniques are currently available for measuring religious 
and spiritual phenomena, by studying the brain objectively. Some approaches directly image 
physiological changes in metabolism, blood flow or neurotransmitter activity – as briefly named 
under 2.2 – others, more indirectly, measure changes in the bloodstream and body. The reason 
for the latter type of measurement being, Newberg asserts, that recent studies have shown 
correlations between certain practices, like meditation and prayer, and changes in blood 
pressure and heart rate (cf. Newberg et al., 2003; Newberg et al., 2006; Peres et al., 2012). 
Sadly, there are a few major problems affronting the ability to interpret data from all functional 
brain imaging studies. The most prominent of which, is how the subjective experience, actually 
relates to what is being measured physiologically (and vice versa). In effect it begs the question 
of the causal relationship between brain processes and the subjective experiences. This brings us 
to the next topic:  
Theological and epistemological implications 
At issue here is that brain scans might be unable to distinguish between the brain creating an 
experience, on the one hand, and the brain responding to an experience, on the other. 
Furthermore, in line with what has been noted at the beginning of this chapter, Newberg posits 
that everything a person perceives are subject to the internal processes of the brain. This 
problematizes differentiating between any external objects, and their representations within the 
brain.  
Two main research paradigms have been designed to address the subjective-objective problem, 
as well as that of causality. The fist, this paper will briefly explain, is pharmacological induction 
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and altering of spiritual phenomena. This study would aim to ascertain whether a 
pharmacological agent could induce some kind of spiritual experience. Alternatively 
measurements taken from previous spiritual experiences would be compared to those conducted 
on subjects given pharmacological agents, to ascertain the level of influence thereof.20 
It is possible to conceive that studies of this kind may have a major impact upon the discussion 
surrounding the causal arrow. They may bend it toward more materialistic and reductionist 
explanations of spiritual and religious experience – however, Newberg stresses that the use of 
psychotropic substances to alter or induce these kind of experiences does not necessarily 
eliminate a spiritual dimension thereof. He appeals to the Shamanic and Native American Indian 
groups that have been using psychotropic compounds for thousands of years to induce spiritual 
states. He argues that the pretext for their use of psychotropic assistance is merely that it opens 
the mind to the spiritual realm. 
The second research paradigm used within this same field of study resides in the examination of 
neuropathologic and psychopathologic spiritual experiences. This study, Newberg explains, deals 
with alterations of religious experiences, brought about by neurological conditions –seizure 
disorders, brain tumours in the temporal lobes and stroke – as well as psychiatric disorders 
known to have been associated with spiritual and religious experiences – such as schizophrenia 
and mania. Newberg delineates that, knowing the kind of pathology and its location within the 
brain, certain neurobiological substrates of spiritual experience can be identified.  
The significance of the study of neuropathologic and psychopathologic spiritual experiences lies 
within the possibility of elucidating the neurobiological systems that undergirds what has come 
to be known as “normal” spiritual experience. In this regard it is Newberg that warns his peers to 
take care in defining and differentiating between what can be called “normal” or “abnormal” 
                                            
20 Two relatively recent studies by Johns Griffiths et. al (2008) and Carhart-Harris et. al (2012), respectively, 
showed that administering psilocybin, a.o., results in powerful experiences that have frequently been 
described in spiritual terms. 
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experiences. The danger, he states, comes when attempting to over-pathologize such 
experiences inappropriately (Newberg 2010:126ff).  
Having briefly described Newberg’s foundational principles and parameters for the interaction 
between neuroscience and religion, we now turn to the neurophysiological and –psychological 
underpinnings that motivates his case for complementary interaction between these two fields 
of study. 
2.4. The Neurophysiological and Neuropsychological underpinnings of Newberg’s 
Model 
“In The Mystical Mind, Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg aim to show that religious 
experience and, in particular, mystical experiences, can be understood as the outcome of the 
integrated functioning of specific processing units in the brain. The generation of such 
experiences is neither the result of malfunctioning in these systems nor is it an epiphenomena of 
brain functioning. Rather, it is a primary function of these systems, working together, to generate 
religious experiences.” - (Norman & Jeeves, 2010:242) 
The model used by Newberg, in collaboration with the late Eugene d’Aquili, to explain mystical 
experiences as they relate to the mind and brain, is based upon the functioning of the following 
neurobiological and -psychological elements: a twofold division of the autonomic nervous system 
(one arousing, the other quiescent), portions of the limbic system (especially the amygdala and 
hippocampus) and the four tertiary association areas of the neocortex (Visual, Orientation, 
Attention and Verbal-Conceptual association areas). Psychologically, Newberg and d’Aquili focus 
on seven different cognitive operators (the holistic, reductionist, causal, abstractive, binary, 
quantitative, and emotional value operators) which are deemed the primary functional 
components of different parts of the brain. Additionally a process of deafferentation can inhibit 
incoming information to certain components of the cognitive system in certain situations, 
prompting these systems to operate according to its own internal logic, bringing about 
interesting experiences.  
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The scope of this study would not permit the researcher to fully describe each of the mind/brain 
components, or the entire scope of the religious implications drawn from studies regarding the 
above mentioned elements and phenomena therein. Suffice it to say, that, as will be shown 
briefly, the driving force behind d’Aquili and Newberg’s neurotheology, are their understanding 
of the functioning of the perceived biological en psychological correlates of religious and spiritual 
experience. A brief description of the most important of the above elements will now be given, 
with some of the religious implications they incite. 
The twofold division of the autonomic nervous system (ANS): 
In their joint publication, The Mystical Mind (1999), Newberg and d’Aquili describes the ANS as 
the most basic part of human cognitive processes (p.23f). This system helps to connect the brain 
to the rest of the body, and assists in generating the most fundamental emotions, such as fear, 
joy and shame. 
The ANS can further be subdivided into two systems (cf. Kandel et al. 2013:337ff; Newberg & 
d’Aquili 2008): the sympathetic/arousal system – which promotes the active ‘fight-or-flight’- 
response21 - and the parasympathetic/quiescence system – more passively promoting 
homeostasis and the conservation of the body’s resources and energy. These two systems usually 
have an inhibitory function toward each other (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:24), preventing 
excessive activity in either system. Studies have shown that under certain circumstances of 
maximal stimulation in one system, a spill-over effect may occur, resulting in an activation 
response (rather than inhibitory) from the opposite system. This is a very rare state that causes 
the two systems to function simultaneously. 
D’Aquili and Newberg propose five basic categories of the arousal/quiescent states that may 
occur during phases of extraordinary consciousness (op. cit., p.25). 
                                            
21 This is a short-range baseline physiological response to either desirable or noxious stimuli in the 
environment (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:23). 
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- The Hyperquiescent State: During this state quiescent activity is exceptionally high, 
bringing about extreme relaxation. Activities commonly associated with this state include 
normal sleep and ‘slow’ ritualistic behaviour such as prayer or chanting – as opposed to 
frenzied or rapid behaviour. 
- The Hyperarousal State: During this state arousal activity is exceptionally high, resulting 
in an extraordinary sense of arousal or excitation. Commonly associated with this state 
are motor activities that tend to be continuous and rhythmic, such as ritualistic dancing 
and long-distance running, or swimming. 
- The Hyperquiescent State with Eruption of the Arousal System: The spill-over function 
takes effect due to extreme quiescent activity, activating the arousal system. Studies have 
shown subjects experiencing this phenomenon to undergo a great sense of bliss, 
accompanied by a feeling of a tremendous release of energy. 
- The Hyperarousal State with Eruption of the Quiescent System (op. cit., p.26): The spill-
over function takes effect in the opposite route as described above, whereby the 
quiescent system becomes active during hyperarousal. A subject may experience an 
orgasmic, rapturous or ecstatic rush, with the spill-over bringing about a trance-like state. 
- Simultaneous Maximal Discharge:  This is the state triggered when both the arousal and 
quiescent systems reach their maximum capacity. “There is evidence that this occurs 
during the state in which there is a complete breakdown of any discrete boundaries 
between objects, a sense of the absence of time, and the elimination of the self-other 
dichotomy” (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:26). This state could be related to such religious 
experiences as unio mystica, Nirvana, or similar unitary states. 
Deafferentation:  
Deafferentation is the process by which incoming afferents (information) into a certain brain 
structure are cut off, or blocked, causing the neurons of the locale in question to start firing on 
their own, based on the internal logic of its evolutionary function (op. cit., p.41f). This process 
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can come about by physical interruption, such as a tumour, or by surgery, or functional 
deafferentation. The latter type occurs when fibres with an inhibitory function block the 
transmission of information between brain structures (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:41-42). 
D’Aquili and Newberg gives an example of the types of experiences that might accompany total, 
or near total deafferentation. When a brain structure like the orientation association area – the 
area that receives input from the sensory areas to create a sense of space and time – would 
become deafferentated, it still works according to its own internal logic and could create a sense 
of no time or space, or infinite time and space. According to them, a great number of the world’s 
mystical literature describes this experience, possibly induced by deafferentation. 
The cognitive operators: 
The cognitive operators are known as the “primary functional components of the mind” (d’Aquili 
& Newberg, 1999:50), which are linked to specific parts of the brain. Certain mathematical 
qualities could be ascribed to these operators, as they function by relating elements to each 
other. A simple example would be to multiply (x) 2 with 4. The operator in this case being the ‘x’ 
and the elements to be related to one another the 2 and 4. Naturally, cognitive operators are far 
more advanced than simple mathematics, with elements being related to one another, for 
example, by sensory perception, emotion and thoughts. It is the complex and integrated 
functioning of the cognitive operators that produce a sense of mind. It is also important to note 
that these operators’ basic functioning and anatomical correlates are basically the same for all 
people – prompting the assumption that this function of the brain must be genetically pre-
programmed into the human genome (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:50f). 
D’Aquili and Newberg (op. cit., 51f) identifies seven primary cognitive operators. They comprise 
of the most basic functions of the mind, by which the mind are allowed to think, order, interpret, 
feel and experience the universe: 
1. The holistic operator – This operator allows us to view reality as a whole, to place any 
given experience within a more global context. With regards to religion, this operator 
might allow us to understand the unity of God, or the oneness of the universe. 
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2. The reductionist operator – This operator can be considered the antithesis of the holistic 
operator, allowing us to analyse the individual pieces that made up a whole. Humans 
probably get their scientific, logical and mathematical capabilities from this operator. The 
interaction of the reductionist and holistic operators are crucially important for our most 
accurate understanding of the universe.  
3. The causal operator – Through this operator, humans view reality in terms of causal 
sequences – prompting us to ask why something is the way it is. This function of the brain 
is also called the causal imperative – driving human beings to search out causes and 
eventually toward formulating first causes, so as to close the causal loop. This is an 
especially important function of thought for disciplines such as science, philosophy and 
religion.  
4. The abstractive operator – Playing a great part in the language function of the brain, the 
abstractive operator forms general concepts from individual facts, e.g., to collectively 
classify Chardonnay, Bordeaux and Sauvignon Blanc as wine. Furthermore this operator 
can formulate a unified abstract concept of two individual facts, such as can be found 
within scientific theories, philosophical assumptions and religious doctrine. 
5. The binary operator – This operator extracts meaning from the world by ordering abstract 
elements into dyads,22 e.g., good and evil, right and wrong, happy and sad, heaven and 
hell. It is often the case that these opposing/contrasting elements need each other to be 
fully understood or defined. By looking at the examples given, it is obvious that the binary 
operator has a central role to play in the creation of myth. 
6. The quantitative operator – The ability to abstract quantity from a variety of elements is 
a function of the quantitative operator. This enables humans to order their surroundings 
based on a numbering system, or the estimation of amount. 
                                            
22 Dyads: something that consists of two opposing elements or parts. 
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7. The emotional value operator – This operator prompts the assignment of certain 
emotional values to various elements of perception and cognition – enabling the ability 
to evaluate and respond to our perceptions. The function of this operator is paramount 
in the development of culture, society and belief systems. Because the emotional 
operator needs to assign emotional value to the responses of all the other operators, it 
truly needs the most complex brain functioning of them all. 
“The cognitive operators represent the way that the mind functions on all input into the brain” 
(d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999:57). These operators originate within the brain, but their function – 
the way they respond to external input – should be understood as the working of the mind. The 
mind and brain cannot be separated from each other. As the brain represents the 
structural/physiological aspects of the mind, the mind represents the functional/psychological 
aspects of the brain. d’Aquili and Newberg termed the phrase “mystical mind” (d’Aquili & 
Newberg, 1999:47) based upon the myriad of complex interactions by the various components 
of mind and brain, which, for them, established the possibility of the brain being genetically 
hardwired to facilitate religious and spiritual experiences. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has charted a basic outline for Newberg’s neurotheological model, which could now 
be scrutinized in the chapters that follow. It has elaborated on Newberg’s ontological view off 
reality – reality is out there, it can be found out. It has also described his epistemology – 
everything that can be thought of about the world is ultimately an assumption; prompting an 
unbiased engagement with reality on these grounds. This brings us to his methodology, utilizing 
the neurological hermeneutic, characterized by the overarching principle of rigor to differentiate 
between the best methods for a specific topic of study, be it more a traditionally scientific or 
theological methodology – this position can be termed pragmatist and will be elaborated on in 
chapter four.  
It is refreshing to witness Newberg’s attempt at following his neurotheological hermeneutic 
where ever it may lead (this researcher’s own termonology) – to be committed to the possibility 
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of a total dismantling or grounding of either theology or neuroscience on the basis of unbiased 
research.  The next chapter will discuss the measure with which his research succeeds or falls 
short on these terms. 
With regards to the goals of Newberg’s model for neurotheology, it seems quite clear that he 
endeavours to establish a framework for understanding RMS experiences and impulses. This is 
done in such a manner that it would benefit and enlighten both, people looking at the model 
from a purely scientific or purely religious viewpoint – elucidating the neurobiological and 
neuropsychological elements for scientists, and interpreting the RMS experience for the 
practitioner with reference to Newberg’s meta- or megatheology. 
By concluding this chapter with a basic outline of Newberg’s neurotheological model, it behoves 
the researcher to place it within the framework of other models to realise Newberg’s unique 
thrust in this regard. Thus, the next chapter will be dedicated to describing the four basic forms 
of engagement with neurotheology and their main proponents, as well as where Newberg’s 
model would feature in this broader framework. A critical engagement with Newberg’s 
neurotheology will also be conducted.  
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Chapter 3 – Engaging Neurotheology 
3.1. Introduction 
“The Astonishing Hypothesis is that ‘you’ – your joys and your sorrows, your 
memories and ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will – are in fact 
no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated 
molecules”- Francis Crick (1994) 
Pierre-Yves Brandt (Brandt et. al., 2010:305), describes Neuroscience as both a challenge and 
opportunity for religion and theology. On the one hand, he explains, it seems that the 
neuroscientific endeavour of researching the nature and functioning of the human brain 
threatens traditional theological and religious notions, specifically regarding the human soul and 
genuine religious experience. 23 On the other hand, it seems as though advancements in 
neuroscience are offering previously unequalled resources for the study of religion and religious 
behaviour, while simultaneously providing valuable scientific support for theological claims and 
furthering their development.  
Much like Jeftic’s ‘directional analogy’ (2013) described in the previous chapter, Brandt et al. 
(2010:305) identifies two fundamental ways in which Neurotheology can be thought off: 24 
- Firstly Neurotheology can be thought of as a branch of Neuroscience, in which the focus 
                                            
23 Jeftic (2013:276) puts it to neurotheology, that to “explain all religious phenomena, both practical and 
theoretical, through the prism of experience” is doing an injustice to the complexity of religious 
phenomena, as well as the views its proponents hold. 
24 Blume (2011:307) cautions us to remain mindful of the numerous different and overlapping 
perspectives toward Neurotheology from the research fields involved. These fields range from paleo-
archaeology through psychology and medical studies, with differing foci ranging from the individual brain 
to social and cultural interactions. Research are also being conducted using diverse vantage points, such 
as the defining of concepts (e.g. ‘religion’),  experiences, or behaviours to name but a few.   
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is on the neuroscientific study of religious phenomena.  
- Secondly Neurotheology can be thought of as a branch of Theology, in which the impetus 
rests upon neurologically informed theological reflection.  
Furthermore, Brandt states, a few distinctions can be made within these main types. A 
neuroscientific approach to religion can be divided into reductionist and religionist schools  
(Brandt et. al., 2010:306; cf. Feit, 2003:22-25). In the same vein, a theological approach to the 
neurosciences can be divided into an apologetic or integrative stance. 
This chapter will be dedicated to exploring these subdivisions, their proponents and the 
subsequent dynamic engagement they have with Neurotheology. The goal is to move on from 
the previous chapter’s description of what Neurotheology is, particularly Andrew Newberg’s 
model thereof, towards delineating the diverse range of interaction between neuroscience and 
Neurotheology, and theology and Neurotheology, placing Newberg’s model somewhere within 
this range. 
3.2. Science and Neurotheology 
3.2.1. Reductionist view 
The principles of neuroscience assume and predict that all experiences are 
generated by brain activity as a consequence of structural patterns. A convergence 
of methodologies and measurements indicate that religious/mystical experiences 
and beliefs associated with them are predictable phenomena (Persinger et al. 2010)  
Brandt et al. (2010:306) describes the reductive neuroscience of religion as aiming “to disprove 
the reality or importance of religion and to replace it with non-mysterious neurological functions 
(or malfunctions), in other words, explaining typical religious and mystical experiences as simple brain functions taking place under 
certain circumstances (Du Toit, 2007:227). One of the most prominent proponents of this specific 
view is Michael Persinger.  
Inherent in his reductive neurological model, as well as those of like-minded scholars, are the 
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basic principle of neural-structuralism (Persinger, 2001:515 & 2010:432)25, which enables the 
researcher to localise certain functions of the mind and brain. 26 The main conviction of neural-
structuralism is that, through an appropriate and thorough study of the brain, neuroscientists 
would be able to predict phenomena associated with certain genes, chemical make-up (Muller, 
2008:3), or areas of the brain (cf. Ramachandran et al. 1997).27 
In terms of religion, the structuralists views ‘God’ as a term simply given to an imaginary external 
cause of certain sentiments and sensations. It is argued that these experiences are no more that 
neurological accidents (cf. Persinger, 1987 & 2001). The domain of the ‘religious’ is consequently 
considered as an evolutionary by-product or neurological epiphenomenon. Generated or 
projected by the brain, the ‘religious’ explains away the causes of certain mental activities, which 
generally perplexes the conscious brain (cf. Brandt et al., 2010:306). 
The mechanism by which these ‘religious’ experiences are born, Persinger argues, are 
‘epileptiform micro-seizures’ focussed in the temporal lobes, specifically the amygdala and 
hippocampus. The seizures are triggered by stress-related chemical states, such as 
hypoglycaemia, hypoxia or fatigue. Furthermore, according to Persinger (2001), these micro-
seizures can have an emotional function – both positive and negative – as it may induce feelings 
of peacefulness and meaningfulness on the one hand, and anxiety and fear on the other.  
                                            
25 This model may also be called ‘materialist’, as it is argued that all mental processes can “ultimately be 
accounted for by a few basic physical laws” (Muller, 2008:3) 
26 In the latter half of the 20th century there has been a considerable amount of researchers proposing the 
existence of a ‘God spot’, ‘God gene’ or ‘God circuit’ in the brain (Graham, 2014). Ramachandran (1998), 
for example, proposed that the brain’s amygdala may by the source of all religious experience. 
27 There has been a sizeable amount of researchers warning against reductionism, imploring the the 
neurosciences to take the whole person in it’s environment and different contexts into account. It is 
argued that such is the nature of complex systems and that the human person embodies ‘ultimate 
biological complexity’ (Du Toit, 2007:276) 
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According to Brandt (2010:306), structuralists, like Persinger, are proponents of an evolutionary 
origin – and thus it had an important survival function (cf. Inzlicht et al., 2009) –  to what they 
deem incorporates ‘religious experiences’.28 Atran (2002, in McNamara, 2006:182) defined 
religion in terms of this perspective as “...a converging by-product of several cognitive and 
emotional mechanisms that evolved under natural selection for mundane adaptive tasks.” In the 
same vein, Boyer and Bergstrom (2008:111) asks the question whether the health and fitness 
benefits of religious practices could further bolster the argument from an evolutionary 
standpoint (cf. Williams & Sternthal, 2007:2001).  
In conclusion, it is clear that the main thrust of the structuralist, or reductionist view of 
neuroscience, is to explain religion by establishing it’s neurological underpinnings – in other 
words, reducing religion to a natural phenomenon (Dennett, 2007). 
One famous experiment conducted in an attempt to validate the claim of the reductionist school 
was Persinger’s ‘God helmet’ (cf. Cooke et al., 2013:3). This helmet used low voltage 
electromagnets to stimulate the temporal lobes, by generating an electrical field rotating 
horizontally. A double-blind study indicated that subjects exposed to these electrical stimulus 
experienced something akin to what they would describe as RMS. The researchers interpreted 
the results as evidence that the temporal lobes may well be the sources of all RMS experiences. 
The reductionist school built upon these studies by attempting to further localise higher brain  
functions such as religion, emotion, language, etc. 
 
 
 
                                            
28 It is argued, for example, that God-experiences during life-threatening events assisted in the 
disappearance of fear and a readiness to die. 
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3.2.2. Religionist view 
Brain-Mind studies can help religious people to understand their religious 
experiences. The Theological emphasis on the human person as an interr elated unity 
will help to obviate reductive and simplistic approaches in the neurology debate (Du 
Toit, 2007:279).  
In contrast to the reductionist view, although still concerned with contouring the neurobiological 
substrates of religious phenomena, is to indicate the the authenticity of religious consciousness 
(Brandt et al., 2010:306) by demonstrating that religious phenomena are accompanied by a 
genuine neural occurrence.  
In practice, this view is premised upon the observations of brain-state changes during RMS 
practices such as meditation and prayer, using SPECT scans. In contrast to the reductionist view, 
proponents of this stance argue, that RMS experiences are irreducible to other neurological 
states. Thus, in a somewhat apologetic fashion, religionists reason that these experiences are not 
the product of “distraught or dysfunctional minds and cannot be explained away as the results 
of epileptiform seizures or psychotic hallucinations” (Brandt et al., 2010:306). 
D’Aquili and Newberg are generally accepted as the main protagonists of this view (Brandt et al., 
2010:306). Although the religionist school propagates an authentic scientific understanding of 
religion, some theology is lost or relativized in the process. The point of departure in this regard, 
is that theology can be described as mostly unscientific and therefore needs to be replaced by 
the new discipline of Neurotheology – scientifically informed theology. Charlene Burns 
(2012:308) gives an appropriate description of this view of Neurotheology as ‘theology without 
theologian.’  
There will be a more thorough engagement with Newberg’s work and Neurotheological nuances 
toward the end of this chapter to better place them on the spectrum of the four different views.  
3.2.3. Conclusion 
At this point it is important to distinguish clearly between the reductionist and religionist view.  
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The most prominent difference, evident in the outline above, is on account of their respective 
assumptions about, metaphysics and anthropology, among others.  
The reductionist school has no regard for any authenticity in RMS experiences, in effect, these 
experiences are irrelevant to their view of reality, except as objects of scrutiny – there are no 
mysterious origin to these experiences. The religionist school, although conservative enough not 
to allocate an external causality to RMS phenomena outright, does consider them to have an 
origin not entirely so non-mysterious as made out by the reductionists. As pertaining to 
anthropology, the religionist approach tends to cultivate a more holistic view of the human 
person as a psycho-somatic being , as opposed to the mechanistic view of the reductionists. 
These assumptions are evident in their respective methodologies, and can be expected to 
exercise a measure of divergent influence on their epistemological and ontological beliefs. 
3.3. Religion and Neurotheology 
As already mentioned, neurotheology is generally understood from two differing viewpoints: as 
a subdiscipline of the neurosciences, or, as in this case, the theological interpretation of 
neuroscientific data. The latter approach can then be subdivided further into another two 
perspectives – apologetic and integrative. 
3.3.1. Apologetic view 
Explaining religious experience in terms of brain functions will not change the way 
people experience God...Religion may be explained along wit h human evolution. It 
may have developed with the growth of human consciousness to help humans make 
sense of life. Even if this is so, it doesn’t falsify the existence of God or abolish 
religion. God might even have chosen it to happen this way (Du Toit, 2 007:295) 
Brandt (et al., 2010:306) describes this approach essentially as using the evidence of 
neuroscience to confirm or justify theological claims. In this regard he refers to James B. 
Ashbrook’s joint publication with Carol Rausch, in which they represented the apologetic view as 
a ‘natural theology of the brain’ (cf. Blume, 2011:306). The central premise of their work is that 
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the brain and its features are structurally modelled after the human mind, as well as our 
knowledge of God (Ashbrook & Albright, 1997)29 – in other words, the human brain is ‘hardwired’ 
to receive and process applicable information in other realms of knowledge (cf. also Muller, 
2008). Based upon this assumption, proponents of the apologetic view, such as Ashbrook and 
Albright, claim that the human brain is able to perceive attributes of God (cf. Winkelman, 
2004:203). 
Natural theology has been gaining a considerable amount of ground among the apologists, not 
only when engaging the neurosciences, but also the whole spectrum of scientific inquiry – 
biology, geology, cosmology, genetics etc. Researchers such as Alister McGrath, Nancy Murphy, 
Arthur Peacocke, Francis Collins, John Polkinghorne and Keith Ward, to name a few, have begun 
to argue that creation – encompassing all of the natural world – cannot be fully understood 
without reference to a (the?) Creator, or Ultimate mind/reality. God works in and through the 
natural world, and thus it would be possible to get to know certain attributes of God’s character 
by studying the natural world – which would include the human brain. 
3.3.2. Integrative view 
...experience (notably, the experience of “the unity of a being”...) is in [sic] the core of religious 
life. This experience, when interpreted by means of modern methods of neural sciences, should 
lead to conceptual change in theology – Andrej Jeftic (2013) 
Brandt (et al., 2010:306) describes the integrative view of neuroscience from a theological 
perspective as an approach wherein neuroscience informs a person’s theology at a 
fundamental30 level – thus the movement is from theology to neuroscience, as opposed to the 
                                            
29 In correlation with this perspective, Ashbrook (1984) makes the following statement: “the mind is the 
significance of the brain and God is the significance of the mind.” For Ashbrook, the mind had a bridging 
function between the brain and God, thus there could be no reductionistic view of the working brain. 
30 Fundamental, in this respect, is used in terms of the core or cardinal tenets upon which a certain view 
is perpetuated. 
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movement in the apologetic view: from science to theology. This opens up the possibility of a 
dynamic reimagining of the theological enterprise. 
Certain traits of this approach can also be perceived in the work of Newberg and d’Aquili. For 
them, a creative tension exists between a necessary agnostic stance on the grounds of their 
profession as neuroscientists – to view religious and mystical phenomena objectively – and 
making bold theological31 claims based on their neuroscientific studies. 
An interesting attribute of this view, in some cases, is an almost utilitarian/pragmatic interaction 
with spirituality – RMS practices become useful devices or methods to be utilized in the service 
of betterment of the human condition – to provide dynamic answers for equally dynamic 
questions.  
In his article Spirituality and the Aging Brain (Newberg, 2011), Newberg indicates that there are 
evidence supporting the significant effects religious and spiritual practices, such as meditation 
and prayer, might have on the brain. Positive effects include improved memory and cognition, 
mood and overall mental health. In the same vein, Newberg  proposes the utilisation of spiritual 
practices for neurodegenerative diseases: “Meditation techniques present an interesting 
potential adjuvant treatment for patients with neurodegenerative diseases and have the 
advantage of being inexpensive, and easy to teach and perform” (Newberg et al., 2014:112). 
3.3.3. Conclusion 
At this point it is again important to distinguish clearly between the apologetic and the integrative 
views.  
The most prominent differences are that of their respective epistemologies – how they relate to 
reality. For the proponents of the apologetic approach orthodox theology stands a priori – from 
the vantage point of theological reflection personal experience is interpreted and the scientific 
                                            
31 A distinction should be made that their claims have theological undertones, and not necessarily 
supernatural ones. 
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study of nature is used to validate theological claims.  
One example of this would be that of nuns in communal prayer. They experience something akin 
to the transcendent presence of God and validates this experience by referring to the Scripture 
of Matthew 18:20 for example, “For where two or three are gathered together in My name, I am 
there in the midst of them.” The fact that neurological studies have shown certain neural 
behaviour accompanying the specific experience the nuns had, does not discredit it for them, but 
rather affirms their belief in an omnipresent Creator. 32 
On the other hand, for the proponents of the integrative approach, it would seem that RMS 
experience stands a priori (cf. Brandt et al., 2010:306). Theological notions do not determine, but 
are rather derived from prior RMS experiences, and then informed by means of neuroscience 
(both in a physiological and psychological sense). In this instance it is expected that new 
neurological insights must bring drastic changes in theology – in other words, neuroscience 
informs and, by implication, reforms theology. The implications of such a view may entail that a 
person’s theology must be fluid, in the sense that it is not rigidly bound to doctrine. 
3.4. Critically engaging and categorising Newberg’s neurotheology 
At this point in the study a clear outline has been given of Newberg’s neurotheological model. An 
adequate framework of different utilizations of neurotheology has also been given, within which 
most neurotheological approaches could be placed with relative ease. From this framework it 
would be possible to extrapolate Newberg’s model’s paradigmatic underpinnings even further. 
                                            
32 The researcher is aware that this matter can be complicated by asking the question of objectivity with 
regards to the theology in question – e.g. can there be a ‘view from nowhere’, even when praying nuns 
look to their Scriptures for guidance, or is the best that can be hoped for some sort of intersubjectivity? 
However, it is not within the scope of this chapter to discus the objective-subjective topic, and the 
researcher would settle, for the sake of the intended outcome, to have four clearly separated categories 
to aid the following engagement with Newberg’s model. 
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It consequently serves the purpose of distinguish his model more clearly as it pertains to 
neuroscience and theology proper.  
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to critically engaging Newberg’s neurotheology 
with the intention of sufficiently categorising it within the framework given above. This will be 
done in order to be able to properly compare his integrated model with a cognitive 
neuroscientific and a reformed theological one in chapter 5. This researcher understands the 
problematic nature of trying to categorise any one model – given the fact that even within a pure 
and seemingly isolated research field, such as the theological or scientific enterprise – there are 
numerous distinctive schools with very specific, and sometimes unique, nuances with regards to 
their field of study. It should be no different when examining Newberg’s model in relation to the 
broader field of neurotheology. 
Blume (2011:307) confirms this by stating that “many ‘neurotheological’ hypotheses are 
marketed by claiming to constitute ‘the’ contemporary understanding of brain science(s).” But, 
he argues, there are no such thing as a single perspective on the human brain – the organ and 
it’s functions are constantly being studied by a number of unique and, quite often, competing 
entities. Blume (2011:307) argues that religion-related claims are “drawn from classic 
neuroanatomy refreshed by brain imaging studies.”  
It is at this juncture that Norman and Jeeves (2009) cautions the neurotheological endeavour to 
actively avoid sliding into a ‘reinvented phrenology’. 33 The big problem Norman and Jeeves 
(2009:243) identify with classical phrenology is that although it was empirical, it was not 
scientific. They give the example of Franz Gall arguing that the localization of certain behavioural 
and psychological phenomena based on measurements of the subject’s head, or skull, if it was 
done post-mortem, may be based on measurement data, but it is not a scientifically credible 
                                            
33 Phrenology can basically be described as the prominent nineteenth-century doctrine that a number of 
mental faculties constituted the functioning of the human mind – in short, phrenology was pre-occupied 
with the localization of mental function in the brain (Norman & Jeeves, 2009:235). 
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exercise to make such bold assertions from the gathered data. They consequently propose that 
modern-day neurotheology might also run the risk of not being scientific, stating that, although 
they do not deny the mass of collected empirical data that relates to measurements in brain 
activity regarding RMS experiences, they question “whether investigations of the relationship 
between brain activity and religious/spiritual activity have been scientific” (2009:243). The 
suspicion that Norman and Jeeves voices in this regard (2009:244), is the concern that empirical 
data is being collected only to support certain hypotheses and not to disprove them – in their 
own words, if “investigations are designed only to collect confirming evidence or if results are 
explained in a post hoc manner.” 
Notwithstanding their ‘empirical-but-not-scientific’ critique and caution for neurotheology, 
Norman and Jeeves (2009:244) do state that they would find it hard to argue for a position where 
an RMS experience, either behavioural, affective or perceptual, could occur without any 
accompanying brain activity. They therefore endorse this area of study, but propose a careful 
consideration of the definitions and modes of measurement used with regards to brain activity 
and its connection to RMS experiences.  
There has been a great amount of debate about the nature of brain activity that would 
accompany RMS experiences. Jeftic (2013:271) states that neurological activity during these 
experiences can be regarded as a truism, but that the same cannot be said with certainty about 
the form of the neurological activity. He references Matthew Ratcliffe who maintains that, “the 
fact that a person undergoing an experience recognizes it as religious...does not mean that it 
represents a particular form of a neurological experience” (in Jeftic, 2013:271) – the example has 
been given of the difficulties in being able to differentiate between experiencing a cat and 
experiencing RMS phenomena.  
Thus Ratcliffe (2006) is of the opinion that, in order for neurotheology to establish itself as an 
autonomous discipline, it must be able to clearly define a unique neurological category of RMS 
experience. 34 He, however, strongly believes that the possibility of such a categorization is 
                                            
34 At this point Cunningham (2011:225) brigs the discussion back to the issue of localizing certain brain 
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impossible, due to the fact that every so-called unique type of experience is only recognized as 
such during the course of interpretation – a further complication is the context-laden nature of- 
and language used to interpret the experiences.  
In light of the above, one question remains for Norman and Jeeves: “It can be argued that 
scientific investigations conducted in the context of neurotheology will, by definition, deal with 
the natural order of things. The question is, to what extent can a naturalistic understanding 
further our understanding of spiritual activity that is conceived as transcendent?” (2009:245).35 
Now on to Newberg’s specific handling of the subject matter. “Newberg’s vision for 
neurotheology is extraordinarily ambitious. Though his initial definition of neurotheology is 
deceptively simple—“the field of study linking the neurosciences with religion and theology” 
(Barrett, 2011:133). For Barrett, Newberg’s vision to establish a meta- and megatheology, 
grounded in the two universal elements of religion and the human brain, initially seems like a 
genuine pursuit of an integrated perspective on religion and science. However, he states that in 
the end, especially looking at Newberg’s Principles of Neurotheology, it is clear that the real drive 
behind his neurotheology is brain science. He extrapolates from Newberg’s writings, that his 
hope lies in the assertion that neuroscience, in tandem with a “rich phenomenology of religious 
experience”, 36 will enable neurotheologians to answer perpetual questions about the nature of 
consciousness and reality, as well as the existence of God (Barrett, 2011:133). 
Although, Barrett states, Newberg is always meticulous in leaving room for the possibility that 
                                            
functions, coupled with unique experiences, in that the experience for which a locus is sought, would need 
to be defined very clearly. He states that “religious experiences, like all other psychological experiences 
which do not take up space and cannot be physically observed, require something else which can be 
observed to represent or “stand in for” them (i.e., an operational definition).” 
35 This allusion to natural theology will be explicated in chapter five. 
36 Persinger and Lavallee (2010:600) stresses the necessity of using appropriate neurophysiological 
methods to capture subjective phenomenological experiences. 
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the religions of the world have already obtained experiential access to ultimate reality. He states 
that it is still Newberg’s belief that neuroscience will play a decisive role in improving the human 
condition and guiding the human race toward a ‘new enlightenment’ as well. It is a further 
contention of Newberg that this can be accomplished by using neuroscience to develop a 
systematic understanding of religious experience (Barrett, 2011:133). 
Barrett (2011:134) goes further by critically engaging Newberg’s principles for neuroscience, as 
well as the epistemological implications they carry. He finds Newberg’s principles to be clear and 
straightforward, but not justified adequately. Barrett particularly brings Newberg’s 
epistemological premises that seem to epitomise neuroscience for a religio-scientific synthesis 
into question. The basis on which he does this is, again, that it is not sufficiently examined or 
justified. This is problematic in that Newberg’s neurotheological hermeneutic, derived from his 
intended epistemology, can, in Barrett’s view (2011:134), be seen as ‘the most distinctive feature 
of his [Newberg’s] methodological approach’. Indeed Barrett (2011:134) goes even further in 
arguing that Newberg’s view of how the brain determines a person’s experience of reality, is not 
just the cornerstone on which he builds his religio-scientific synthesis, but it can be surmised to 
be the fundamental premise of his neurotheological model. 
Barrett bases his argument on the tenth chapter of Newberg’s Principles (2010:249-265) – 
‘Epistemological Issues in Neurotheology’. The central thrust of this chapter is the proposition 
that neuroscience, in tandem with the phenomenology of, what Newberg calls, ‘primary 
epistemic states’, might be able to offer leverage surrounding questions about the ultimate 
nature of reality. Barrett’s critique lies with the irony of such a proposition, that “leverage is 
gained by placing us in an epistemological predicament of seemingly hopeless isolation” 
(2011:134). This comment is made with reference to Newberg’s contention that “we are trapped 
with our brain peering out into the world and reconstructing it the best we can” (p. 252). 
It would would benefit the discussion to linger on Newberg’s account of baseline reality for a 
moment. Gilroy (2005:11) calls into question Newberg’s “unusual blend of dual aspect37 and 
                                            
37 According to Gilroy, Baruch Spinoza put forth the idea of dual-aspect theory, as a way to avoid an 
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epiphenomenalist38 positions on the mind/body problem.” Furthermore he argues that, “while 
abiding by this view, Newberg is not obligated to explain the interaction between a Cartesian 
body and mind. His neurotheological model, however, does sustain a definite distinction 
between brain and mind, and freely builds upon the presumption that brain somehow creates 
mind” (2005:11). Gilroy’s suspicion remains on the grounds of Newberg’s acknowledgement of 
the fact that the “precise nature of the mind-brain relationship remains mysterious...”39 
Barrett concludes his review of Newberg’s Principles by stating that his neurological 
presuppositions are not overly novel among the cognitive sciences. He argues that Newberg falls 
comfortably within the standard epistemological stance that can be viewed as a “kind of 
‘evolutionary Kantianism,’ i.e. a formalist40 and representationalist41 view bolstered by 
evolutionary biology and given specious clarity by the computational metaphor of the brain as 
                                            
explanation of how the interaction between such dissimilar entities as Cartesian minds and bodies would 
occur. His answer to this problem was to opt for an all-encompassing substance within which mental and 
physical entities could reside, as non-interacting attributes of that substance, distinct from each other, 
though still correlated.  
38 Epiphenominon: a secondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by it; specifically :  a 
secondary mental phenomenon that is caused by and accompanies a physical phenomenon but has no 
causal influence itself (Merriam Webster, 2015: Epiphenominon) 
39 Gilroy (2005:12) cites Newberg in this regard as saying: “The inexplicable unity of the biological brain 
and its ethereal phenomenon of mind is the first aspect of what we have defined as the mind’s mystical 
potential.” 
40 Formalism:  the practice or the doctrine of strict adherence to prescribed or external forms (as in religion 
or art) (Merriam Webster, 2015: Formalism) 
41 Representationalism: The doctrine that the immediate object of knowledge is an idea in the mind 
distinct from the external object which is the occasion of perception (Merriam Webster, 2015: 
Representationalism). 
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an information processor” (2011:135). To put it into less laden terms, Newberg argues his case 
for a neurotheological hermeneutic from the contention that the human mind-brain has evolved 
to process and interpret information,42 being subject to socio-culturally conceived ideas as a 
coping mechanism to understand and categorise perceived reality. 
My last comment relates to Newberg’s methodological approach. Ladd and Ladd (2010:220) 
states that, regarding d’Aquili and Newberg’s ground-breaking work, The Mystical Mind, that  
“readers could put down this book mistakenly believing that neuroscience results are clean and 
crisp, with interpretations that border on the self-evident. This is not the case in the mainstream 
of neuroscience, however, let alone in the subfield exploring issues of spirituality.” They cite what 
Nichols and Poline43 noted about the kind of studies that employ fMRI technology. According to 
them these studies are, at best, ‘problematic in that the common multiple-testing approach can 
unintentionally alter interpretations of significance and that methods are vastly under-reported.’ 
(in Ladd & Ladd. op. cit.). From this it would seem that there are a few problems that need 
addressing – the most important of which is that precise operationalization in the realm of RMS 
experience are indeterminately more elusive than what has been shown to be true, even when 
dealing with observable brain structure and functional response. 
3.5. Conclusion 
The obvious shortcoming in all attempts to categorise a spectrum of different views about a 
certain subject – in this case, Neurotheology – is the fact that the subtle nuances and micro-
spectrums within each category are overlooked for the sake of categorical distinction. To give an 
example, some proponents of the reductionist stance might be more inclined toward accepting 
and incorporating certain elements of the religionist view, while others might hold to the core 
                                            
42 Van Huyssteen, in his book Duet or Duel? (1998a), argues that an evolutionary epistemology, from which 
rationality arises, is the key to understanding the universe.  
43 For further reading regarding critical reflection on fMRI usage in neurological studies refer to, Nichols, 
T.E., & Poline, J. 2009. 
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tenets of reductionism with militaristic vigour. However, keeping in mind one of the purposes of 
this study – discovering to what extent Christian reformed theology might interact with 
Newberg’s model – it would prove beneficial to be able to place his neurotheological viewpoint 
within this framework. In order then to sufficiently accomplish this, it is necessary to review the 
discussion.  
It would seem that Newberg’s neurotheology and consequent handling of the neurosciences, 
could be regarded as one amongst a lot of other schools – thus it does not represent the only 
contemporary understanding of the neurosciences, even though he has a quite standard 
epistemology pertaining to his research field. Methodological issues have been noted as well. 
With regards to the inclination of using neurological findings to hypothesise theological 
assertions – positive or negative – Newberg’s neurotheology might run the risk of facing the same 
critique as that of classic phrenology. The main thrust of this critique resting upon the claim that 
such studies may be empirical in the way it collects data, but that the conclusions are sometimes 
far from being scientific. The primary concern in this regard would be the admonition that, 
although it can be said with certainty that brain activity accompanies RMS experiences, it is not 
conclusively possible to isolate any one standard model of brain activity during these 
experiences, due to an immense amount of variables that need to be taken into account – e.g. 
the subject’s socio-historical and cultural background, personal inclination toward RMS 
experiences, the influence of an unnatural/clinical setting within which these experiments and 
studies take place and “especially experiences that in more natural contexts are reported to be 
transient, noetic, and ineffable (i.e., inaccessible for introspection and unavailable for verbal 
reports)” (Cunningham, 2011:226). 
Furthermore, the ‘neurotheological hermeneutic’ is a problem for theology but not necessarily 
for neuroscience. This point has been raised, not only because of the epistemological isolation 
inherent in Newberg’s view of the relation between reality and the cognition thereof, but also 
because the object of subjective ‘transcendent experience’ is largely being discounted in 
neurotheological hypotheses. In other words, the experience itself is isolated and described in 
naturalistic terms without regard for the transcendent object thereof when making predictions. 
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Thus, in Newberg’s work a disregard for theology is immanent in what seems only to be a concern 
for what can be gained by studying RMS experiences – e.g. grounds for a meta- and megatheology 
that would incorporate all RMS experiences and theologies. 
Taking into consideration all that has been said, discussed and elucidated, in the current and 
previous chapter, it still remains a difficult task to place Newberg’s neurotheological approach 
within the framework given at the start of this chapter. It would seem that Newberg alternates 
between a religionist approach and a seemingly integrated approach. While professing no formal 
allegiance to either theology or neuroscience, for his progression toward a meta- and 
megatheology to be credible, most reviewers of his work would feel comfortable in placing him 
away from being a fully fledged integrationist44 – his dependence on the neurosciences in 
experimentation and hypothesising is a primary consideration. On these grounds it would seem 
reasonable to this researcher, to categorize Newberg as a religionist, with a few subtle nuances 
indicating an attempt at integration – in line what Brandt observed (2013:306). 
When looking toward the next chapter, it is necessary to note what has already been done. A 
thorough outline of the foundation of Newberg’s neurotheological model has been given, it has 
been critically engaged both in isolation, as well as within the scope of the broader 
neurotheological endeavour, delineating some of the issues with the epistemology and 
methodology within this field. In the conclusion of this chapter, Newberg’s model has been 
tentatively placed within a certain research neurotheological disposition. Taking into account 
Newberg’s vision of a possible meta- and megatheology being constructed by his 
neurotheological model – and the consequent paradigm shift it may illicit from the fields of 
neuroscience or theology or even both – it is now necessary to establish if any of these two fields 
would be sufficiently implicated by any neurotheological progress, to warrant such a paradigm 
shift. 
                                            
44 This is evident from the critical discussion above, as well as will be from the content of chapters four 
and five. 
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To this end, it will be the purpose of the following chapter to thoroughly establish the paradigm 
of enquiry within which Newberg’s model functions. Once this has been achieved, in relation to 
chapter five’s content, it would be possible to properly describe the parameters of the 
relationship his neurotheology can have with both neuroscience and theology. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
Chapter 4 – Paradigm-theory 
4.1. Introduction 
It is critical to be open to the possibility of developing new methods and new paradigms for 
understanding neuroscience and theology – Newberg (2010:117) 
This chapter will give a brief account of what is meant by ‘paradigm-theory’ as it pertains to the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of research models, theories and 
research fields – with specific reference to Thomas Kuhn’s ground-breaking work The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1962). A basic outline and brief discussion of the four received and 
alternative inquiry paradigms will also be presented, namely: positivism, postpositivism, critical 
theory and constructivism. A description and discussion of qualitative, quantitative and mixed 
method research will follow, also showing how it relates to the four basic paradigms. The final 
part of this chapter will offer an overview of the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions of Newberg’s neurotheological model – also drawing on the critical discussion in the 
previous chapter. Lastly, there will be an evaluation of how this model fits into the qualitative-
mixed method-quantitative continuum. The rationale and significance of this chapter can be 
described as follows:  
As was shown, Newberg’s project is permeated by two primary aspirations:  
1. Becoming a meta- and megatheology – describing all RMS phenomena45 in terms of its 
basic neurological underpinnings and, by extent, informing the world’s religions of their 
inherent neurological tenets.  
2. Eliciting a paradigm shift from either the scientific or theological endeavour,46 or both; 
                                            
45 This includes mythmaking, ritual, liturgy, mysticism, near-death experiences and the experience of 
absolute unitary being, to name a few (d’Aquili & Newberg 1999). 
46 As Newberg (2010:58f) describes it: a paradigm shift in the sciences might occur due to a better 
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either in terms of its correctness, or usefulness in studying and describing reality. 
These two aspirations have the potential to herald important implications for both science and 
theology, should it indeed prove probable that Newberg’s neurotheology is a proper religio-
scientific synthesis. It is the intention of this researcher elucidated this probability on the grounds 
of Newberg’s model’s paradigmatic function – how Newberg does neurotheology – and the 
extent to which it integrates qualitative (traditionally associated with theological research) and 
quantitative (traditionally associated with empirical scientific research) methodologies. 
4.2. Data, Theory, Models and Paradigms 
Paradigms are created by collecting data and constructing theory from it. According to Barbour 
(1997:106f), science has these two basic components (data and theory). He suggest to correlate 
this fact with religion on the basis that ‘data’ could be viewed as religious experience, ritual and 
story and that the beliefs held by religions do have a similar function as that of ‘theory’. 
With this in mind Barbour (1997:107f) elucidates how theories are related to data. He briefly 
elaborates on the classic – bottom-up – inductive method of inquiry.47 This he dismisses on 
account of not being sufficiently able to test any theory derived from induction by means of 
                                            
understanding of the data relating to ‘distant intentionality’/the effects that consciousness has on the 
world. Conversely, a religious paradigm shift might occur in two ways, namely that one religion is proven 
to be the correct one, or that all religions are conclusively proven to be wrong. 
47 Inductive research moves from observation of data, to forming models and analogies depicting certain 
patterns that have been observed and then postulates theories based on these analogies. It claims to 
explain phenomena ‘as is’ and as such leave no room for falsification – an example would be: “all animals 
that I have observed must eat to survive, thus all animals on earth must eat to survive.”In effect this 
method of research quickly leads to the formulation of very abstract and generalized theory (Barbour, 
1997:107) that tend to validate and explain analogy, but not reality (cf. Heit & Rotello, [2010]  and Ketokivi  
& Mantere [2010] for further perspectives on the relation of inductive reasoning to deductive reasoning, 
as well as the challenges involved in inductive reasonging). 
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experimentation. He states that theory should lead us to expect some observations, but not 
others – no single theory is capable of encompassing all possible variables and account for all 
possible outcomes. With this in mind he describes the – top-down – hypothetico-deductive 
method. This method moves from theory to observation. “If a theory or hypothesis is valid, then 
particular observational patterns are expected, though the reasoning process always involves a 
variety of background assumptions, auxiliary hypothesis and rules of correspondence linking 
theoretical and observational terms” (Barbour, 1997:107).   
The initial assumptions of this practice was the fact that data could be described in an objective, 
theory free language of observation and that this fixed, objective data could be used to test 
alternative theories. However, Barbour (1997:108) clearly states that “all data are theory-laden.” 
The influence of theory on research can be observed even in the decision of which phenomena 
to study, as well the choice of variables to be considered significant enough to measure – “the 
form of the questions we ask determines the kind of answers we receive” Barbour (1997:108). 
Of particular importance when evaluating Newberg’s model according to these standards later 
on, is the fact that the object being observed (in the case of neurotheology: it is RMS phenomena)  
may even be altered by the process of observation itself. As was alluded to in the previous 
chapter (please see 3.5), true RMS experiences, especially those of absolute unitary being, are 
not, in general, mechanistically produced on demand. 
Although the scope of this study does not involve a clinical evaluation of the theoretical 
competence of Newberg’s model, it is useful to note Barbour’s (1997:109ff) four criteria for 
assessing the validity of theories created in normal scientific research, as well as truth claims 
associated with them in light of the purpose of this chapter: 
1. Agreement with Data – although being the most prominent criteria, it does not prove a 
theory to be true. It is possible that future theories may also fit the data well or even 
better. Theories, as noted above, hold to the promise of success and can merely be 
underdetermined by data. It can even tolerate anomalies for an indefinite period. The 
prediction of novel phenomena in accordance with the data and what Barbour calls 
“predictive success” (1997:112), does establish notable support for a theory. 
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This view advocates truth on the basis that a proposition needs to correspond to reality. 
Barbour explains that such an approach is typical of classical realism, due to its 
dependence on empirical evidence. The problem, however, is as have been noted above: 
data cannot be obtained without the influence of antecedent theory. 
2. Coherence – a measure of consistency with accepted theories, as well as a conceptual 
interconnectedness with them is important. Scientists place a lot of value on theories that 
are simple and as well as internally coherent. 
This view advocates truth on the basis that a proposition needs to be comprehensive and 
internally coherent. Proponents of this view can be described as rationalists, or 
philosophical idealists, as it seems that this view fits the theoretical side of science. The 
problem with this view is, Barbour states, that no theory can be considered in isolation – 
it needs to be evaluated with reference to a network of theories. Thus, coherence should 
always be considered alongside scope. Barbour’s concern with this view is that, in any 
given domain, there may be a number of internally coherent set of theories. He adds to 
this that reality more often would seem less logical and more paradoxical than the 
rationalists presume (Barbour, 1997:113). 
3. Scope – theories are judged in terms of comprehensiveness or generality. Value is placed 
upon theories that can bring unity to previously disparate fields, that are supported by an 
array of evidence types, or if it is applicable to a wide range of the variables in question 
(Barbour, 1997:113).  
4. Fertility – a theory is not respected for its laurels (or past achievements), rather it is 
respected for its ability and promise to provide guidance for an ongoing research 
program. Barbour (1997:113) asks the question: “is the theory fruitful in encouraging 
further theoretical elaboration, in generating new hypotheses, and in suggesting new 
experiments?” Value is placed upon a scientific community with continuous research 
activity. 
This view advocates that a proposition needs to work in practice (the pragmatic view). 
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Proponents of this view, such as instrumentalists48 and linguistic analysts, are not too 
bothered by questions of truth. For them, the focus of a proper theory should be to solve 
problems. Barbour critiques this view on the basis that, whether an idea is useful or works 
remains unclear, until other criteria can help to further specify its concepts. 
In light of the above, Barbour (1997:110f) professes that his personal conclusion about the 
meaning of truth is, in short, “correspondence with reality.” He clarifies that, because reality will 
always be inaccessible to some extent, al four of the tenets mentioned above must be included 
to provide a sufficient criteria for truth. In terms of operationalizing a model from these 
specifications, Barbour explains it as a form of realism – because the definition of truth is taken 
to be “correspondence” (1997:111) – but that it should also be deemed critical, because of the 
combined criteria in use. Thus, it can be surmised that Barbour opts for a critical realism view of 
reality, when in pursuit of truth. 
In most instances, theory has the need of a concrete model to optimize operational value – “a 
model is a structure that makes all sentences of a theory true” (Frigg et al. 2012). Barbour 
elaborates on this in stating that “…models usually take the form of imagined mechanisms or 
processes postulated in a new domain by analogy with familiar mechanisms or processes” 
(1997:115). According to Frigg et al., models have the capacity to facilitate two fundamentally 
different representational functions: “On the one hand, a model can be a representation of a 
selected part of the world (the ‘target system’). Depending on the nature of the target, such 
models are either models of phenomena or models of data. On the other hand, a model can 
represent a theory in the sense that it interprets the laws and axioms of that theory. These two 
notions are not mutually exclusive as scientific models can be representations in both senses at 
                                            
48 John Dewey and Karl Popper were the two most notable instrumentalists of the twentieth century. They 
both agreed on a functional definition of instrumentalism as Dewey put it: “instrumentalism is an attempt 
to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms, by 
considering primarily how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences” 
(cf. Boydston, 1984). 
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the same time” (2012). 
In this light, Barbour posits three characteristics of models: 
1. Models are analogical – a researcher breaking new ground may postulate entities that 
have both familiar and unfamiliar connotations to existing entities. Barbour gives the 
example of Niels Bohr’s planetary model of the atom and its electrons, in which the 
familiar model of the solar system comes into play – planets orbiting the sun (1997:115). 
Although, unlike the solar system, the electrons’ orbits differ considerably from the 
original model – therein lies the unfamiliar. 
2. Models contribute to the extension of theories – it is often claimed that a model is a 
‘temporarily useful psychological aid’ that holds only until a theory’s equations are 
formulated. Barbour is of the conviction that it is quite often the model, not the theory, 
that suggests its applicability to new phenomena or data. He gives the example of how 
the billiard ball model contributed to both applying the kinetic theory of gases to other 
domains, as well as reconstructing the theory itself (1997:115). 
3. Models are intelligible units – “models provide a mental picture whose unity can be more 
readily understood that that of a set of abstract equations” (1997:116). What strikes 
Barbour about models, is that it can be understood as a whole, summarizing vividly the 
complex relationships inherently present.  
Significant amounts of research are conducted on models, rather than reality itself, because, as 
Swoyer (1991:450) puts it, models allow for “surrogative reasoning.” By studying a model it is 
possible to discover and ascertain features and facts about the system the model incorporates. 
It is in this respect that there has been given a lot of attention toward the cognitive function of 
models. It has even been suggested that models gave rise to a new kind of reasoning called 
‘model based reasoning’ (see Magnani et. al., 1999 and Magnani and Nersessian 2002 for further 
reading on this subject). 
Models and theories operate within paradigms. Egon Guba (1990:17) defines a paradigm in the 
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following manner: “a basic set of beliefs that guide action, whether of the everyday garden 
variety or action taken in connection with a disciplined inquiry.”49 These directing entities are 
called belief on the grounds that there is no way to establish their ultimate truthfulness, how 
ever well it might be argued. In this light, Kuhn posits that without a set of received beliefs, a 
scientific community cannot practice its trade. Beholden to these beliefs, coupled with the 
assumption that, through science, it truly is possible to know that the world is like, normal science 
will suppress any novelties which might undermine its foundations. Kuhn therefore declares that 
the primary objective of research is not necessarily to discover the unknown, but rather "a 
strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by 
professional education" (1962:6).    
Thus, scientific revolutions, as Kuhn describes them, are the result of an anomaly that undermines 
the basic assumptions of a certain scientific practice, to the extent that it necessitates a shift in 
the professional commitments  to these assumptions. In the aftermath of scientific revolutions, 
new assumptions – or ‘paradigms’ – require the re-evaluation of prior facts and the 
reconstruction of prior assumptions. This process is usually very time consuming as well as 
strongly resisted by the established community – as will be the case when such a shift could be 
prompted by neurotheology. The fact of the matter is, as Barbour (1997:108) explains it, 
paradigms are much harder to overthrow than theory or a specific model within a given 
paradigm. It is therefore imperative that clarity should be sought regarding neurotheology’s 
status in this respect – is it merely a model operating within a designated paradigm, or could it 
be considered as a paradigm in itself?  
To explain how paradigms are created in the first place and what they contribute to scientific 
                                            
49 In Guba & Lincoln (1994) he elaborates further on this definition “A paradigm may be viewed as a set 
of basic 
beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview that defines, 
for its holder, the nature of the "world," the individual's place in it, and the range of possible relationships 
to that world and its parts, as, for example, cosmologies and theologies do.” 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
 
inquiry, Kuhn (1962:10ff) explicates what he calls ‘the route to normal science’. Normal science 
"means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that 
some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its 
further practice."50 Paradigms, in this instance, are likened to these achievements, with a few 
recommendations: they must be sufficiently unprecedented in order to attract a group of 
adherents away from contending modes of scientific activity. It must also be sufficiently open-
ended as to leave the new group with a fair amount of novel problems to resolve. Thus, a 
paradigm is a shared commitment to abide by a certain set of rules and standards for scientific 
practice, in order to create avenues of inquiry, formulate questions, select methods with which 
to examine questions, define areas of relevance and establish or create meaning’. Kuhn makes 
the claim that "no natural history can be interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body 
of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and 
criticism" (Kuhn, 1962:38). If a paradigm offers the promise of success, normal science 
endeavours to actualize that promise. 
4.2.1. The Basic Paradigms of Inquiry 
Now that a clear view about the process of inquiry and the apex thereof in paradigm 
establishment has been given, a description of the four basic paradigms of inquiry will be given.  
Paradigms of inquiry define parameters for the inquirer of what can be seen to fall within the 
realm of legitimate inquiry and what falls outside of it. The basic beliefs of any paradigm can be 
ascertained in accordance with what proponents of any one paradigm would answer to the 
following three questions: 51 
                                            
50 Beholden to this definition, it would be safe to endorse Neurotheology as part of the ‘normal sciences’, 
due to it reliance on contemporary neurological assumptions. 
51 Guba and Lincoln (1994:108) argues that the order in which these three questions will be elaborated 
upon reflects the most logical primacy. 
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1. The Ontological question: “What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is 
there that can be known about it?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108).  Guba & Lincoln gives the 
example that, if a ‘real’ world is assumed, then all that can be known about it is the ‘way 
things really are’ and the ‘way things really work’. Therefore, only questions relating to 
this real existence and real action are acceptable. Questions involving morality or 
aesthetics would naturally fall outside the scope of legitimate inquiry according to this 
paradigm. 
2. The Epistemological question: “What is the nature of the relationship between the 
knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108). The 
answer to this question is necessarily constrained to the answer given to the ontological 
question. Staying true to the assumption of a ‘real’ reality, the attitude of the inquirer 
must be one that Guba & Lincoln calls, ‘objective detachment’ or ‘value freedom’. This 
disposition is necessary to discover how things really are and how they really work.52 
3. The Methodological question: “How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding 
out whatever he or she believes can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108). Regarding the 
first two answers, not just any methodology can be deemed appropriate. For example, an 
objective inquirer pursuing a real reality would be constrained by a mandate to control 
possible perplexing factors – this will be the case whether either qualitative, quantitative 
or mixed methods are used.53 54 Lastly, methodology are not just a collective term for the 
methods being used, but it determines the methods to be used. 
                                            
52 If the epistemological question had primacy – a knower must be objectively detached – then the 
assumption would follow that there exits a ‘real’ reality to be objective about. 
53 These three methodologies will be expounded upon later-on in 4.3. 
54 If the methodological question had primacy and a manipulative method was chosen – e.g. 
experimentation, for argument’s sake – it follows that the inquirer should be objective and that there 
should be a ‘real’ world to be objective about. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 
Guba and Lincoln (1994:108) argue that paradigms are ultimately the “the most informed and 
sophisticated view that its proponents have been able to devise, given the way they have chosen 
to respond to the three defining questions.” Thus, as human constructions, paradigms are not 
invulnerable to human error. As a consequence there are no incontestable arguments or 
assumptions in paradigms – rather, proponents of a certain view must rely on the persuasiveness 
and utility thereof, in arguing their position. 
With all of this in mind, here are the four basic paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1990:19-27): 
Positivism 
- Ontology: Realist – reality really exist ‘out there’ and is driven by incontrovertible natural 
laws and mechanisms. Knowledge of these entities within reality are traditionally 
summarized in ‘time- and context-free’ generalizations. In some instances these 
generalizations could take on the form of cause-and-effect laws. 
- Epistemology: Dualist/objectivist – the inquirer adopts a nonintrusive and objective 
stance toward reality. This way the influence of values and biases are factored out of the 
intended outcomes. 
- Methodology: experimental/manipulative: propositions are made in advance in the form 
of questions and hypotheses. These proposals are then subjected to empirical tests in 
controlled conditions, with the intention of testing for falsification. 
When committed to a realist ontology, an objective epistemology is the only option for the 
positivist. When an inquirer believes that there is a real world out there, he/she must be able to 
ask it direct questions from which he/she can expect direct answers . The inquirer takes up 
position outside of reality, looking in. in this instance the question can be raised: how can there 
be accounted for the possibility of inquirer bias, on the one hand, and nature’s ability to 
confound, on the other? For the positivist the answer lies in manipulative methodology and 
empirical methods to take the inquirer out of the equation, leaving nature unintruded and 
vulnerable. 
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Postpositivism 
- Ontology: critical realist – reality, although it exists really, can only ever be partially 
understood and never fully apprehended – thus the need for analogous models. 
- Epistemology: modified objectivist – objectivity remains the ideal means of acquiring 
knowledge, but it is no longer in an absolute state. Rather, it can be approximated by 
means of external ‘guardians’, such as the critical community and the critical tradition. 
- Methodology: modified experimental/manipulative – emphasis is placed upon critical 
multiplism. The imbalances of pure experimental/manipulative methodology is 
addressed by doing inquiry in more natural settings, reintroducing discovery, using more 
qualitative methods, while depending more on grounded theory. 
This paradigm seeks to undo the damage that has been done by the naïve realist posture55, by 
redirecting it to a more critical stance. The rationale behind this shift is based on the imperfect 
sensory and intellectual mechanisms that humans use in the perception of reality – this notion is 
then factored into the research, which bids a critical stance toward what is uncovered. 
Epistemologically speaking, the assumption of being able to stand outside of reality and even 
outside of humanness for the duration of inquiry has been found to be absurd. It has been 
demonstrated that any and all ‘findings’ that may emerge from inquiry, come from the 
interaction between the inquirer and what is being inquired into. Thus, objectivity is a regulatory 
ideal which directs the inquirer to be as neutral as possible, but also to identify the 
predispositions the inquirer brings to the inquiry. Part of the methodological implications for this 
regulatory principle is an interaction with the critical community and critical tradition – to draw 
on as many sources as possible when inquiring into reality. 
 
                                            
55 For a comprehensive history of the reasons for this paradigm-shift, please see Godfrey-Smith 2003: 
Problems and Changes 
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Critical Theory  
- Ontology: historical realist – a reality that was once ‘plastic’ is deemed apprehensible, as 
it was shaped over time by an amalgam of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and 
gender factors. From these influence it crystallized into structures that are assumed to be 
natural and immutable – a virtual or historical reality (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1994:110). 
- Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist – the investigator and investigated object 
are interactively linked by the values of the investigator, which inevitably influences the 
investigation. This purports to value mediated findings. This challenges the distinction 
between ontology and epistemology, in that knowledge of reality is only gained by 
interacting with reality. 
- Methodology: dialogic and dialectical– due to the transactional nature of the inquiry, a 
dialogue between the inquirer and the subjects of the inquiry is necessary. This should be 
done in a dialectical fashion in order to transform ignorance and misapprehensions. (cf. 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994:110) 
Guba deems the label ‘critical theory’ to be limited in the scope it is supposed to implicate. 
Rather, he states, it should be termed “ideologically oriented inquiry” (1990:23). This view stands 
opposed to the supposed value-freedom propagated by postpositivists. A paradigm, as a human 
construct, indubitably reflects the values of its constructors. All areas of inquiry, such as the 
selected problem, most relevant paradigm, instruments, analytic approaches, interpretations 
etc. are selected based on the specific values and assumptions of the inquirer. Value is the 
hermeneutic window through which reality is perceived. The problem in this regard is that certain 
inquirer’s values could become dominant, over and against those who have less influence in the 
same field – thus it becomes a political act whereby some are empowered and others are 
disempowered. The methodology of critical theory, therefore, is aimed at working towards 
transforming the world by raising consciousness among- and energising participants. A dialogical 
approach is then taken to rally participants to a common view.  
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Constructivism 
- Ontology: relativist – reality, its form and content, is based on multiple mental 
constructions, contextually based on the social, experiential, local and specific exposure 
of the inquirer. It should in actuality be distinguished from idealism and nominalism (cf. 
Guba, 1990:25). 
- Epistemology: subjectivist and transactional – the inquirer and what is being inquired into 
are viewed as a single entity, producing findings deemed as the product of interaction 
between the two (cf. Guba, 1990:25).  
- Methodology: hermeneutic, dialectical – with the aim of rendering a few constructions 
that enjoys substantial consensus, constructions are produced and refined using 
hermeneutics, and compared and contrasted in a dialectical fashion. The reason for this 
is because reality can only be constructed by the individual interacting with it, therefore 
interaction between respondents is vital (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1994:111).  
Based on what has been described already, it seems plausible that postpositivists and critical 
theorists could see their way open in accommodating each other’s paradigms. Conversely, 
constructivists feel that these paradigms are completely flawed and need to be replaced. Guba 
(1990:25) gives four reasons in this respect: 1) all facts are theory laden, 2) all theory is 
underdetermined, 3) all facts are value laden and 4) there is no escape from the dyadic nature of 
an inquirer/inquired-into relationship.56 
4.3. A Description of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
Historically, a great amount of emphasis has been placed on quantification in science. The ‘queen 
                                            
56 An interesting phenomenon occurs as a result of this last statement, in that the ontological (what can 
be known) and epistemological (the relationship of the knower to what can be known) distinction 
becomes obsolete. What is ‘out there’ is created in a process of interaction between the inquirer and the 
inquired into. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
66 
 
of the sciences’ has been deemed to be mathematics, and along with other fields that lend 
themselves equally well to quantification, such as chemistry and physics, are generally known as 
‘hard/concrete’ science. Less quantifiable fields, such as can be encapsulated by, among others, 
the social sciences, are deemed ‘soft’ sciences, and described as being more qualitative (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994:105-106).  
When taking the paradigms discussion into account, in association with what has been said and 
will follow under 4.3, it will help the discussion along to categorise the four basic paradigms here. 
The positivist and postpositivist worldviews can be placed under the overarching quantitative 
paradigm, and the critical theory and constructivist worldviews under the overarching qualitative 
paradigm. 57 The rest of 4.3 will be dedicated to elaborating on what is meant by these two 
overarching paradigms.  
Although it might seem that there is duplication regarding what has been explicated under 4.2.1, 
the researcher deems it necessary in order to establish a proper basis of reference for the 
description and discussion of mixed method research under 4.4. This, in turn, will supply the 
pivotal elements necessary to evaluate Newberg’s neurotheology in 4.5.  
Joanne Sale (Sale et al., 2002:44-45) summarizes the quantitative paradigm as follows: 
Science is characterized by empirical research; all phenomena can be reduced to empirical 
indicators which represent the truth. The ontological position of the quantitative 
paradigm is that there is only one truth, an objective reality that exists independent of 
human perception. Epistemologically, the investigator and investigated are independent 
entities. Therefore, the investigator is capable of studying a phenomenon without 
influencing it or being influenced by it. Techniques to ensure this include randomization, 
blinding, highly structured protocols, and written or orally administered questionnaires 
                                            
57 There have been some critique of an overarching paradigm for what can be deemed ‘qualitative 
research’ (cf. Rolfe, 2006:304), but the overall feeling is that a unified outlook is beneficial to the fields in 
question. 
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with a limited range of predetermined responses. 
From this summary it is evident that a certain preoccupation with elements, such as the ability 
to replicate, the understanding of causality, objectivity and operational definitions, exists (cf. 
Bryman, 1984:77) within the quantitative paradigm – confirming what has been discussed under 
4.2.1. The quantitative paradigm, in its broadest sense, rejects the field of metaphysics (Krauss & 
Putra, 2005:760). The goal of knowledge, in this respect, is simply to describe the phenomena a 
person experiences – any knowledge beyond that is impossible.  
Because this overarching paradigm encapsulates both positivism and postpositivism, and given 
that postpositivism is now the most dominant form of positivism, the engagement with this 
paradigm under 4.2.1 can be considered appropriate and sufficient for the quantitative paradigm 
as well.  
With quantitative research being the dominant and most preferred paradigm for scientific 
research (cf. Krauss & Putra, 2005:760; Healy & Perry, 2000), some extra remarks is warranted 
about the merits and challenges of qualitative research.  Sale et al. (2000:45) summarizes the 
qualitative paradigm as follows: 
The qualitative paradigm is based on interpretivism and constructivism. Ontologically 
speaking, there are multiple realities or multiple truths based on one’s construction of 
reality. Reality is socially constructed and so is constantly changing. On an epistemological 
level, there is no access to reality independent of our minds, no external referent by which 
to compare claims of truth. The investigator and the object of study are interactively 
linked so that findings are mutually created within the context of the situation which 
shapes the inquiry… Techniques used in qualitative studies include in-depth and focus 
group interviews and participant observation. 
John Lewis (2009:2) cites Denzin and Lincoln in their 1998 work – Collecting and interpreting 
qualitative material – as identifying the present as “the fifth moment for qualitative research.”58 
                                            
58 The fifth moment can be characterized by the prediction Denzin and Lincoln (1998:22) made, stipulating 
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He speculates that, if they are correct, the way forward for qualitative researchers will be one 
burdening them with the task of redefining and justifying the validity and reliability of their 
results. The reason for this is the possibility of allegations that qualitative research can be 
identified as being undisciplined, sloppy and hopelessly subjective. Lewis (2009:7-10) sets out to 
delineate certain reliability measures, standards and methods – which will not be expounded 
upon in this study – but concludes (p. 13) that, in cases where these standards could be adhered 
to “qualitative research has been proven to be as truthful as quantitative research.”  
Quite a lot has been written over the last thirty years on the seemingly incompatible nature of 
the quantitative and qualitative paradigms. Rolfe (2006:2) divides the literature on this issue into 
three positions:  
1. Those who argue that qualitative research should be judged according to the same 
standards as quantitative research. 
2. Those who propose that different standards of judgement are appropriate. 
3. Those who draw into question whether qualitative research should indeed be judged 
based on any predetermined standards. 
Hope and Waterman (2003:123) concluded, in this respect, that “the application of criteria, 
however defined, is not clear, and confusion exists as to how judgements should be made about 
whether or not a standard has been reached.” The prevailing problem remains, Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech (2005:376) argues, that the protectors (purists) of the respective camps focus too 
readily on their differences, rather than the similarities.  
The first and foremost similarity between these two warring perspectives is the fact that both 
quantitative and qualitative endeavours to address their research questions by way of 
                                            
that “more action-, activist-oriented research is on the horizon, as are more social criticism and social 
critique...The search for grand narratives will be replaced by more local, small-scale theories fitted to 
specific problems and specific situations.” 
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observation. Sechrest and Sidani (1995:78) elaborates in this respect that both methodologies 
“describe their data, construct explanatory arguments from their data, and speculate about why 
the outcomes they observed happened as they did.” Two other similarities are the fact that both 
of these camps use techniques that are analogous to some extent, as well as using similar 
methods of safeguarding against confirmation bias and other sources that may invalidate a 
research study (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005:379).  
According to Rossman and Wilson (1985, in Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2000) three schools of 
thought evolved out of the qualitative-quantitative debate: 1) purist, 59 2) situationalist60 and 3) 
pragmatist.61 These three schools can be viewed as a continuum. With respect to the discussion 
of Newberg’s neurotheology in the previous chapter, this continuum can be regarded as a 
measuring rod for each perspective that was brought to bare thereon – in other words, each 
critique or comment comes from a proponent of one of these three schools. However, the scope 
of this study will not permit the categorizing of the different commentaries used – not that the 
school from which the critique is made somehow grants the author more, or less authority. It is 
still meaningful to keep in mind, from what has been shown – as well as what will be delineated 
in the next chapter regarding language, experience and interpretation – that no one perspective 
has the definitive say in the matter. Rather, each perspective contributes to a more robust 
                                            
59 Purists argue that quantitative and qualitative methods arise from differing ontological, epistemological 
and axiological views on research, as well as fundamentally different worldviews (cf. for further discussion 
on the purist stance, Bryman, 1984; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Collins, 1984) 
60 Situationalists advocate, like the purists, that a paradigmatic – or mono-method – approach carries 
more weight, but that both methods have value. The value lies therein that the type of research questions 
that need answering determine the method by which the answer should be ascertained. 
61 Pragmatists contend that the relationship between the two methods can be termed ‘a false dichotomy’ 
(Newman & Benz, 1998). The belief in this regard is that quantitative methods are not naturally positivist, 
and that qualitative methods are not naturally hermeneutic, thus methods can be integrated in a single 
study (cf. Cook & Reichardt, 1979; Daft, 1983; Miller & Fredericks, 1991; Sieber, 1973) 
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interaction with Newberg and his model. 
4.4. Mixed Method Research 
In general, mixed methods research represents research that involves collecting, analysing, and 
interpreting quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or in a series of studies that 
investigate the same underlying phenomenon – (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009:265)62 
Naturally, as has been alluded to already, there are those that have taken part in the qualitative-
quantitative debate and argued: why not both? In the years following the height of this debate, 
some researchers started crafting a new paradigm that encapsulates both the quantitative and 
qualitative paradigms (cf. Caracelli & Greene 1993). This paradigm has been called several 
different names (Johnson et al., 2007:118), e.g “blended research (Thomas, 2003), integrative 
research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), multimethod research (e.g., Hunter & Brewer, 2003; 
Morse, 2003), multiple methods (Smith, in press), triangulated studies (cf. Sandelowski, 2003), 
ethnographic residual analysis (Fry, Chantavanich, & Chantavanich, 1981), and mixed research 
(Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Christensen, 2004).” The most popular terms in use, namely mixed 
method or integrative research, hold the advantage of incorporating a broader spectrum than 
some of the other terms named above. Proponents of this paradigm caution against terminology 
that would limit its research to methodology alone. 
A central belief of the mixed-method, as Howe (1988, in Sale et al.,2000:47) describes it, is that 
truth is a normative concept, and that truth can be understood in terms of what works – this can 
generally be defined as pragmatism. It seems that only pragmatists, as people who are not 
normally beholden to either paradigm, would attempt to combine research methods (cf. also, 
Johnson et al., 2007:113).  
Having described and discussed the basic tenets of the two separate paradigms – quantitative 
                                            
62 For a comprehensive study of mixed-method research – its utility, foundations, problems, history etc. – 
please see Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009. 
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and qualitative research – the arguments for a single integrated study should prove fairly 
comprehensible. There are four main viewpoints to combine qualitative and quantitative 
methods according to Sale et al.: 
1. It has been put forth that both views share the same logic – thus the same rules of 
inference apply in both studies – as well as the desire to understand the world. 
2. The paradigms seem to be compatible on the grounds of a few shared tenets that Sale et 
al. summarizes as the “theory-ladenness of facts, fallibility of knowledge, indetermination 
of theory by fact, and a value-ladened inquiry process” (Sale et al., 2002:46). There is also 
a utilitarian spirit to be detected, as well as a commitment to improving the human 
condition.  
3. Some fields, such as nursing and other forms of healthcare, are so complex that they 
require input and data from a large number of perspectives, which could only be 
facilitated by such a combination of methods. 
4. Some scholars argue that epistemological purity will not get any research done. Thus they 
propose that this debate be seen as a nonsense, in that it is unlikely that any conclusive 
decisions will be reached in the near future. 
Practical reasons for a legitimate combination of the two methods can be described as follows 
(Sale et al., 2000:48): 
1. When it is possible to combine two or more sources or theories of data, it grants the 
researcher a more complete understanding – by means of what is known as triangulation 
– of the phenomena under study. 
2. It becomes possible for models to be incorporated in a complementary fashion when their 
strengths are used with the intention of enhancing each other. 63 
                                            
63 Brayman (1984:84) alludes to a possible coarse of complementarity when he describes the task of 
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In this light, the question has been raised by, among others, Robert Yin (2006), as to when 
methods can be characterised as “genuinely integrated or merely parallel.” After an elaborate 
discussion of the theory involved, as well as scrutinizing some case studies, he comes to the 
following conclusion (2006:46): “The design and conduct of a single study involves an array of 
readily understood procedures, regarding: the research questions being addressed, the definition 
of the units of analyses, the structure of the samples being studied, the instrumentation and data 
collected, and the analytic strategies. The more that two (or more!) methods have been 
integrated into each of these procedures, the stronger the “mix” of methods. Conversely, if each 
method uses its own isolated procedures, the result will be separate studies using different 
methods. Though the studies may be complementary, they will not really represent mixed 
methods research.” 
In this light, a large number of researchers have started incorporating the mixed-method into 
their research to obtain and interpret the desired data. However, certain studies have given rise 
to suspicion when claiming to use both qualitative and quantitative methods, and yet still 
produced results that agreed or overlapped. The question is posed, how this can be when 
completely different sets of phenomena are scrutinized? A possible explanation – apart from 
results being simplified to fit a certain model of understanding – can be that both methods used 
were, in fact, quantitative. Sale et al. (2000:48) gives the example of a frequency count that is 
done on responses to open-ended questions and other such studies. They admonish it outright 
for not being qualitative. It should be understood that it is not always possible or even 
appropriate to use mixed method analyses. “Indeed, the challenge is knowing when it is useful 
to count and when it is difficult or inappropriate to count” (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005:381). 
When considering the merits of mixed method research, especially when usage of the term could 
grant the researcher a wider readership – from proponents of both the quantitative and 
qualitative fields – it is imperative to establish clear guidelines, structure and definitions, so as 
not to misuse this paradigm for undue benefit. 
                                            
qualitative research to be exploratory, and the task of quantitative research to be explanatory. 
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In line with what can be understood from Yin’s conclusion and the need for guidelines and 
definitions as argued above, Johnson et al. (2007:124) provides an illustration (Fig.1):  
 
This illustration describes qualitative, mixed-method and quantitative research as part of a 
continuum. Within this continuum there are several overlapping groups of mixed-method 
researchers and mixed-method research types. 64  
From left to right, the illustration starts off at the qualitative end of the spectrum – here there is 
no mixing of methods involved, the research incorporates and retains only pure qualitative 
methods. 65 Next, as can be seen, a subgroup of the mixed method emerges, termed ‘qualitative 
                                            
64 Johnson et al. (2007:124) declares that it makes sense for a researcher to have a primary ‘home’ in one 
of the three major paradigms. 
65 As has been shown under 4.2.1, a certain methodological perspective indubitably necessitates a 
corresponding epistemology and ontology as well. Thus as the continuum progresses from this point 
onward, the ontological, epistemological and methodological presuppositions of the proponents of each 
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mixed/dominant’  – it is neither purely qualitative nor purely mixed. Such research would rely on 
the qualitative (constructivist-poststructuralist-critical) view of the process of doing research, 
while recognizing that the addition of quantitative data and approaches can ultimately benefit 
most of its research. In the centre of the continuum stands the pure mixed-method, where due 
consideration is given to both qualitative and quantitative prospects. To the right thereof another 
subgroup of the mixed method emerges, termed ‘quantitative mixed/dominant’ – as with the 
‘qualitative mixed/dominant’ subgroup, it is neither purely quantitative nor purely mixed. This 
view relies on the postpositivist understanding of the research process, while recognizing the 
benefit of adding qualitative data and approaches to its research projects. 
An understanding of this continuum – and indeed that it is necessary to speak of these three 
paradigms in terms of a continuum and not isolated views – would facilitate useful means of 
evaluating the research being done in any specific paradigm. To complete the discussion, it would 
be remiss of this researcher not to mention some of the issues and challenges Johnson et al. 
(Johnson et al., 2007:124-128) deems worthy of pointing out, regarding the mixed-method 
approach: 
1. As research goes through certain stages, it is important to know which stages would 
benefit, or not, from incorporating mixed-methods. 
2. Thus, effective strategies are needed to guide mixed-method integration into research. 
3. Clarity is needed on what philosophical framework will best be able to accompany the 
mixed-method. Pragmatism has been proposed, although the problem of different 
perspectives on its application need also to be addressed. 
4. This begs the question of whether a specific philosophical and methodological framework 
is actually beneficial to the mixed-method – embracing differences is indeed the sine qua 
non thereof. 
                                            
point on the spectrum will also change. 
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5. Is it really possible to assign equal status to the use of both qualitative and quantitative 
epistemologies? Some scholars suggest, in this respect, that mixed-method research is 
only possible when a dominant paradigm takes the lead. 
6. Credibility, trustworthiness and validity is a central concern for the mixed-method. A 
great number of typologies and standards have, out of necessity, been put forth by 
methodologists to guide this specific issue. 
7. The question is asked if the three variants of the mixed-method (qualitative-dominant, 
equal-status and quantitative-dominant) should be more fully developed and 
differentiated, as well as how this may be done.  
8. In terms of the possibility of a fully developed contingency theory66, answers need to be 
sought for the question: when, and under what conditions, should either qualitative, 
quantitative or mixed-method research be considered the appropriate approach. 
9. A fuller definition of mixed-methods may need to incorporate and expound upon the logic 
behind such research – to combine different paradigms of research in a way that 
“produces complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses” (Johnson et al., 
2007:128). 
10. The question arises if the mixed-method field will be able to create a typology of research 
designs that could in general be agreed upon. 
4.5. Conclusion: Paradigm-theory and Newberg’s Neurotheological Model 
From what has been said in the present and previous two chapters – taking into account what 
has been said about Newberg and his model, as well as what Newberg himself has said – Newberg 
can be classified as a constuctivist/pragmatist (cf. Forster, 2006:128). This categorization of 
Newberg – and his model for neurotheology – sheds some light on his fervent undertaking to 
                                            
66 As it pertains to the pragmatic utilization of different paradigms in order to do research. 
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establish neurotheology as a research discipline in its own right. That being stated, it is still 
necessary to delineate the inherent arguments in making such a statement, as well as to properly 
articulate the subtle nuances of Newberg’s unique approach. 
According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005:376) constructivists/pragmatists and purists reside 
on opposite sides of the mono-/multimethod spectrum. That should give us a good indication of 
the implicated paradigmatic loyalties and nuances.  
It has already been said that Newberg cautions against any scientific or theological bias when 
doing neurotheology – no ontological priority should be given to either the material universe or 
to God – as this field of research is not beholden to either science or theology. This a priori 
principle alludes to the relativist characteristic of the constructivist ontology. In this light one can 
attempt to articulate Newberg’s view of causality regarding RMS experiences.67 When taking into 
account his ‘wherever it might lead’, relativist stance, it comes as no surprize that his personal 
perspective can be expressed as: our brain either creates RMS experiences in response to 
external stimulation (thus affirming the apologetic approach to neurotheology), or it creates RMS 
experiences as an epiphenomenal function of the brain itself (thus affirming the reductionist 
approach to neurotheology). In the meantime, with no conclusive evidence as to the prior or 
latter possibility68, he perpetually endeavours – as can be expected of a religionist-integrationist 
– to keep these two perspectives in a creative tension.69  
This mode of research safeguards against any temptation to deconstruct and assimilate either 
                                            
67 Clarity on this point will be of great importance when proposing the possible parameters of interaction 
reformed theology might establish with his neurotheology. 
68 Brain scans, no matter how sophisticated, are unable to distinguish between the brain creating an 
experience, or the brain responding to an experience. 
69 This begs the question, what would neurotheology have to prove to illicit a paradigm-shift from either 
the neurosciences, or theology? It also alludes to the question of what specific function neurotheology 
provides its constitutive counterparts? 
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theology or neuroscience into a forced model. It also enforces complementarity between its 
constituent parts – e.g. neurotheology can be thought of as both a branch of Neuroscience, in 
which the focus is on the neuroscientific study of religious phenomena, while, at the same time, 
it can be thought of as a branch of Theology, in which the impetus rests upon neurologically 
informed theological reflection. 
The creative tension mentioned above can thus be characterized as the ‘soundboard’ for 
Newberg’s ‘neurotheological hermeneutic’,70 in the sense that it perpetuates a balance between 
the two inherent universal elements, namely, the perspectives on the human brain and religion. 
In this respect, it can be argued that the neurotheological hermeneutic obintes the ontological-
epistemological distinction. This can be argued on the basis that the inquirer produces 
representationalist constructs about the ‘inquired into’ – that which is ‘out there’ – and that any 
findings in this respect are deemed the product of interaction between these two entities. 
Pertaining to Newberg’s methodology, in which the neurotheological hermeneutic is prevalent, 
his subjectivist epistemology actually complicates any data he might produce. The 
epistemological isolation produced by his neurotheological hermeneutic necessitates a 
(pragmatic) shift to qualitative dominant, or quantitative dominant research methods of data 
interpretation to bring research issues to conclusion. This fluid methodological position alludes 
to a strong mixed-method approach. 
Critique of his methodology, as well as the meta- and megatheology it strives to create, has been 
done on account of the fact that an experientialist approach cannot do justice to the complexity 
of religious phenomena, as well as the views its proponents hold. Pertaining to the relationship 
between neuroscience and neurotheology, and between religion and neurotheology, the 
question has been posed: how can these two research fields take neurotheology seriously if, as 
                                            
70 The neurotheological hermeneutic, as have been described in chapter 2, follows from the philosophical 
standpoint Newberg terms ‘experientialism’. This is the notion that all thinking, emotions and ideas are 
tied to human experience, that all experiences are implicated by the systemic working of the mind and 
brain, and that the working of the mind and brain are always restrained by a pre-processed view of reality. 
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a constructivist paradigm, it deems them as completely flawed in terms of their paradigmatic 
assumptions?71 
To conclude this chapter we look to what has been done up to this point and how that casts light 
on the coming chapters. Newberg’s neurotheological model has been categorically paced in 
Brandt’s four perspectives/dispositions on neurotheology – seeing traits of what he describes as 
religionist, as well as integrationist perspectives in Newberg’s handling of this field. In this chapter 
Newberg’s paradigmatic underpinnings has been extrapolated from the description of his model 
in chapter two, as well as from the critical engagement in chapter three With this information he 
has been categorised as a constructivist/pragmatist, in light of the correlation with Guba’s 
description of the relativist ontology, subjectivist/transactional epistemology and hermeneutical 
and dialectical methodology inherent in this paradigm. His nuanced usage of the mixed-method 
approach has also been described. 
The next chapter will endeavour to describe and discuss, on the one hand, a contemporary model 
for neuroscience that enjoys considerable consensus, as well as for reformed theology on the 
other. These two models will then be categorised, as has been done with Newberg’s 
neurotheology, with regards to Brandt’s four categories, as well as their paradigmatic position 
on the quantitative-qualitative continuum. A possible model for interaction between these two 
fields will then be discussed. When all of this has been accomplished, chapter 6 will have enough 
information to define the parameters within which neuroscience and reformed theology may 
interact with Newberg’s neurotheology, without having to cross their own paradigmatic 
threshold. 
                                            
71 As Guba (1990:25) depicts the four reasons for this perspective: 1) all facts are theory laden, 2) all theory 
is underdetermined, 3) all facts are value laden and 4) there is no escape from the dyadic nature of an 
inquirer/inquired-into relationship. 
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Chapter 5 – Contemporary Models for Neuroscience and Reformed 
Theology 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter will engage to the two questions posed in the title of this study: What science? 
Who’s theology?  
Evident in these questions is the assumption that there exists multiple views on what science is 
exactly, as well as the fact that there are a multitude of religions, generating a multitude of 
theologies. Newberg’s aim for his neurotheological model, is that it will be able to facilitate some 
form of reconciliation between science and religion (cf. Dinis, 2008:85). The critique in chapter 
three of Newberg’s model, however, should be enough reason to see the merits of the two 
questions posed above. When proposing an integration of science and theology on the basis of 
his neurotheology, Newberg has clearly acted on a very specific understanding of science and 
theology, and from there his assumption came that an integration would indeed prove possible. 
The problem with this assumption is exactly the fact that an integration-interaction model is put 
forth on the basis of a specific understanding of science and religion, respectively (cf. Barbour, 
1997:103).  
It would seem, from all that has been said, that Newberg’s model and consequent aspirations, 
generally holds the most threatening implications for religion – especially if his representation of 
religions and religious experiences were possibly proven true. Dinis (2008:78) writes in this regard 
that, “the first assumption of neurotheology is an internalist and individualistic view of religious 
experience that underestimate the importance and correlation that exists between personal 
religious experiences and external factors, namely a tradition, a community of faith sharing and 
the more practical aspects of most religious traditions such as the ‘golden rule’: love your 
brothers as you love yourself.” In this light, Dinis (2008:85) further argues that Newberg and his 
colleagues consistently operate within the parameters of neurotheology, but with a very 
disputable view of what counts as an RMS experience.  
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It is clear that Newberg’s pragmatism allows him to effectively oscillate between his general 
understanding of science and religion in terms of their respective paradigms of inquiry, toward 
fulfilling his neurotheological aspirations. This is in line with his neurotheological principle stated 
in chapter 2: “Neuroscientific and theological perspectives must be considered to be comparable 
contributors to neurotheological investigations” (p. 23). However, for neurotheology to be 
considered a comparable contributor to neuroscientific and reformed theological investigations, 
it needs to be shown to what extent a contemporary understanding of these two fields of 
investigation can be taken seriously by Newberg. 
In this light, it is of paramount importance to ascertain on which grounds scientific and religious 
integration has been deemed possible – in other words, what scientific and religious interaction-
model has proven to be most collaborative. This could then be regarded as a framework for 
evaluation. Furthermore, it would serve the purpose of this study to use this framework in 
evaluating how a generally accepted neuroscientific model, as well as a reformed theological 
model – that is deemed representational of responsible reformed-theological reflection – 
correlates with and contributes to the religio-scientific view of an integrated model. Then, finally, 
this correlation can be used as a framework to evaluate to what extent Newberg’s model fits into 
the scope of a possible integration, where the integrity of both science and theology are kept in 
tact. 
To accomplish this, the present chapter will firstly elaborate on Barbour’s four interaction 
models, ending with the integration-interaction model. This section will specifically be focussing 
on what understanding of science and theology facilitates an integration. Chapter 2 has already 
spent some time on describing Newberg’s own stance toward the four possible interaction-
models, but there was no thorough explication of what specific scientific and religious views 
would merit his chosen stance. To provide a framework for evaluation of his model, it would be 
necessary to show on which grounds there could be integration between science and religion, 
and if his view thereof can fit into the framework. Barbour’s integration-interaction model will 
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then be used to evaluate Newberg’s use of science and theology in his own integration model. 72 
Next a contemporary understanding of the foundational principles of neuroscience and reformed 
theology will be expounded upon respectively. These models will then be used in a comparative 
capacity with regards to the scientific and theological foci of Newberg’s neurotheology. 
5.2. Some Ways of Relating Science and Religion 
“Science seems to provide the only reliable path to knowledge. Many people view science as 
objective, universal, rational, and based on solid observational evidence. Religion, by contrast, 
seems to be subjective, parochial, emotional, and based on traditions or authorities tat disagree 
with each other.” – (Barbour, 1997:77) 
Throughout modern history, especially since the scientific revolution, there have been 
considerable discussions and arguments on the topic of how science and religion should be 
related. Ian Barbour delineates fourfold typology of interaction (conflict, independence, dialogue 
and integration) which he deems as the most encompassing of the major attitudes toward this 
topic.73 Of specific interest in this part of the study are the nature of the scientific and religious 
views which lead scholars to become proponents of one of these interaction models.74 
Conflict 
The conflict model has been influenced by much more than viewing science and religion in 
isolation. Historical and political agendas have given rise to the wide, and sometimes uncritical, 
                                            
72 The question will be asked if Newberg’s rendering of science and theology correlates with Barbour’s 
integrational view. 
73 There are some scholars who are of the opinion that this typology is not very useful, especially in 
providing historical background for the interaction of science and religion (cf. Cantor & Kenny, 2003:765). 
However, for the purpose of this study a historical discussion within the typology will not be necessary. 
74 There will be an engagement with the models at the end of this section. 
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acceptance thereof. Barbour turns our attention to Galileo and his conflict with the Roman 
Catholic Church. He blames the conflict on contextual conditions that no longer apply, such as 
the authority of Aristotle and political agendas driven by the threat of the reformation. He further 
points to Darwin, elucidating the fact that both the theological and scientific responses were far 
more nuanced than the image of warfare between two conflicting entities produced by popular 
media (1997:77). 75 The same can be said for the view of the debate between the so-called new 
atheists and apologists of today.76 
The view of science and religion in this interaction model can be described as scientific 
materialism over and against biblical literalism. 
Barbour (1997:77) is of the conviction that these two extremes share a few commonalities:  
- Both believe that there are perpetual conflict between a contemporary scientific view of 
the world, and a classical religious view.  
- Both seek to acquire knowledge with a sure foundation – the one by means of logic, the 
other by means of infallible Scripture. 
- Both claim to make rival statements about the same domain, e.g. the history of nature. 
Barbour believes that the reason for this conflict rests on both parties’ misuse of science 
(1997:78). He states that the scientific materialist starts from the point of science, and then ends 
up making broad philosophical statements, e.g. the origin of the universe and the redundancy a 
                                            
75 David Hart, in his book Atheist Delusions (2009), identifies and expounds upon a number of popularly 
used examples throughout history that continuously perpetuate the conflict model. He argues, in line with 
Barbour, that there are a vast number of variables to take into account, regarding each of the historical 
examples, rather than just the perennial mantra of science versus religion. 
76 Some of the most popular authors in the New Atheist movement include, Richard Dwakins (The God 
Delusion [2006]), Christopher Hitchens (God is Not Great [2007]), Sam Harris (The End of Faith [2004]) and 
Daniel Dennett (Breaking the Spell [2006]). 
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theistic God. As for the biblical literalist, the road goes from theology toward making scientific 
conclusions, e.g. the age of the universe, events that shaped earth’s geology. This needs to be 
explicated some more. 
The standard scientific materialist subscribes to two very basic beliefs: 
1. The scientific method can be regarded as the only legitimate way of gaining knowledge of 
reality. 
2. The fundamental reality of the universe is matter and energy. 
From what has been discussed in chapter four, these statements can be viewed as the 
epistemological  and ontological positions of the scientific materialist. Inherent in these 
statements are the fact that only science can successfully study and explain the nature of 
reality.77 As has already been described, this can be regarded as the reductionist/empiricist 
position.78 One of the primary tenets of this view, that has not been explicitly named,  is the belief 
that a study of the constituent parts of any system would naturally lead to understanding its most 
fundamental reality – as opposed to a study of higher levels of organization (the study of 
complexity). 
Biblical literalists argue for the infallibility of Scripture and thus the claim of a mechanistic 
inspiration of Scripture by the Holy Spirit – this mechanistic inspiration theory can be thought of 
as anything short of God physically writing the Scriptures. Hence, the epistemology and ontology 
of Biblical literalism are dictated by the specific hermeneutical approach to the content of 
                                            
77 In some circles this assertion has been termed scientism (Barbour, 1997:81; cf. Stenmark, 1997:15 for 
a disambiguation of the term scientism).  
78 Tom Sorell (1991:4) delineates five underlying assumptions he deems to be at the heart of this position: 
1) Science is unified, 2) there are no limits to science, 3) science has been extremely successful at 
predicting, explaining and controlling, 3) scientific methods confer objectivity on scientific results, and 5) 
science has been extremely beneficial for human beings. 
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Scripture.79 This is a  strong representation of the apologetic view discussed in chapter three. 
This view of Scripture has had a long history, which nearly always surfaced in a time of “moral 
confusion and rapid cultural change” (Barbour, 1997:83). From this view has also sprang an 
argument for a new attitude toward science, called scientific creationism or creation science. This 
view argues that there are scientific evidence for the Biblical narrative of creation, and 
subsequent narratives, such as the universal flood, the sun’s motion being suspended for a whole 
day, the ten plagues of Egypt etc. Such conviction can be regarded as an absolutist outlook on 
reality, which leaves little to no room for scientific discovery – because it is believed, and I say 
this in a caricaturist fashion, that everything that can be discovered about the world is already 
written down in the Bible.  
Independence 
One way around the problem of perpetual conflict between science and religion is the view 
pioneered by Stephen Jay Gould (1997:16) that science and religion actually have nothing to do 
with each other. In this respect he coined the phrase, Non Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA). This 
proposition views science and religion as two distinct and autonomous fields, each with its own 
methods and justified on their own terms. The NOMA proposition has been defended on two 
different fronts: 1) on the grounds that this will inhibit any possible conflict, as well as 2) to 
preserve the distinctive character of each field (Barbour, 1997:84). 
Barbour (1997:84) explicates this interaction model in terms of two differing claims made by its 
proponents, namely, 1) that science and religion have vastly different methodologies, and the 
other, 2) that the language used by them fulfils very different functions for human life. 
                                            
79 Corley et al. (2002:XV) states, with empathy, that people who are “committed to living under the 
authority of Scripture want to be sure that they grasp its teaching” – it is with this mindset that biblical 
literalists sometimes ferociously hold to their view of Scripture. This view of Scripture is discordant with 
what Thiselton (1977:308) believes biblical hermeneutics should facilitate, i.e. the Word of God becoming 
a living Word we hear anew.  
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Barbour explains that there are many conservative Christians that hold to the spiritual truths of 
the Bible, without being literalists or proponents of creation science. The Christian faith, for 
them, answers the question of why, whereas science answers the question of how (1997:85). 
Science is thus not threatening, nor supportive of their religious claims. Although some have 
pointed out the limitations of science – e.g. explaining the origin of life, the universe, or 
consciousness – and proposed a natural theology arguing for design, science and religion are 
essentially two independent domains of life in this view. 
A case for methodological divergences has been made on account of faith depending on divine 
initiative and self-revelation, whereas a scientific – or even natural theological – approach relies 
on fallible human reason and discovery. It is also proposed that science and theology operate on 
differing subject matters – God’s action takes place within the sphere of history and not nature, 
therefore theology is to inquire into history and not nature. In light of all this, science and 
theology are free to go their separate ways. In this model, in terms of the theological stance, the 
Bible is not seen as revelation in and of itself, but rather human recordings and interpretations 
of revelatory events. Here, Biblical narratives taken as gospel by the so-called creationists, are 
seen as a symbolic portrayal of the relationship between God and humanity.80  
This stance is also strongly reminiscent of existentialism81 (1997:86) – the fact that certain things 
(like personhood) can only be experienced by a subjective involvement, while others (like 
impersonal objects) can only be known by objective detachment. Religious existentialists 
maintain that God can only be encountered through a personal relationship, not by a detached 
                                            
80 The essence of this theological view is that religious meaning, when received today, is no longer bound 
to the ancient cosmology in which is was conceived. Hence, the importance of suitable hermeneutics, 
which will be discussed in section 5.5. 
81 “Man is nothing else but what he makes himself.” This is how Jean-Paul Sartre articulates the first 
principle of existentialism, hence likening it to subjectivism. Existence, for Sartre, is the foundation of 
human life, from this springs the essence – what one creates or wills for one’s life (cf. Sartre, 1984:324-
325). 
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analysis.82 
In terms of the argument of differing languages, Barbour deems it the most effective way to 
separate science and religion. If science and religion are seen as different languages – or 
“language games” as Wittgenstein termed it (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953) – they will never be 
unrelated, because their functions will not be alike – in other words, science and religion are in 
different functional categories which cannot be viewed in a relatable sense. The language of 
science, thus, is given a specific function – to summarize data, correlate regularities in observed 
phenomena, and produce applications in technology, among others. To expect science to provide 
us with a worldview, a set of ethical norms or a proper way of life, would be asking it to overstep 
its primary function – this would be the function attributed to the language of religion. 
Dialogue 
The dialogue interaction model serves as an intermediary position between the independence 
and integrative models – science and religion are not as divergently portrayed as in the 
independence model, but they are also not as close as they are in the integration model. 
Dialogue, Barbour explains (1997:89), moves from the approximation of the general 
characteristics of science and religion, rather than from specific theories. He structures his 
discussion around three points, which will be briefly expounded upon below: 
1. Presuppositions and limit questions 
Limit questions, or boundary questions, are questions that cannot be answered by the methods 
of science. Barbour states that certain theologians argue, to some extent, that theism is an 
implicit presupposition for doing science – based on the contingency and intelligibility of nature 
(Barbour, 1997:90). Science arose from within a religious context, fixating on answering the 
questions related to an intelligible and rational universe. In this light, it has been argued by 
                                            
82 Kierkegaard proclaimed the subjectivity of truth and faith, over and against objective certainty, 
especially when dealing with the truth about, and faith in God (cf. Smith, 2012:811) 
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authors such as Ernan McMullin (1987), as Barbour points out, that, on its own level, the scientific 
account of reality is complete and without any gaps. However, this is because science is only 
equipped to study secondary causes, Barbour states (1997:89), through which God, as primary 
cause, acts. 
This position is also opposed to all attempts in deriving arguments for God’s action and existence 
from unexplained scientific phenomena (the so called God-of-the-gaps theory [cf. Harris, 1963]). 
It is the contention of the researcher that the fact that God exists and is personally involved in 
God’s creation, should always be an a priori assumption83 for the theologian, regardless of 
scientific theories opening or closing a gap to prove this. The scientific and religious view of the 
dialogue model will not allow a scientific theory to be used as support for a Christian doctrine or 
vice versa. Barbour does however argue the value of reforming certain doctrines – that are clearly 
historically conditioned – in the light of scientific discovery, e.g. the doctrine of creation. 
2. Methodological parallels 
To the positivists, as has been discussed, science seemed like and objective discipline, whereas 
religions seemed subjective. Since the 1950’s this distinction became less and less absolute on 
account of scholarship becoming aware of the theory-ladenness of all data. Data are 
conceptionally interpreted by means of imagination and analogy. Due to the hiddenness of a 
great part of our world, there analogies are the most reliable sources from which to understand 
reality. It seems to be the case for religion as well, Barbour states (1997:92), when the usage of 
metaphors and models in religious language are brought to mind – the object of religion, 
God/Ultimate Reality is similarly hidden from us.  
He also likens the paradigm-bound element of a scientific community to that of a religious 
community, and argues that being paradigm-bound may even be more so for theology, than for 
science. He bases this argument on the fact that theological paradigms are extremely resilient to 
falsification, due to a greater use of ad hoc assumptions when confronted with anomalies 
                                            
83 Section 5.5 will explain why this assumption should be normative for the theologian. 
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(1997:92). In other words, since theology is largely an abstract field of reflection, the theories 
and theological constructs could (should?) be rearticulated quite easily.  
The dialogue interaction model also affirms the change that has taken place regarding the role 
and status of the observer within inquiry – effectively endorsing a critical realist stance toward 
inquiry. Michael Polanyi (1958) has stated that, on these grounds, a methodological harmony 
covering the whole range of knowledge can be deemed possible, whereas the theologian may be 
counted with the critical realists as well. John Polkinghorne endorses this view on the grounds of 
the methodological similarities that exist between the fields of science and theology. He is of the 
mind that “each is corrigible, having to relate theory to experience, and each is essentially 
concerned with entities whose unpicturable reality is more subtle than that of naïve objectivity” 
(1987:64). 
Barbour (1997:93) cautions the use of the dialogical interaction model on account of three 
possible problems – these cautions would be very important for the evaluation of Newberg’s 
model under 5.3. 
a. Although it has been accepted that scientific data are not theory free, he argues that 
science is still not as subjective as theology. Data from both of these fields are from 
immensely different sources, and there is a greater limit placed upon the testing of 
religious beliefs. 
b. In order to overcome the absolute distinction between science and religion – as is 
described in the independent interaction model – the tendency to treat religion as 
nothing but an intellectual system should be avoided. Religious belief should never be 
taken out of the context of a religious community or, as Barbour describes it, the goal of 
personal transformation (1997:93). 
c. Methodological issues have a tendency to become very abstract and, as Barbour points 
out, “might be of more interest to philosophers of science and philosophers of religion 
than to scientists or theologians and religious believers” (1997:93). In recognizing 
methodological similarities, the possibility arises to view theology as a reflective 
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enterprise, capable of growing and developing and open to new insights. 
3. Nature-centred spirituality 
A nature centred spirituality stands in contrast to the philosophical approach of the authors 
discussing the limit questions (Barbour, 1997:95). Proponents of this view have described the 
experience of a religious dimension to nature within their work. This experience is not beholden 
to any specific religion, but it does invoke a deep sense of awe in those who hold to this type of 
spirituality.84 It is from this sacred experience of nature that its proponents express a deep 
commitment to social justice and environmental ethics. This view also alludes to the New Age 
Movements that combine an interest in harmony with nature, meditation, and an array of 
supposedly scientific claims, as well as a more holistic approach to inquiry (cf. Wilber, 2001). 
A dialogical approach, for some, is born of the belief that in all of science there are certain 
elements of sacredness not reducible to phenomenal objects. Likewise with religion, the belief 
stands that there are concrete elements underlying the abstract nature of its inquiry and practise. 
Barbour (1997:97) professes his sympathy for the spiritual hunger of a materialistic culture, as 
well as the endemic dissatisfaction people have with traditional institutions85, be it science or 
religion. In this light there are those who would be open to more inclusive paradigms of inquiry, 
which stretches the conceptual boundaries of acceptable science and religion.  
Integration 
Advocates of a more direct integration of scientific and religious content believes in a particular 
correlation between scientific theories and religious doctrine. Barbour (1997:98ff) clarifies that 
there are three main versions of interaction, which will be expounded upon briefly: 
                                            
84 One such example can be found in the person of Bede Griffiths (cf. Trapnell, 2013:18). 
85 A good example of this would be the description of the ‘nuclear man’ in Henri Nouwen’s The Wounded 
Healer. 
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a. Natural theology 
The short description of natural theology is this: science demonstrates (unintentionally) that 
there is evidence of design in nature. With this evidence, natural theology infers the existence of 
God. 
Some of the arguments from the perspective of a natural theology include: Thomas Aquinas’ First 
Cause or Cosmological argument (cf. Aquinas, 1990), as well as his teleological argument for the 
structured nature of natural phenomena. William Paley (cf. Paley, 1803) put forth his argument 
for design on the basis of the complexity in coordination of a single function like the human eye. 
Richard Swinburne argues the plausibility of God’s existence on the basis of science’s 
confirmation theory.86Most recently the argument for design came in the form of the Anthropic 
principle (cf. Bostrom, 2002:5f) – the argument that, for life to exist, there had to be a significant 
amount of specific conditions in the early universe, if the expanse theory is taken into 
consideration. For each of these advocacies for design a counter argument has been made, 
although most of the debates that follow are done so by purely theoretical, philosophical and 
abstract means. There are other arguments to bolster this perspective, but those that have 
already been mentioned will suffice. 
b. Theology of Nature 
The short definition of a theology of nature can be construed as follows: sources of theology are 
mainly found outside of science, but certain doctrines can be reformulated in accordance with 
some scientific theories. 
Over and against a natural theology, a theology of nature starts from the religious tradition and 
experience, and moves from that perspective to science. Science and religion are mostly viewed 
as independent sources, but with some areas of overlap. It is because of these overlapping areas 
                                            
86 This is the theory that every theory has an initial plausibly. The addition of evidence contributes to the 
probability that the theory is true, but not that the theory is absolutely true (cf. Crupi, 2013). 
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that some theologians deem it necessary to reformulate certain doctrines. The prime example 
would be to let the current understanding of nature and natural processes inform the theological 
description of God and humanity’s relation to the natural order. Proponents of this view, such as 
Arthur Peacocke, posit that theological reflection should take place within a past, present and 
ongoing theological community.87 
c. Systematic synthesis 
A systematic synthesis can be succinctly described as: the movement towards an inclusive 
metaphysics88 (or ontology) by means of both scientific and religious contributions. 
Process philosophy is deemed the most promising prospect for mediating a systematic synthesis 
between science and religion. Biology and physics plays a major role in characterising nature as 
predominantly in a state of constant change, driven by chance and inclined to novelty as well as 
order. God is the source of this system and is intimately related to its workings. God is both 
transcendent and immanent in the world, operating by persuasion and not compulsion, 
“unchanging in purpose and character, but changing in experience and relationship” (Hartshorne, 
1948 in Barbour, 1997:103). Furthermore, process thought stands over and against reductionism 
– as reductionists tend to work with the parts and not the whole – and is inclined to a view from 
complexity (top-down) in operational systems. It also opposes a Kantian dualism and endorses 
the dual aspect nature of all events – these terms are used in the sense it was described in chapter 
three.  
With the evaluation of Newberg’s model in mind it would be beneficial to point out Barbour’s 
                                            
87 Cf. Arthur Peackocke’s, Paths from science toward God (2001), for further reading on a theology of 
nature. 
88 Barbour (1997:103) defines inclusive metaphysics as “the search for a set of general categories in terms 
of which diverse types of experience can be interpreted.” 
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remarks on an the different interaction models, and specifically the integration-interaction 
model. He tends to agree with a theology of nature, coupled with a nuanced use of process 
thought. This coupling is used to discourage too much reliance on science which would 
undermine the important experiential aspect of religion. At the centre of Christianity Barbour 
sees an experience of reorientation, healing toward a new wholeness, and a new expression of 
our relationship toward God and the proverbial “neighbour” (1997:105). Thus, he commends the 
existentialists and linguists for pointing toward the primacy of social and personal life in religion, 
as well a the neo-orthodoxy for rightly aligning the Christian community with the person of Christ 
as the source of all change in life (1997:105). In light of his alliance to a theology of nature, 
Barbour urges us not to belittle the created order on account of redemption from the world – 
rather to endeavour to be redeemed in and with the world (1997:105). In this regard a theology 
of nature will have to draw from both religious and scientific sources. He posits that using a 
systematic metaphysics could lead toward a coherent vision (synthesis), but cautions that religion 
should never be reduced to a metaphysical system – distorting scientific or religious ideas to fit 
this synthesis is not the aim, but rather keeping the rich experiential diversity in mind. “A 
coherent vision of reality can still allow for the distinctiveness of differing types of experience” 
(Barbour, 1997:105). 
5.3. An Evaluation of Newberg’s Integrational Presuppositions 
In light of Barbour’s description of, and remarks on these four interaction models, it should be 
possible to adequately place Newberg’s neurotheological model within its scope. This is done to 
further ascertain what type of interaction between science and religion Newberg foresees.  
With regards to the field of neurotheology, it has been established in chapter three that Newberg 
functionally operates from within a religionist and integrationist view of science and religion. 
From a paradigmatic vantage point, it has been shown in chapter four that Newberg operates as 
a pragmatist. The establishment of these inherent characteristics of Newberg’s  dealing with 
science and religion provide us with a useful framework. This framework will now be used to 
compare and contrast Newberg’s use and understanding of science and religion to that of the 
four views described above. 
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As a religionist – in line with what has been said in chapter three – Newberg subscribes to the 
belief that all natural phenomena should and can be studied scientifically. Over and against the 
reductionist view, he does not believe that legitimate metaphysical inferences can be made as a 
result of this study. However, this does not inhibit him from creating some explanatory scenarios 
in terms of causality, be it predominantly scientific or theological. This characteristic of 
Newberg’s view is in line with what Barbour described as the dialogical interaction model’s 
handling of the limit/boundary questions in science and religion – science is only equipped to 
inquire into secondary causes. In correlation, Newberg withholds from trying to ‘fill the gaps’ of 
science with God, as well as not prematurely ‘closing the gaps’ with scientific reductionism. 
Furthermore, it seems that Newberg correspondingly operates with an approximation of the 
general characteristics of science and religion, at least as he sees them, and is not beholden to 
actual contemporary theories or models – in other words, there does not seem to be a blatant 
misuse of scientific data to support any specific religious doctrine. 
In placing Newberg among those with an integrationist stance toward science and religion from 
the perspective of neurotheology, he is clearly of the mind that science informs theology on a 
fundamental level. This implies that he believes it necessary for religious traditions to 
reformulate some of their theological doctrines on the basis of his neurotheological discoveries, 
as has been shown previously (p. 42-43). This stands over and against the apologists view that 
science validates theology. It is all clearly in accordance with what Barbour describes as the 
integrational model’s ‘theology of nature’ -- science informing religion. This conclusion is also 
strengthened by the fact that Newberg predominantly operates within an empirical sphere of 
inquiry, as theological sources fall outside the realm of empirical validation. Newberg’s 
integrationist stance aligns him with some aspects of a systematic synthesis as well. This claim is 
made with reference to his adherence to the dual-aspect view of personhood, as well as his 
aversion to scientific reductionism – at least in his mind. Although, he wouldn’t fit within a 
systematic synthesis completely, this researcher believes that he could find an accord with 
Barbour’s nuanced view thereof. 
As a pragmatist, Newberg believes that, for his neurotheology to function properly, no 
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ontological priority should be given to either science or theology (2010:145). If he is beholden to 
the pragmatist’s relativist ontology and subjectivist epistemology, it is understandable that 
science and theology’s distinct characteristics and operational paradigms present a problem. 
Again, the pragmatist account of inquiry assumes an integrational stance. This argument is based 
on Barbour’s exhortation under the ‘theology of nature’ approach, that both scientific and 
religious sources should be taken seriously. Pragmatism can, in fact, be seen as an overarching 
model that, to some extent, could find a positive use for each of the four perspectives on scientific 
and religious interaction. 
When taking into account all that has been said in this section, a few critical remarks remain. 
Newberg’s handling of science and theology in general terms, rather than abiding by specific 
theories, is reminiscent of his endeavour to unite all religions and spiritualties within a 
megatheology. The problem with this is that it has little to no real-world application for the 
plethora of different and divergent RMS phenomena and the beliefs couples with them, as well 
as not taking their unique features seriously (cf. Jeftic, 2013:274). Similarly, in showing science 
and theology that it can co-exist in a dialogical or even integrated fashion on the basis of its most 
fundamental characteristics, leaves the problem that religion could be forced into becoming just 
another reflective enterprise – devoid of its inherent personal and relational character. 
It is with this in mind that an evaluation is deemed necessary by two contemporary models, one  
from science and one from theology. 
5.4. Towards a Contemporary Understanding of the Foundational Principles of 
Neuroscience 
How does the brain—an organ weighing only three pounds—conceive of the infinite, discover 
new knowledge, and produce the remarkable individuality of human thoughts, feelings, and 
actions? – (Kandel et al., 2013:3) 
In recalling Blume’s (2011:307) reference from chapter three – that there is no single perspective 
on the human brain – a choice will have to be made. Since it has been shown that Newberg is not 
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beholden to a specific neuroscientific theory or model, this section will endeavour to delineate 
the characteristics and nuances of such a model, proposed by authors that is currently deemed 
most representative of their field. Although there are many different areas of study89 that can be 
grouped under neuroscience, the one area that provides neurotheology with the most leverage, 
due to the abstract and theoretical nature of its conclusions, is that of cognitive neuroscience. As 
has been said in chapter three, Newberg’s epistemology is not significantly novel among the 
other cognitive sciences (Barrett, 2011:135), it is his methodology and the inferences he draws 
from them, 90 as Ladd & Ladd pointed out, that raises caution. For this reason the focus of this 
section will consist of a basic description of Kandel et al.’s (2013) model of cognitive 
neuroscience, as it relates to the functionality of the brain in behaviour, as well as consciousness. 
Moreover, reference will be made to the methodology used in their research. 
An Introduction to Some Important Research Topics of Neural Science 
The ultimate challenge for the biological sciences, as Kandel et al. (2013:5) puts it, is “to 
understand the biological basis of consciousness and the brain processes by which we feel, act, 
learn, and remember.” This is the area of neural research that strives to unify the study of 
behaviour and neural science. Such a unified approach – in which body and mind are not viewed 
as separate entities – Kandel et al. states, is built upon the basis of all behaviour being the result 
of brain function (2013:5). This entails that, what is called “the mind” is in all actuality a “set of 
operations carried out by the brain” (Kandel et al., 2013:5). A corollary of this view is that a 
disturbance of brain function will similarly be the reason for all behavioural disorders, 
characterized as psychiatric illness – affective (feeling) as well as cognitive (thought). At this 
juncture the question of the localization of brain functions comes to the fore. 
                                            
89 i.e Developmental, cognitive, molecular, behavioural and clinical neuroscience etc. 
90 Forster (2006:128) points out, in this regard, that a great deal of d’Aquili and Newberg’s early 
conclusions have been done on account of inductive reasoning. In Chapter four, Barbour has pointed out 
the limitations of this type of scientific reasoning. 
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A functional view of the relationship between brain and behaviour 
Modern views about the brain, its nerve cells and the behaviour it elicits, emerged during the 
mid twentieth century from a synthesis of several experimental traditions, i.e., molecular biology, 
neuroanatomy, electrophysiology, and cell and developmental biology (Kandel et al., 2013:333). 
As a result, the modern science of mind came into being as an autonomous research field, on 
account of a pragmatic attempt to merge cognitive psychology with neural science. “The aim of 
the new science of mind is to examine classical philosophical and psychological questions about 
mental functions in the light of modern cell and molecular biology” (Kandel et al., 2013:333). This 
is indeed a bold undertaking. Kandell et al. stipulates that a reductionist approach to mental 
functions – especially the major functional systems in the brain, i.e. sensory, motor, motivational, 
memory, and attentional systems – has, so far, produced considerable progress toward a better 
understanding thereof.  
In order to appreciate the biological basis of these functional systems, an understanding of the 
subservient anatomy is required. Here is a standard model of the brain that Kandell et al. put 
forth: 
(Fig.2) – Kandel et al. (2013:9) 
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The seven main parts of the central nervous system carry out the following functions: 
- Spinal Chord: this region receives and processes sensory information from the bodies 
limbs and trunk, as well as controlling its movement. 
- Brain Stem: the brain stem receives and processes sensory information from the head, as 
well as controlling it motor functions. It further conveys the information between the 
brain and spinal chord, as well as regulating arousal and awareness levels. 
- Medulla Oblongata: this organ is responsible for several autonomic functions, i.e., 
digestion, breathing and control of the heart rate. 
- Pons: information about movement is conveyed through the pons, from the cerebral 
hemispheres to the cerebellum 
- Cerebellum: this region regulates the intensity of movement, as well as being involved in 
acquiring motor skills. 
- Midbrain: controls sensory and motor functions like eye movement and coordinating 
visual and auditory reflexes. 
- Diencephalon: two structures are contained within the diencephalon: the thalamus 
processes the information entering the cerebral cortex and the hypothalamus regulates 
autonomic, visceral and endocrine functions. 
- Cerebrum: this organ is comprised of two cerebral hemispheres, has an outer layer 
(cerebral cortex) and three deep-lying structures (the basal ganglia, the hippocampus, 
and the amygdaloidal nuclei). The cerebrum is divided into four distinct lobes: frontal, 
parietal, occipital, and temporal as shown in figure 2B. 
In light of this illustration, Kandel et al. (2013:337) emphasizes that modern neuroscience is based 
on two tenets: 1) the brain is organised into specific functional areas, 2) the factors distinguishing 
one functional area from the next, and indeed one brain from the next, are the amount and type 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
of neurons in each, as well as how the development of the brain has interconnected them. This 
entails that the firing of these interconnected neurons produces all behaviour, from simple 
reflexes, to complex mental acts (Kandel et al., 2013:337). The conclusion that can be drawn from 
this is that it is possible to understand the neural control of any behaviour by first breaking it 
down into its key components, then by identifying the regions of the brain that correlates with 
each component and finally to analyse the connections between the implicated regions. Kandel 
et al. (Kandel et al., 2013:337) reasons that, on these terms, it is relatively simple to understand 
the complex workings of the brain. 
A functional view of the brain and consciousness 
In order to understand the biological processes of cognition, Kandel et al. (2013:389) states, it is 
necessary to consider how information is processed, not only by individual neurons, but 
throughout neural networks. To accomplish this, it is necessary to incorporate methods and 
approaches from both cellular and systems neuroscience, as well as cognitive psychology. One 
such cognitive process is summarized as follows: 
"The anterior regions of the parietal lobe contain elementary internal representations91 
of the body surface and peripersonal space that can be modified by experience. 92 Analysis 
of such modifications in the posterior parietal association cortex indicates that selective 
attention93 is a factor in integrating the  internal representation of the body with 
perception of extrapersonal space. The representation of the body is integrated with the 
representation of actual, imagined, or remembered visual space, and self-consciousness 
                                            
91 An internal representation is a certain pattern of neural activity with at least two aspects: 1) a pattern 
of activation within a certain neuron population and 2) a pattern of firing in individual cells. 
92 These experiences may include any form of movement, e.g. walking, falling, jumping etc. 
93 Selective attention in visual perception is deemed the most elementary manifestation of consciousness 
(Kandel et al., 2013:18) 
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functions within this integrated representation” (2013:389) 
With this example of self-conscious action in mind, it is highly likely, that, just as spatial 
experience can take on many different forms, there may be more than one form of 
consciousness, each with its own distinct neural representation. This statement alludes to the 
distinction between primary (core) consciousness, and higher-order (extended) consciousness 
(Kandel et al., 2013:389).  
- Primary consciousness is explained as and awareness of objects in the world and the 
ability to formulate mental images of them. This form of consciousness are shared 
between all relatives of the primate family and even some other vertebrate animals. 
- Higher-order consciousness, contrary to primary consciousness, involves being conscious 
of being conscious. It is a form of consciousness that is uniquely human and facilitates the 
formulation of a conceptual understanding of past and future. This ability allows one to 
think on the consequences of one’s action and feelings. 
In light of this, Francis Crick and Christof Koch (cf. Crick & Koch, 1990) attempted to develop a 
coherent reductionist approach to consciousness studies. They began with Freud’s contention 
that most mental functions are unconsciously conducted. Freud posited that our unconscious 
mental life cannot be deemed a single process, but comprises of three separate components: 
implicit, dynamic and preconscious unconscious94 (Kandel et al., 2013:383). The implication of 
this argument was a bottom-up view of moving from neural action to conscious action.95 
Although contributing to a reductionist view of the conscious self, it does pose a problem for the 
                                            
94 The implicit unconscious includes the type of memory responsible for perceptual learning as well as 
learning motor skills. The dynamic unconscious is the type of mental activity that involves repressed 
thoughts, sexual and aggressive urges as well as conflict. The preconscious unconscious is the most readily 
available part of the unconscious, with regards to the conscious mind, and is primarily concerned with 
planning and organizing immediate actions. 
95 For an argument from higher-order (complex) causation, please see Thompson & Varela 2001. 
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concept of free will and what the nature of free will would be on these terms (cf. Tibor, 2011:153). 
Conclusion 
Although a multitude of important elements of this specific model have not been described due 
to the constraints of the scope of this study – e.g. how the brain produces language, thought, 
affect and learning, how behaviour emerges during the development of the brain, the influences 
of and implications for other research fields etc. – it is this researcher’s contention that the 
primacy of neural action in behaviour and consciousness can be deemed the fundamental 
principle thereof. In light of this study, this fact categorizes the model with what has been 
described in chapters three and four as the reductionist and positivist views respectively. This 
will be taken into consideration under section 5.6. 
5.5. Towards a Contemporary Understanding of the Foundational Principles of 
Reformed Theology 
Bultmann (1973:9f) describes theology as a “perennial human task.” He calls the human person 
a “theologizing animal”, in that one tries to rationalize all the facets of experience that point to a 
meaning beyond the visible and material reality. For this reason it is of paramount importance to 
include a discussion of theology in this study, especially when contemplating the nature of 
humanity’s relation to itself and the reality of which the human person is a part of. 
The choice of using a reformed theological model within this study is grounded on the basis of 
the very unique context within which reformed theology is done, and a reformed Christian 
religion is experienced. Heyns and Jonker (1974:242) distinguish reformed theology from Roman 
Catholic (RC) theology on the basis of their respective understandings about how one receives 
salvation/justification. The RC church profess salvation, in essence, to be dependent on the 
believer’s works - whether participation in the seven sacraments or charity (cf. Meiring, 
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1973:69).96 97 The reformed tradition declares a person to be sanctified through faith and by the 
grace of God alone (cf. McGrath, 2011:358ff).98 
On these grounds it is clear that the distinction between the two traditions rest upon their 
respective views of how Scripture informs theological thought – most notably, the doctrine of 
justification. Heyns and Jonker (1974:242-248) summarize the different views as follows: 
- Within the RC tradition the Scripture is viewed as the infallible source of teachings about 
the faith. The Scripture takes an inferior stance behind the primacy of the tradition 
however, as it merely enforces the certainty about the salvific nature of the sacraments 
(Heyns and Jonker, p. 242). Faith, as the belief in the infallibility of the Scripture, plays the 
role of preparing the believer for the salvation that is acquired through partaking of the 
sacraments and/or doing charity (cf. Dulles, 2011:98). In terms of its theology, the RC 
church endeavours to rationalize their beliefs through mental activity, which inevitably 
leads to metaphysical and speculative reasoning (This can be attributed to the 
Augustinian, Thomistic and Neo-scholastic approaches being the most influential 
                                            
96 This entails the baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, penance, anointing of the sick, matrimony and holy 
orders. McGrath explains that the sacraments are seen as superficial signs of the invisible grace of God 
(2011:365).  
97 The RC church does affirm that no one can be justified without faith (cf. Dulles, 2011:96), but “to 
affirm the necessity of faith is not to affirm its sufficiency” (Dulles, 2011:98) – the RC doctrine of 
justification has a very strong connection with James’ teaching, that faith without works is dead faith 
(James 2:17), and Paul stating that only through the works of love, can faith avail salvation (Galatians 
5:6). 
98 The researcher is aware that there has been conversation and development on an ecumenical level 
between the RC church and the reformed churches since Heyns and Jonker’s work regarding justification, 
most notably the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (1999). However, it is evident that an 
accord has not yet been struck and that protestant theologians are still finding troubling ambiguities in 
the RC position (cf. Eilers & Strobel, 2014:98). 
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traditions withing RC theology [cf. Fiorenza, 2011:6]). Thus the theologian is the person 
that spends his time contemplating theological questions, that seeks to know and analyse 
in order to build a comprehensive thought-system (Heyns and Jonker, p. 244).99 
- The reformed tradition, in contrast, 100 proclaims that belief in the truth of the scriptural101 
account of salvation is the sole premise of the doctrine of salvation (Heyns and Jonker, p. 
242). Hence, the scriptural account of salvation becomes something entirely existential, 
as opposed to an objective description of how salvation is to be acquired (Heyns and 
Jonker, p. 243). 102 God, and not the church, gives salvation on account of God’s mercy and 
not the actions of the believer. On these grounds, the reformed church “wants to be a 
church of the Word”, for people who want to listen to God’s Word and whom finds their 
sanctity within it. In terms of its theology, the reformed tradition endeavours to preach 
the Word responsibly (cf. Helm, 2014:1). Thus, theology has a hermeneutic function (cf. 
Van Huyssteen, 1988b:214). The primary goal of theology is to ask the question of how 
we may gain knowledge about God, ourselves and our relationship with God. For this 
there will never be a static answer, on the contrary, it will remain a process of constant 
                                            
99 Naturally this can be seen as one perspective that would most certainly merit some challenges. The 
researcher is however merely delineating Heyns and Jonker’s argument, as it contributes to the rest of 
the study. 
100 Helm posits that there are those who, from the perspective of reformed orthodoxy, would term the 
classical view of the reformed tradition as “catholic protestantism” (2014:1). The reason lies therein that 
basic strands of theological thought could be detected throughout these two traditions. Hence, to pit 
reformed theology over and against RC theology cannot be viewed as an absolute contrast. 
101 Sproul  posits that reformed theology is systematic, in that it tries to understand doctrine in a unified 
and coherent manner. It does not seek to impose a particular philosophical system on the Bible, but to 
discover and define a system that is taught by the Scriptures themselves (1997:23). 
102 This is because salvation is believed to be received by personal faith alone, and is seen as the 
restoration of a relationship as opposed to the healing of a “sin-sick soul” (Eilers & Strobel, 2014:97). 
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engagement. In light of this, it is argued that theology loses sight of itself when it wants 
to engage in metaphysical and speculative reasoning. 
One of the core tenets of the reformed tradition that is the concept of ecclesia semper 
reformanda est (the church is always to be reformed) (cf. Mahlmann, 2010:382). This stems from 
the responsibility of theology to speak into the concrete lives of people. Wentzel van Huyssteen 
(1998b:214) acknowledges “the epistemically crucial role of interpreted experience, and the way 
that tradition shapes the values that inform our reflection about God and what some of us believe 
to be God's presence in the world.” For these reasons this researcher believes that an 
engagement with neurotheolgy – as another field that seeks to gain knowledge about humans 
and their relationship to ultimate reality – will be particularly meaningful if it is done from a 
reformed theological perspective. 
5.5.1. Defining the task of Reformed Theology 
We speak about God “non ut diceretur sed ne taceretur” (not in order to define but because it is 
not possible just to say nothing) – Augustine (in Bultmann, 1973:10) 
Migliore (2004:1) explains that there are a considerable number of different views about the the 
task of theology. Some contend that its task is to clearly describe Christian doctrine (cf. Erickson, 
2013:8), while others are of the mind that it should translate the Christian faith into intelligible 
terms for the wider culture (cf. Davaney, 2014:26). For others it just provides a certain 
perspective for thinking about important issues. Lastly there are still others who contend that 
theology should be a reflection on practicing the Christian faith within oppressed communities 
(cf Fiorenza & Galvin, 2011:323).103 
What is evident in all of these views, Migliore finds, is the fact that faith and inquiry are 
inseparable when thinking about the task of theology. In the same vein Anselm of Canterbury 
                                            
103 Fiorenza distinguishes between the academic task of theology – to be historically accurate, 
conceptually rigorous, systematically consistent and interpretively clear – and the task in relation to 
providing guidance for faith (2011:3). 
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said that theology can be described as fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding). 
Lesslie Newbigin (1995:4) articulates his endorsement of this view in stating that faith in the 
incarnation of Christ – the unification of spirit and flesh – should enable the theologian to engage 
the world he/she lives in theologically. God became human and therefore created a lasting bond 
between our reality and God’s. Thus, faith can be seen as a way to knowledge – of God and 
oneself – through interaction with God’s world. Thus, faith is not the end of knowledge in itself.104 
This is in accordance with what Heyns and Jonker (1974:128) regard as the starting point of 
theology, namely, knowledge of God. 105 Knowledge of God is attained not only by asking the 
‘what’ questions (e.g., what is God’s relation to God? A Trinitarian relationship), but also the 
‘how’ (or why) questions (e.g., how is God understood as three persons).  
The point this researcher is making, is that the reformed theological tradition encourages 
theologians to ask the difficult questions and not to ‘cop out’ by giving easy answers. It implores 
them to engage with other fields of knowledge for the possibility of more informed engagement 
with reality. It consequently admonishes a foundationalist or nonfoundationalist106 stance 
toward the faith as an easy way out of dealing with concrete reality, as it becomes clear the reality 
can be described and spoken of by more than one worldview. 
In light of the above, a reformed approach to theology can best be described as the critical 
justification of faith (Van Huyssteen, 1989b). It seems that Migliore (2004:2) would agree with 
this description of theology in stating that “theology is not mere repetition of traditional 
                                            
104 This is an important statement due to the personal and experiential elements inherent in how faith is 
received and expressed. Faith is not contained in abstract thought and dogma, but in a lived experience. 
105 They state that the starting point for gaining knowledge of God is the Bible (Heyns and Jonker 
(1974:128). 
106 Van Huyssteen (1998a:214) describes foundationalism as the classical objectivist view of theology, and 
nonfoundationalism as the opposite side of this coin in that each theology relies solely on its own 
confessional uniqueness (in other words, contextual objectivist theology). 
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doctrines but a persistent search for the truth to which they point and which they only partially 
and brokenly express. As continuing inquiry, the spirit of theology is interrogative rather that 
doctrinaire; it presupposes a readiness to question and to be questioned.” A theological view 
such as this needs to inform how the Biblical text – as the primary source of knowledge about 
God and one’s relationship with God – should be read and understood by theologians. A 
secondary element that needs to be implicated by this view of theology is how extra-Biblical truth 
– about God and one’s relationship with God – is sought.107  
5.5.2. Theology as the critical justification of faith 
"Somewhere between the modern and the postmodern, a safe place exists—a place ... where 
reason rules but does not tyrannize, where we enjoy the temperate gains of the postmodern 
without suffering its extremes” – (Joseph Bottum, in Van Huyssteen, 1998b:213) 
Van Huyssteen deduces that, for theologians to account for their faith critically, they must be 
prepared to reflect on their own processes of thought. This, he argues, burdens them with the 
fundamental task of relating the essential nature of their faith to the question of the very nature 
of rationality (1989b:xii). This task relates to the system of rational reflection as delineated by 
contemporary philosophy of science. Van Huyssteen (1989b:186) correspondingly describes this 
task as a balancing act for the theologian, between the vital truths of the Christian tradition on 
the one hand – which are derived from the central Biblical message108 -- and what he calls “the 
complex but ineluctable challenge of contemporary thought and problem-consciousness,” on the 
                                            
107 ‘Truth’, in this sense, is taken to denote ‘complete knowledge’ of God and one’s relationship towards 
God. Knowledge, however, is not gained by mental activity alone; song, confession, rejoicing, suffering, 
prayer and action are all contributors to this knowledge (in summary, as noted previously, knowledge is 
gained by a lived experience). Migliore (2004:7) points out that this is because the understanding that is 
sought by faith, is wisdom that illuminates life and practice, and not speculative knowledge.   
108 The message, as Van Huyssteen describes it, of God’s saving grace through the crucifixion of His Son, 
Jesus of Nazareth (1989b:186) 
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other. In other words, the task of theology is to find a relation between the truths mediated 
through tradition, and the concrete context of the theologian. 
This task challenges the theologian, that seeks to give a critical account his/her faith, with the 
query whether rationality can regain a place in theology.109 When questions of rationality reclaim 
a foothold in theological reflection, they are specifically aimed at the foundation of theology – 
i.e. what are the principles and theories that underline the foundations of a theological model? 
– and thus extremely important for interdisciplinary discourse. These questions, Van Huyssteen  
states, are in effect asking about methodology (1982:43). This consequently implicates the object 
of study and, as a consequence, the justification of theological claims as well. In other words, 
how do we go about gaining knowledge of God, through God’s revelation, as the object of 
theological reflection? 
On these grounds we beg the question: can all of these elements be integrated into a system that 
will hold its own against the contemporary philosophy of science? Van Huyssteen (1982:45) gives 
a description of the minimum requirements for a rational and critical theological model, as put 
forth by the report of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Netherlands (Velema, 1981) about the 
nature and authority of the Bible: 
In theology, Christians (subject) endeavour, in the scientific investigation (method) of God’s 
revelation (object), to make responsible claims about God and the world (truth), in service of the 
church and community (function). 
Drawing from some of Van Huyssteen’s writings, criteria for the subject, method and object 
constituents of the minimum requirements stated above can be made: 
                                            
109 Heiko Schulz proposes that religious belief can be, what he terms, “epistemically successful” and thus 
justified rationally in a pragmatic sense. He describes his criteria for religious beliefs to be epistemically 
successful as: “whenever and to the extent that they [religious beliefs] express and are rooted in certain 
experiences to be spelled out as an ‘acute spiritual crisis’” (2013:281).  
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- The subject of theology 
Van Huyssteen (1982:52) points out that the believer, as the subject of theology, should reflect 
in the capacity of standing in relation to both the church and the scientific enterprise. This entails 
that the theologian should conduct his/her science freely, while still speaking the language of 
faith, in harmony with a credible and responsible conception of the authority of the Bible. He 
cautions theologians in this respect to be weary of their a priori commitment to God’s revelation, 
and in using it as a rational pretext for developing the theological models irrationally on 
unexamined premises (1989b:188). The reason for this is that it can be devastating to the 
credibility of the theologian and may lead to him/her taking refuge in an esoteric epistemology 
(nonfoundationalist theology)110 as a means of immunization against criticism. The possibility for 
the theologian to retain his/her identification with a theological tradition, as well as being able 
to preserve intellectual integrity, can be produced by accounting for this inherent subjectivity 
within his/her theorising honestly and responsibly (1982:54). 
- The method of theology 
“As a science, theology is under the obligation to share its method with other scientific fields; its 
theories should, as a result, be subject to practical findings.” 
This statement is taken from the report “God with us” (Velema, 1981, in Van Huyssteen, 
1982:55). Van Huyssteen remarks that, if this should be taken as the essential character of 
theology, we run the risk of reducing it to “Scripture-positivism”, and its task solely to exegesis. 
He is of the opinion that the scientific quality of theological designs entail much more than just 
method. Likewise, the method of theology is deemed much more than just explicating 
                                            
110 This is often the easy option in a post-modernistic climate. Van Huyssteen (2007) responded to this in 
arguing that hermeneutics (or, epistemic reflection [cf. Van Huyssteen, 1998b:214]) will always need 
epistemology to guide it and give it credibility. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
Scripture.111 This, says Van Huyssteen, consequently undermines the understanding that science 
similarly has a relational quality to it (1982:55). Because of this inherent quality, to strive toward 
a unification-ideal within the spectrum of al sciences will do an injustice to the distinctiveness of 
theology’s rational progress. However, Van Huyssteen argues, to appeal to the object of its study 
in order to retain methodological distinctiveness, theology could potentially run the risk of being 
accused of immunizing itself against answering the difficult life questions (1982:56). In this 
respect the philosophical scientific reflection could contribute to theology in terms of 
understanding its sphere of influence. Furthermore, it can lend its support so that theology may 
determine if its claims can be deemed plausible in terms of describing reality, thus answering the 
question if it qualifies as a hypothesis. The nature and language of theological statements plays 
a crucial role in this respect, because of the theory- and value-ladenness thereof112 (Van 
Huyssteen, 1989b:128).  
- The object of theology 
God’s revelation, as the object of the theological endeavour, is contained foremost within the 
Bible (special revelation), but God’s immanence within reality (general revelation) plays an 
equally crucial role in theological reflection (Van Huyssteen, 1982:57). This statement raised a 
problem in the sense that there has been a great deal of controversy among theologians 
                                            
111 The theological method propagated by theologians such as Rudolph Bultmann, Paul Tillich, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Karl Rahner and Wolfhard Pannenberg, among others, can be characterized as a “careful 
articulation of theoretical issues arising from contemporary experience” (Pilario, :266). These issues 
would then be correlated with Christian revelation. This method is similar to that of Van Huyssteen 
mentioned above. 
112 Van Huyssteen explains this statement by arguing that all Christian statements about God are 
predicated on experience and the multidimensional framework within which these experiences are 
interpreted (1989b:129). This alludes to the metaphorical nature of religious statements and why a critical 
engagement with the Scripture and tradition is of such cardinal interest. See Van Huyssteen (1989b:137) 
for a comprehensive explanation of the nature and function of theological metaphor. 
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throughout history about the nature of this revelation. How God’s revelation is perceived 
implicates the manner in which it is taken to be the starting point of theological reflection, 
especially from the vantage point of the sola scriptura (Scripture alone) of the reformation.113 
The proposal Van Huyssteen makes in this respect is to view the Bible as “a book of faith with a 
radical religious dimension” (1989b:177).114 As such it is a wide-ranging and complex text that 
provides written evidence, in religious and metaphoric language, of how believers perceived God 
in a relational manner. In this respect, Van Huyssteen cautions that “a positive religious 
encounter with revelation provides no alternative to subjectivism in theology” (1989:189). Thus, 
the task of the theologian, pertaining to the object of theology, is to attempt to convey the 
essential message of the Bible with a responsible hermeneutical form of scriptural appeal 
(1989:189). This is done in order to illuminate the deepest intention of the text, so that it will be 
able to direct any contextual religious experience (cf. Van Huyssteen, 1989:180). The reason for 
such precautions rests with the knowledge that the authority of the Scriptures are not received 
unproblematically. The theologian’s interpretation of the Scripture and consequent doctrine 
problematizes its authority and can therefore not be handled uncritically, otherwise theological 
language would diminish into a purely expressive language. The final outcome of such uncritical 
reflection would see theology being reduced to nothing but another form of social ideology (cf. 
Van Huyssteen, 1989b:189). 
In seeking to answer the question of its identity, reformed theology is not obligated to prefer 
                                            
113 A fine balance exists between considering the Bible to be the Holy Word of God and just a collection of 
recorded human experiences of God. Thus, the authority of the Bible comes into question when 
considering the revelatory nature thereof. 
114 From an entirely different perspective, Van Huyssteen, in his article Narrative theology: An adequate 
paradigm for theological reflection? (1989a), asks the question of what the epistemological status of 
theological statements can be, when it is based on a fundamentally narrative, and thus metaphorical, 
discourse? How is truth claims assessed in this respect, and what is the hermeneutical criteria from which 
good and bad receptions of Christian texts can be distinguished? 
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theoretical thought to religious experience, as a way to stake a claim regarding rationality. Van 
Huyssteen  posits that the Christian faith itself – how it is experienced and conceptualised – offers 
grounds for a critical realist reflection and, as such, for rational reflection. He writes that our faith 
in Jesus might be articulated in statements of faith, but that it is committed to “a network of 
argumentative constructs” (1989b:189). This, he says, is a critical justification of faith and, for this 
researcher, means the very essence of reformed theology. 
5.5.3. Summary of the criteria for a critical realist theology 
Van Huyssteen (1982:45) summarizes his minimum requirements for a credible theological 
design as follows: 
1. The theology must be utterly contextual with regards to the problem consciousness of its 
time, and thus be able to describe a) the problem and b) its origin systematically. 
2. Theology must always be critical theology and as such has a responsibility to justify its 
faith. 
3. The theology – as critical theology – must establish a responsible scientific design: a 
design that serves as a guide to understand God’s revelation for our time. 
5.6. How does Newberg’s neurotheology relate to cognitive neuroscience and reformed 
theology. 
To streamline this section of the study – especially taking into account the vast amount of 
different elements that need to be brought into conversation – the researcher will endeavour to 
create operational definitions for cognitive neuroscience, and neurotheolgy – using only the most 
relevant elements – in the form of the minimum requirements described in the previous section: 
Cognitive Neuroscience: 
In cognitive neuroscience, Neuroscientists (subject) endeavour, in the scientific investigation 
(method) of the human brain and mind (object), to make responsible claims about the origin and 
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nature of human consciousness and behaviour (truth), in order to better the human condition 
(function). 
Neurotheology: 
In neurotheology, neurotheologians (subject) endeavour, in the scientific investigation (method) 
of the human brain and mind (object), to make responsible claims about the nature of religious, 
mystical and spiritual experiences (truth), in order to better the human condition (function). 
Reformed Theology: 
In reformed theology, Christians (subject) endeavour, in the scientific investigation (method) of 
God’s revelation (object), to make responsible claims about God and the world (truth), in service 
of the church and community (function). 
5.6.1. Categorizing cognitive neuroscience and reformed theology 
In chapter three we delineated the four perspectives of Brandt (2010), in terms of how 
proponents of science and theology view neuroscience, i.e. reductionist, religionist, apologetic 
and integrative. The argument was made that proponents such as Newberg, fits into both the 
religionist and integrative views, albeit in a somewhat nuanced fashion. In terms of the cognitive 
neuroscientific model described under section 5.4 above, it would be safe to allocate its 
proponents to the reductionist view. The reformed theological model described in section 5.5 
above is a little harder to place. It is not entirely satisfied with the natural theology of the 
apologetic view, although it cannot let neuroscience completely reform its fundamental core as 
is the main trait of the integrative view. Thus, it would be best preserved and articulated in terms 
of a nuanced position between apologetic and integrative. 
In chapter four we delineated the four basic paradigms of inquiry, i.e. positivist, postpositivist, 
critical theory and the constructivist/pragmatic paradigm. Neurotheology, as Newberg describes 
it, was found  as unequivocally  constructivist/pragmatic. In terms of how the cognitive 
neuroscientific model was described, it should most certainly be placed within the postpositivistic 
paradigm. The reformed theological model, again, is somewhat difficult to place on account of 
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its position on the revelation of God. It cannot stand for a fully fledged subjectivist view of reality 
since some objectivity does remain. Although, because of the inherent element of experience in 
speaking about God, it could be placed within the range of the epistemologies of critical theory 
and constructivism. Ontologically it could be fairly easily placed in either the postpositivist or 
critical paradigm, on account of its belief in a real reality, but simultaneously a nascent reality. 
Methodologically, because of its contextual, relational and scientific character, it takes from all 
the different paradigms: dialogue, dialectic, hermeneutics and experimental. With this in mind, 
and for want of a placement, reformed theology would fit into a nuanced critical theory 
paradigm, as it is not intrinsically pragmatic or positivistic.  
At the beginning of this chapter we delineated four different views on the possible interaction 
between science and religion. Neurotheology has been placed in a nuanced position between 
dialogue and integration. It is somewhat difficult to place the cognitive neuroscientific model, as 
it is indeed possible that different proponents of the same field may take up different views 
toward this subject. A further variable to consider when making a choice from a scientific 
perspective is the specific theology in question. When all is taken into account, and the specific 
theology is the reformed theology as described above, at worst an independent view could be 
assumed. It is this researcher’s contention that, if cognitive neuroscience is practiced responsibly, 
no less that a dialogical interaction may be accepted – especially when taking the limit questions 
and methodological parallels into account. The reformed theology could also be placed within 
this dialogical scope, but an argument can be made for elements of the integration model’s 
natural theology, theology of nature and systematic synthesis inherent therein. As a result it 
would also be placed in between both models. 
5.6.2. To what extent can Reformed theology and cognitive neuroscience relate to 
Newberg’s Neurotheology? 
Personhood cannot  be explained in isolation; nor can the phenomenon of mind and 
consciousness. – (Du Toit, 2007:293) 
As neutral as Newberg would like to be – as a pragmatist/constructivist and as an integrationist 
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– it is just not possible to effectively integrate two paradigmatically unique fields into a cohesive 
whole without fundamentally altering or mutilating one or both of them. The origingal question 
has been: what would neurotheology have to prove in order to illicit a paradigm-shift for either 
neuroscience, theology or both? This is exactly the point. A paradigm-shift, as discussed in 
chapter one (p. 1), alters the fundamental beliefs of its proponents’ worldview, due to the 
amalgamation of anomalies within its current system until no amount of ad hoc theories could 
support its legitimacy any more.  This is not yet the case for either the positivist cognitive 
neuroscience or critical reformed theology. 
As a reformed theologian, the first problem this researcher has with the study of RMS 
experiences, that endeavours to assign a specific direction to the causal arrow, is based on the 
message of Hebrews 11:1 “Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things 
not seen.”115 The Christian faith is predicated on belief in the mystery of God. God is not a mental 
construct, nor is faith born of knowledge, 116 but it is a gift from God and a relationship with 
God.117 This is the starting point of the reformed theologian’s interaction with neurotheolgy. It 
also sets the parameters for further interaction. 
A second concern theologians have with neurotheology, is its understanding of theology itself. 
Jeftic (2013:274) argues that although there can only be one neurology,118 by no means can there 
be only one theology. Newberg’s aspirations toward a meta- and megatheology seeks to unite all 
                                            
115 New Revised Standard Version, 1996 . 
116 Newbigin argues that faith is a way to knowledge, through a relationship with Jesus Christ – it is not an 
objective source of knowledge (1995:1ff). 
117 Lane comments on Hebrews 11:1 and the consequent verses by drawing our attention to this 
declaration of faith as “the quintessence of all that the writer wished to affirm about the intensity and 
capacity of faith through a catalogue of attested witnesses” (1998:328). Hence, faith is confessional by 
nature and springs from a very direct and personal encounter with the living God (1998:329). 
118 He uses the example that there is no Islamic neurology or Buddhist neurology, just neurology. 
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religions and theologies in one seamless model. Within this model all differences and 
contradictions are explained away as the products of different operators within the brain and 
mind that need not distinguish or exclude them from each other.119 However, Jeftic (2013:274) 
asks, how can the statements “Christ is God” and “Christ is not God” be deemed an illusory 
difference? Thus he concludes that, just as there are no universal theology, there should be no 
universal neurotheology.  
Thus, neurotheology would be better suited as either 1) a component of theology, or 2) a 
component of neuroscience.120 In the first instance, neurotheology would be the mouthpiece of 
theology121 when dealing with the neurosciences, without attempting to construe a universal 
theology in order to become acceptable to all of them. In the second instance neurotheology, 
although still a misleading term in terms of its understanding of theology, will concern  itself with 
the neurological aspects of RMS phenomena. The findings may even prove beneficial to both 
theology and neuroscience. 
The focus on religious experience is the next problem to consider. Jeftic argues that Newberg 
deems a concrete neurological experience as the centre of any RMS phenomenon, i.e. prayer, 
doctrine, meditation etc. (2013:275). As has been noted in the critique in chapter three, it is 
impossible to consider RMS experience as a category of neurological experience. Likewise it is 
impossible to explain religion in its totality by means of neurological processes. Thus, 
neurotheological hermeneutics is problematic on the account that the perception of RMS 
                                            
119 Neuotheology might be beter suited in giving direction as to how different doctrines may coexist, as 
opposed to forcing them together on account of their exclusivity being a mental illusion (cf. Jeftic, 
2013:274). 
120 One specific reason for the neurosciences to reject being amalgamated by neurotheolgy is voiced as 
follows: “the purpose of science is not to fulfil people’s religious needs but to gain knowledge about the 
universe and to build the great edifice of empirical knowledge” (Capra et al., 1992:39) 
121 Each theology would have its own neurotheological counterpart, not a universal one. 
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experiences is taken as  its central point. Theory, derived from experience opens the field up to 
free speculation (cf. Jeftic, 2013:275). As has described in chapter two, Newberg bases his 
theories off of the functioning of the nine cognitive operators – these operators may function in 
a dominant or absolute fashion. Jeftic (2013:275) comments on this by stating: “…the most 
complex theories are reduced to the results of domination of a specific cognitive function while 
this domination is reduced to a specific form of religious-intellectual experience (the flash of 
insight).” When factoring in the influence subjectivity and emotion may have in both the inquirer 
and the  experience of the subject of the inquiry, this way of producing theories is indeed 
anomalous. 
Lastly, this researcher agrees with Jeftic (2013:275) that Newberg’s persistence in arguing for an 
integration of neuroscience and theology is one of his endeavour’s biggest inadequacies. Such a 
reckless integration would be detrimental to science and theology both, in that it burdens science 
with the abstract nature of theological reflection, and likewise burdening theology with a 
research model where its claims have to be subject to experimental falsifiability.122 The extent of 
this scenario – theology bound to the scientific paradigm – would mean that theology must 
reinvent its core principles every time a paradigm-shift occurs. 
In light of the above, it seems that the only way Newberg’s neurotheology might be deemed 
acceptable by its constituent parts is by adhering to the following criteria: 
1. By operating exclusively within the framework of theology or science by informing its 
theory and practice, rather than transforming it.  
2. By accepting that the neurological experience present in RMS phenomena may be unique, 
but it is not universal. Thus, accepting the unacceptability of a meta or megatheology. 
3. By accepting that not all RMS phenomena can be explained through the prism of 
                                            
122 Jeftic (2013:276) gives an extreme example, where the grace of the Holy Spirit will have to be subject 
to measurement by a PET scan for prayer to be a viable practice. 
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experience. This is doing an injustice to the proponents view of the complexity of RMS 
phenomena. 
4. Finally, that it rather endeavours to facilitate a dialogue between its scientific and 
religious counterparts, with the intent of fostering mutual reconsideration. 
It is this researcher’s contention, in accordance with that of Jeftic (2013:276), that if 
neurotheology can be beholden to these criteria, it might prove to be of considerable use to the 
neuroscientific and theological enterprises. 
5.7. Conclusion 
In the beginning of this chapter some remarks were made regarding the title questions of this 
study, i.e. what scientific and who's theological understanding is Newberg referring to when 
using the term ‘neurotheology’? It has been shown that he perpetuates the relevancy of his 
model for neurotheology on the argument that it has value for the respective research fields of 
both neuroscience and theology. Furthermore he posits that it could also facilitate an integration 
between the two fields. In this chapter it was the aim of the researcher to evaluate the possibility 
of both these contentions of Newberg’s neurotheology – first on the grounds of its integrational 
prospects, and second in terms of how it could relates to neuroscience and theology. Thus it was 
necessary to articulate Newberg’s unique use and understanding of science and theology in an 
interactive capacity, as well as arguing the merits of two contemporary models for neuroscience 
and theology, respectively, with which to evaluate Newberg’s model. 
It was shown that his model’s facilitation of interaction between science and religion could best 
be described as dialogical-integrative. Dialogical on the account that it does not presume to be 
able to answer the boundary questions by using the scientific method, thus admitting that 
theology has an authentic contribution to make to science. It is also integrational on the account 
that, as Barbour described a theology of nature, it takes both science and religion seriously, 
although Newberg believes that science should inform theology on a fundamental level.  
This chapter discussed some of the foundational principles of a contemporary neuroscience and 
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theology as well:  
The main focus of neuroscience is on its study and understanding of how the brain is related to 
behaviour and consciousness. It was shown that a strong reductionist approach is in effect, where 
all behaviour is linked to the actions of neurons and neuronal systems, and that consciousness 
has an emergent function driven by a movement from the unconscious apprehension of reality 
onward to full consciousness. In both these cases a bottom-up approach is posited. 
The main focus of the theology expounded upon was summarized by three criteria: theology 
should always be contextual, should always justify its faith responsibly and it should endeavour 
to establish a scientific design that serves as a guide to understand God’s revelation for our time. 
The a priori assumption of this theology is the reality of God’s existence and the fact that God 
reveals God’s will to us in our concrete existence. 
In light of these descriptions of neuroscience and theology, it was suggested that Newberg’s 
neurotheology, in its currant form, will only be able to act as a counterpart/informant to either 
neuroscience or theology. Hence it will not be able to facilitate an integration without seriously 
damaging the unique task, beliefs and other characteristics of both fields. 
Looking toward the next chapter it is now possible to conclude this study and engage the research 
questions the researcher set out to answer. 
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Chapter 6 – General Conclusion 
“If theology is critical reflection on the life and t hought of the religious community, the 
context of theology is always the worshipping community. Religious experience, story, 
and ritual are the starting points for articulating doctrines and beliefs.” – Barbour 
(1997:328) 
The Redeeming God is the starting point of the biblical tradition. Through confrontation and 
solidarity with historical events the Christian community has found rejuvenation and wholeness. 
Here people have come to know the release from guilt, insecurity, anxiety and despair. They have 
experienced the power of reconciliation, as it pertains to estrangement within their worldly 
relationships, as well as their relationship with God. This paved the way for an understanding of 
repentance and forgiveness, facilitating the possibility of a new self-understanding, leading to 
the development of a capacity for love – radically leading them away from self-centredness. This 
can only be the content of confession (it cannot be tested clinically), that through Christ 
something has happened in their lives that opens up new existential possibilities. This is the 
power of the “new creation” in Christ; He is the image of the fullness of the created order, as well 
as the manifestation of creation in continuance. Through Christ, God is encountered in a concrete 
fashion throughout history – in creative personal and societal renewal, and by redeeming grace. 
However, the argument has been made that, although theology starts from Biblical/historical 
revelation and personal experience (section 5.2 and 5.5.2), it cannot stand outside of the natural 
order. Nature remains the stage for God’s redemptive action – thus there is a continuity between 
nature and grace (cf. Barbour, 1997:329), between speaking about nature (impersonal) and 
speaking about God (personal). The Bible indeed declares that God is the Lord over all of creation 
– thus God is both creator and redeemer. God is the transcendent, determining, self-limiting, 
immanent, creative participant in the cosmic narrative (Barbour, 1997:329ff). All of this populates 
the hermeneutic lens through which Christians perceive reality in one way or another. 
It was with all this in mind that the researcher sought to contribute by engaging Andrew Newberg 
and his neurotheology. As a reformed theologian that is aware of the intensely personal nature 
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of religion, the dangers of dealing with religion by making statements in an uncritical or 
unnuanced fashion seemed evident. The scientific study of RMS experiences – which is believed 
by their subjects to have a transcendent nature to some extent – stands the chance to draw 
misguided inferences from the results. 
Thus, it was necessary to lay bare the scientific and theological assumptions that drives 
Newberg’s neurotheological project and give rise to his neurotheological statements – the 
question this study asks is: with what science and who’s theology is Newberg making statements, 
and to what extent (if any) do these statements influence science and theology? By 
accomplishing this, it could serve as a framework for scientific and theological communities when 
entering into conversation with Newberg. This study has sought to facilitate such a conversation 
between cognitive neuroscience and critical reformed theology, using this framework. Below is 
an outline of how this was done: 
Chapter one introduced the study, pointing out the problem explained above, identifying the 
research questions and the research methodology that would shape the study in the successive 
chapters. 
In chapter two a comprehensive, though not exhaustive, description of Newberg’s neurotheology 
was given. Special focus was placed specifically on the goals he has set for neurotheology, the 
underlying principles that drive him toward fulfilling these goals, as well the neurophysiological 
and –psychological structures and systems that Newberg constructs his principles from (section 
2.2-2.4). His position toward all of Ian Barbour’s four interaction models (section 2.3.1) with 
regard to the possible role neurotheology can fulfil within each has been explicated, as well as 
determining that the integration interaction model is his model of choice, though this remained 
to be critically engaged.  
Chapter three described the four possible positions that Pierre-Yves Brandt (2013) proposed  can 
be taken with regards to neurotheology, namely, reductionist, religionist, apologist and 
integrationist (section 3.2 and 3.3). Newberg was categorized as a religionist-integrationist with 
a few subtle nuances. Some of the main critiques of Newberg’s neurotheology within this chapter 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
120 
 
were explicated, and can be summarized as follows: his experientialism leaves the inquirer in 
epistemological isolation, his theory is deemed problematic on account of inductive reasoning, 
acceptable categories for the neurological experiences of RMS have not been sufficiently 
advocated and lastly, the neuroscientific methodology he uses is at best somewhat problematic 
for the types of inferences he draws from them. 
In chapter four the basic paradigms of inquiry – positivism, postpositivism, critical theory and 
constructivism – were described (section 4..2.1), as well as how these relate to qualitative and 
quantitative research. From this description, lines were drawn toward an understanding of 
mixed-method research, delineating al the possible shapes such research can assume. Newberg’s 
neurotheological project was placed within the constructivist paradigm (section 4.5), also known 
as pragmatism, and consequently deemed a mixed-method research paradigm. 
Chapter five laid out Ian Barbour’s description of four possible interaction models for science and 
theology, i.e. conflicting, independent, dialogical, integrational (section 5.2). As a result, 
Newberg’s neurotheology could be placed within this framework and evaluated. It was deemed 
as most representative of a nuanced collaboration between a dialogical and integrative 
approach. Cognitive neuroscience (section 5.4) and reformed theology (section 5.5) were 
similarly delineated in terms of an operational model. They were also categorized with regards 
to the different frameworks given in chapters three, four and five. Lastly a discussion was 
presented on the possible relation neurotheology could have toward neuroscience and theology, 
wherein criteria for possible fruitful interaction were given (section 5.6). 
6.1. Answering the research questions 
1. How, and to what extent, does cognitive neuroscience and critical reformed theology 
critique Andrew Newberg’s neurotheological model? 
Chapter three has taken the most direct approach with regards to critiquing Newberg’s model in 
this regard. However, considering all that has been said within this study, Newberg’s 
paradigmatic approach certainly foresees the most difficulties in being accepted ‘as is’ by both 
neuroscience or theology respectively. Neither neuroscience nor theology can condone a 
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relativist ontology or a subjectivist epistemology (cf. section 3.4 and 4.5). For neuroscience reality 
can be discovered for what it is to a certain extent, and for theology reality – especially when 
regarding God’s revelatory action (both special and general) – was made an important beacon 
for reflection through the incarnation of Christ.  
2. Within which paradigm of inquiry is Andrew Newberg constructing his model for a 
neurotheological integration of science and religion? Is it predominantly quantitative 
(neuroscientifically orientated), qualitative (theologically orientated), or a seamlessly 
integrated mixed-method? 
After due consideration of paradigm-theory, Newberg has been placed within the mixed-method 
paradigm (section 4.5). Although, it is not always the case that he gives equal amounts of 
consideration toward neuroscience and theology (quantitative and qualitative fields) – 
sometimes his research is qualitatively dominant and at other times quantitatively dominant. 
This is the result of his constructivist/pragmatic research tendencies, in which case it would be 
most fitting to assign him to a nuanced position within the mixed-method paradigm.  
3. To what extent can neuroscience and reformed theology engage with Neurotheology, 
without having to make a paradigm-shift? 
In terms of its paradigmatic underpinnings and interactional potential, neurotheology – as 
Andrew Newberg employs it – has been deemed an acceptable counterpart, working alongside 
either the neurosciences or theology, respectively, in a dialogical and informing capacity (section 
5.6.2). The provision, in this respect, is that some of its basic tenets and aspirations must be 
revised, on account of lacking credible justification and discrediting the fundamental 
characteristics of is constituent research fields.  
6.2. Limitations and further study 
The researcher is aware of the fact that the assumptions, proposals and answers articulated 
within this study are subject to his interpretive framework. Furthermore he does not claim to 
have taken every and all noteworthy authors or opinions into account, or even exhausted the 
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opinions of the cited authors. He does, however, propose to have been as objective and 
responsible as possible in dealing with the information presented, and to have offered a clear 
and credible engagement with the research problem by means of the research questions. 
For further study: 
In light of the four criteria given under section 5.6., some possibilities opens up for further study. 
If the proposal is adhered to – that neurotheology should operate exclusively within one of its 
constituent fields – the need arises for the establishment of possible relationship parameters of 
a theology-neurotheology, or neuroscience-neurotheology partnership. These parameters would 
have to facilitate the possibility of dialogue, with the intent of mutual reconsideration. This would 
challenge both scientists and theologians to broaden the scope of variables to be taken into 
account in their respective reflections. This should not only be done with regards to the technical 
discrepancies between these fields, but also to challenge Christians to revaluate the way they 
view humanity and how humanity is situated in the natural order – as psychosomatic beings, over 
and against the lingering Cartesian dualism. The realization of being a part of nature and 
concretely situated within the natural order may consequently inspire humanity to cultivate a 
greater ecological conscience. Furthermore, such a conscience might contribute in fostering 
altruistic behaviour among people, when they realise that we are part of nature in a collective 
fashion. Correspondingly, when the inherent value of creation can be grasped, it may foster a 
deeper respect and admiration for nature, and counter the desperate need some Christians have 
to be redeemed from this earth. 
With regards to the the problem of the causal arrow, as it pertains to RMS experiences – 
reformed theology pointing the causal arrow in the direction of Devine action and neuroscience 
pointing it in the direction of mental function – it would be interesting to see how the 
contemporary Christian views of how God interacts with the world, comments on the study of 
RMS experiences. Indeed, insights from other religious traditions could broaden the scope of 
such a study considerably. Contributions from authors such as Nancy Murphy, George Ellis, Keith 
Ward, Michael Heller etc., who contemplates the scientific possibilities for Devine action – in 
terms of quantum uncertainty (bottom-up), or inspiring events by wilfully interacting with 
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complex systems (top-down) – could contribute considerably to this discussion. As was discussed, 
some people – both scientists and theologians – are too adamant in their beliefs about causality. 
From the Christian side, gaps in scientific explanation would readily be filled with God’s action 
(God-of-the-gaps), but the opposite is also true, that anything but a scientific explanation is 
dismissed to fill the knowledge gaps (science-of-the-gaps).  
Lastly, attempts have been made recently to create a neuroscientific account of ethics – this is a 
product of the neuroscientific endeavour to create a unified theory of the brain. It is the 
contention of the researcher, however, that a responsible neurotheological approach to ethics – 
unifying ethical Scriptural principles with insights from neurobiology and neuropsychology – 
could benefit both theological en secular reflection regarding ethics.  
“Religion, whatever it is, is a man’s total reaction upon life, so why not say that any total 
reaction upon life is a religion? Total reactions are different from casual reactions, and 
total attitudes are different from usual or professional attitudes. To get at them you must 
go behind the foreground of existence and reach down to that curious sense of the whole 
residual cosmos as an everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable 
or odious, which in some degree every one possesses.” – (James, 1902/1936:35)  
It can be said that the theologian, neuroscientist and neurotheologian, all endeavour to express 
and articulate their total reaction upon life as best they can, with the methods at their disposal. 
The time for absolutist claims and unwavering faith in the truth of a singular worldview has 
been unmasked for the problematic nature of its naiveté. Thus, conversation between these 
unique total reactions is vital for a more contoured and textured understanding of the reality 
we are all a part of. 
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